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MPDBRN TH30RISS OF THB FALL OF MAN AND ORIGINAL 
SIN. 
An examination of modern theories, with a 
view to determining how f a r these witness (a) to 
the modification of the orthodox Christian 
doctrines i n the l i g h t of the general theory of 
evolution, and (b) to attempts to vindicate these 
doctrines i n the l i g h t of that theory, together 
with a restatement of the dootrines i n the l i g h t 
of the foregoing examination. 
Thesis submitted to the University of Durham for 
the degree of M . L i t t . 
L . WATSON. 
February, 1949 
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I , INTRODUCTION. 
1 . Pre-Darwinian Christian thought about man: 
Agreements and Disagreements. 
Before Wallace and Darwin presented to the world the 
results of t he i r researches there was a f a i r l y common idea 
amongst Christians about how man had been made. He had been 
created by God separately from the beasts. There was also a 
f a i r l y common idea amongst them as t o how he f i r s t sinned. 
He disobeyed what he knew quite clearly t o be a command from 
God, by yie lding to a temptation, the source of which lay 
outside himself. His yielding to the temptation was known as 
the f a l l of man. The source of the temptation was held t o be 
a wicked angel who had been oreated good by God, who had, 
however, rebelled through pride, had been expelled from heaven, 
and had spent his time thereafter i n seeking to seduoe humanity. 
There was, fur ther , a f a i r l y common idea about the results 
for mankind of this f a l l . Adam had been created o r ig ina l ly 
righteous. Man's nature was now d i f ferent • I t was spoiled, 
weakened, or oorrupted. Man was henceforth s i n f u l from b i r t h 
because of the nature witto which he was bom, and . th is s i n f u l -
ness was called original sin. 
There ware differences of opinion concerning both the 
or ig inal state of man before the f a l l and the e f f ec t s of the 
f a l l on his nature. Tb3 se opinions ranged, i n the case of 
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o r ig ina l righteousness from a conception of ch i l d - l i ke 
innocence to that of a god-like perfection, and i n the case of 
the effects of the f a l l , from the loss of a supernatural g i f t , 
and a weakening of nature, to a t o t a l corruption of nature. 
There ware differences, too, about the question of man's 
g u i l t and responsibility i n re la t ion to or iginal s i n , but, i n 
the main, these ideas about the creation of man, his o r ig ina l 
righteousness, his temptation by Satan, his yielding or f a l l , 
and the consequence known as original s in , are s t i l l so l id ly 
entrenched i n o f f i c i a l Christian doctrine. The main change 
has been i n regard to the method of oreation. The old idea of 
special creation has been largely dropped, and the idea of 
evolution widely accepted. 
2. Effects of the Theory of Evolution on Christian Thought. 
The sc ien t i f i c theory of evolution was bound to make a 
disturbing impact on these old. re l igious ideas. I t to ld 
another story than the Genesis one about how man f i r s t appeared. 
I n doing so, i t appeared to contradict any idea of his or ig ina l 
righteousness and to o f f e r a d i f ferent explanation of his 
proneness to s in, as well as to render unnecessary the thought 
of a personal d e v i l . Man's animal ancestry was the hard f ac t 
against which these old ideas had to struggle, and i t seemed 
d i f f i c u l t to reconcile f u l l y the new knowle dge with the old 
ideas about g u i l t and responsibi l i ty . Sin began to be seen 
by some i n a new l i g h t , and i t was not long before disturbing 
implications seemed to be a r i s ing i n respect of the doctrines 
of the Incarnation and the Atonement. 
I t i s not unl ikely that i t i s the sight of these f a r -
reaching consequences of s c i e n t i f i c disoovaries, that makes many 
Christians draw back from the task of thinking out as f u l l y as 
possible the relat ion between these ancient Christian ideas and 
the new knowledge about man's beginnings. 
The obligation to relate old dootrine to new knowledge i s 
too obvious t o be ei ther remarked or escaped, but i t i s 
especially incumbent upon any who claim that i n t he i r r e l i g ion 
they possess the f i n a l revelation of God's t r u th to the whole 
world.' Wherever i t remains impossible to reconcile an apparent 
oleavage between the two, there i s general loss. Outsiders 
harden i n antagonism, and insiders either weaken through doubt 
or harden i n arrogance. 
3. The chief passages of Scripture re la t ing to the doctrine 
of sin. 
The chief passages of Scripture re la t ing to the doctrine of 
sin are t o be found i n Genesis I I I and V I , i n Romans V, V I , V H , 
I Corinthians XV, 21, 22. I I Corinthians X I , 3, and i n 
Galatians V, 16 - end. In Genesis there i s the Paradise story 
i n chapter I I I , the story of the l u s t f u l angels, the Watcher -
legend as i t i s called, i n chapter V I , 1-4, and the idea of the 
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e v i l imagination i n chapter V I , 5 and V I I I , 21. These three 
items constitute the B ib l l oa l material on which the pos t -exi l ic 
Hebrew mind worked as i t sought to hammer out some explanation 
of the c o n f l i c t between i t s conviction of God's goodness and 
i t s observation of the widespread nature of s i n . The 
apocalyptic l i t e ra tu re of the post-exi l ic-early Christian age i s 
the f r u i t of that speculation. 
The f i r s t of these stories to be f ixed on as pointing to 
some event which was responsible f o r man's sad condition of 
proneness to sin was the story of the l u s t f u l angels. Man's 
wickedness was traced to an infeot ion of human nature which was 
i n i t i a t e d by t h e i r ( i . e . the angels') unholy unions with mortal 
women ( I Enoch, VI - X I ) ; 1 The fact that even a f t e r the 'deluge 
wickedness continued, may have been f e l t as a d i f f i c u l t y of t h i s 
theory. ( In I Enoch LXXXIX, 11, the author of. The Visions 
speaks of Noah's sons begetting an unclean brood). At any 
rate the writer of Jubilees abandoned the watcher-legend and 
f ixed on the Paradise story of Genesis I I I as an explanation o f 
man's wickedness (Jubilees I I I , 17-35). 
I . . E.H.Charles,, Apoo-and Pseudep .of the O.T. pp.191-195. V o l . i l 
2. d i t t o , p. 252. V o l . i i . 
3. d i t t o p,^16, V o l . i i . 
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I t was th i s story which, owing to the l a t e r influence of 
St. Paul became the o f f i c i a l f a l l - s t o r y of the Christian 
Church. 
The displacement of the one story by the other was gradual, 
but by the time of Ezra 4, which probably dates from the las t 
quarter of the f i r s t century A.D. , the watcher-legend had 
disappeared. One s ignif icant point i n i t is that i t re f lec ts a 
tendency which emerged strongly i n la te r Christian speculation 
v i z . , to regard man's proneness to sin as closely linked with 
l u s t . 
Before we pass on to consider the Paradise story we must 
glance at the idea of the e v i l imagination. The dootrine of 
the yeger ha-re" arose d i rec t ly from the exegesis of Genesis V I , 
5, and V I I I , 21. "God saw that the wickedness; of man was 
great i n the earth and that every imagination (yecer) of the 
thought of his heart was only e v i l continually." "The Lord said 
i n his heart I w i l l not again curse the ground any more far man's 
sake, f o r the imagination of man's heart i s e v i l from his youth." 
I n t h i s l a t t e r verse the e v i l imagination seems to be regarded as 
a kind of excuse f o r human wickedness, as though i t were part 
of man's essential constitution f o r which he was not responsible. 
On the basis of these verses there grew up the scholastic or 
Rabbinic doctrine of an e v i l impulse implanted by God i n every 
human soul separately and Individual ly , not i n order to cause 
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man to sin, but i n order to make moral virtue r e a l l y possible 
fo r him by h i s own subordination of the impulse to the Law. 
The doctrine was held sometimes i n contradistinction from, 
sometimes i n addit ion to,the popular idea of a f a l l of the race 
i n Adam which wa.s based on the Paradise story. An example of 
the former i s found i n 2 Baruch where the famous phrase occurs, 
"But each one o f us has be en the Adam of his own Soul" (LIV,19.) 
while an instance of the l a t t e r i s i n 4 Ezra ( I I I f ; 711. 46, 48 
T i l l , 35.) , where the wri ter rejects the idea that the Law i s 
su f f i c i en t remedy f o r the e v i l impulse, and explains the 
empirical universality of actual sin by admitting that while 
Adam began with the implanted e v i l , he proceeded to f i x , and 
habitualise i t by the Sa i l , and so made i t hereditary f o r the 
whole race , i t being henceforth communicated to poster i ty by 
physical propagation. There is one f a t a l objection to th i s 
theory, which, though i t seems f a i r l y obvious, was nevertheless 
nowhere faoed by i t s upholders. I t lays upon God the 
responsibi l i ty f o r creating e v i l , and i n doing so strikes a blow 
at the very heart of ethical monotheism. 
1. Op. c i t . , p.512. 
2. Op. c i t . , pp. 562-3, 585, 596. 
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Our Lord Himself made no specif lo pronouncements i n regard 
to any of the three Ideas which we have mentioned. He Himself 
was concerned ch ie f ly to redeem men from the power of s in . 
Doubtless He held His own private be l ie f about the 
circumstances i n which s in came to have such a grip on the 
human heart, but we have l i t t l e more from His l i p s on the 
subject than the parable i n which He speaks, on an enemy sowing 
tares among the wheat and a number of sayings expie ssing His 
be l ie f i n the ezistenoe and a c t i v i t y of demons. There is no 
means of determining with any degree of precision what theory 
of the o r ig in o f s in Christ held. I t i s to St. Paul that the 
Church has ever looked as her chief authority i n t h i s matter, 
and we have already remarked that i t was he who raised the 
Paradise story to that position of eminence i n the Christian 
world of speculation about the o r i g i n of s in from which i t has 
never declined. 
I n view of the huge doctr inal edifioe which has been 
b u i l t by generations of theologians on the story, i t is as well 
to state at once as b r i e f l y as possible the resul ts of the 
c r i t i c a l examination to which i t has i n recent years been 
subjected. There is no doctrine of original righteousness, 
i n the sense of high moral and sp i r i tua l endowment, i n the 
Genesis narrative. A l l that the story allows i s , Adam was 
capable of being addressed by God, he understood divine 
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permission and prohibi t ion, and when the f i r s t temptation oams 
he sinned by disobedience. There is no record of Adam ever 
having been strong enough to res i s t temptation. At f i r s t he is 
l i k e a l l other men. He has tha t i n him which makes temptation 
possible. His f a l l seems to point to a prone ness to s e l f -
seeking. 
There1 i s no basis i n the Genesis story fo r asserting that 
any fundamental drastic change took place i n Adam's moral 
a b i l i t y or constitution af te r his s in . The Image of God would 
seem to belong to man not only i n his 'unfalien* but also i n 
h is ' f a l l e n ' state. (Genesis I . 26; V, 1,3; IX, 6 . ) . 
There i s no doctrine of o r ig ina l s i n i n the story. The 
idea that the s in of Adam was. the source of the sinfulness of 
succeeding generations or i n any way an explanation of i t is 
absent. The tendenoy to sin which i s ftund i n his children Is 
i n Adam right from the beginning. There i s no difference 
between Adam and his descendants here. Abel, Enoch and Noah 
hardly support the idea of universal sinfulness. The story 
does not teach the f a l l of the race, i n Adam as the oause of the 
moral e v i l of Adam's poster i ty. 
There i s no necessary connection i n the story as i t stands 
between Adam's sin and man's morta l i ty . The Scr iptural ' text 
implies that Adam was created mortal, though he might have 
made himself immortal, by eating of the tree of l i f e even a f t e r 
his s i n , and that i t was i n order to keep him mortal that God 
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placed the Cherubim a t the entrance to the Garden. God's 
warning that death would follow disobedience need not be taken 
to mean that immortality would be replaced by mortal i ty , but 
that immediate death (Instead of death at some re la t ive ly 
distant date) would fo l low for one who had to die i n any case. 
The. f ac t that God 's warning was not immediately f u l f i l l e d i s a 
d i f f i c u l t y here, but i t i s also a d i f f i c u l t y that God should 
plaoe the tree of l i f e i n the garden, i f , independently of 
eating i t s f r u i t , Adam was supposed to be already immortal 1 
Logical d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h i s sort , however, may not have appeared 
to the mind of the composer of the s tory. 
I n the t e x t , as i t stands, there i s no suggestion tha t the 
serpent i s Satan i n visible form, or that he is indwelt by 
Satan, or that he embodies any personal principle of e v i l 
external to or other than himself. 
The story suggests a f a l l only i n the sense that Paradise 
was f o r f e i t e d , the opportunity of obtaining immortality was 
lo s t , and man was bound to the servitude of hard t o l l . The 
connection between the f i r s t s in and man's subsequent hardship 
is not represented as being due to anything l i k e an i n t e r i o r 
corruption or i n f i r m i t y capable of being transmitted physically 
to of fspr ing . Man's misfortunes are pictured as being due 
par t ly to the decree of a jealous God, pa r t ly to the conditions 
of l i f e brought about by man's growth i n knowledge. In th i s 
l a t t e r connection, perhaps the phrase "social heredity" might 
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be guardedly used. The idea that Cain was tainted with an 
innate bias to e v i l i s based on Genesis 17.7, " i f thou doest 
not wel l , s i n coucheth at the door", - a text which, because 
of the uncertainty of i t s real meaning, cannot be made to bear 
the weight of any such idea. 
The sex-motif is present i n the story i n that the 
immediate e f f e c t of eating the f r u i t is the sadden consciousness 
of nakedness, and the sense of physical shame. 
By the time of Ben Sira, i n the f i r s t quarter of the 
second century before Christ , the view was prevalent that 
physical death was the outcome of the f i r s t sin (Eoclus.XXV,24; 
compare also Wisdom I I , 23,24.), while i n 2 Enoch XLI (roughly 
contemporary wi th Christ.) we f ind the def ini te , idea that Adam* s 
sin was the cause of s p i r i t u a l death i n his descendants.1 
I n t h i s we have the beginnings of a doctrine of original s i n . 
There also grew up gradually an exalted estimate of the 
state of man before the f a l l . Adam's at tr ibutes were added to 
as speculation developed, and the "or ig inal perfection*? of man 
soon beoame an established be l i e f . I t i s stated quite* c lear ly 
i n 2 Enoch XXXI., where the f i r s t man i s described as "a second 
angel, honourable, great and glorious", "appointed as ruler to 
1 op. c i t . , p.456. misquoted by Williams (p. 55:..Bampton Lectures) 
as C.XL. 
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the earth, and to have God's wisdom." Probably th i s extra-
Bib l ica l idea underlies the passage i n Ezekiel XXVIII, 11-19, 
where the future f a l l of the King of Tyre is likened to an 
expulsion from the Garden of Eden. 
For the sake of completeness we can mention a variation 
of the story which is found i n the Slavonic Enoch (XXXI,6,), 
the idea that Eve was seduced by Satan who appeared as a 
serpent, and that as a result she contracted and passed on to 
her posteri ty an actual physical po l lu t ion . This i s the theory 
of the inquinamentum, and i t i s ref lected i n 2 Corinthians, X I , 
2,8, and i n I Timothy I I , 14. 
Such was the material or background of thought against 
which St. Paul worked out his own bel ie f about the significance 
o f sin i n human l i f e . The main positions ttiich he adopted may 
be b r i e f l y summarised as fol lows: (a) Adam's sin communicated 
to his posterity physical mor ta l i ty . "For since by man came 
death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as 
i n Adam a l l die even so i n Christ shall a l l be made a l i v e . " 
(I .Cor. XV, 21-22). (b) I t also communicated what can r e a l l y 
be called original s i n . "Wherefore, as through one man s in 
entered in to the world and death through sin and so death 
passed unto a l l men fo r that a l l sinned. For u n t i l the Law sin 
was i n the world: but s in is not Imputed rfiere there i s no 
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law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even 
over them that had not sinned a f t e r the likeness of Adam's 
transgression who i s a f igure of him that was to come." 
(Rom. V. 12-24). Though the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h i s passage are 
well known, i t i s ne vert ha less generally agreed that i t does 
represent a causal re la t ion between Adam's sin and subsequent 
s in and death. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to separate this language 
from the idea that there is i n man some kind of hereditary 
s p i r i t u a l disease, a sort of "unconscious suppressed sinfulness" 
which comes to the surface i n acts of conscious sin when 
provoked by contact wi th the Law. (o) Such original s in , 
however, did not imply fo r St. Paul original g u i l t . "Sin i s 
not imputed where there i s no law." (Rom. V. 13 . ) . This 
phrase i s d e f i n i t e l y against that idea. (d) Nor is there any 
trace i n his w r i t i n g o f any. clearly held be l ie f i n or iginal 
righteousness. (e) The remedy f o r the condition of o r ig ina l 
sin was t o be found i n baptism (Rom.vT, 1-11.), though i t was a 
d i f f i c u l t y not dealt with f u l l y that converts to the f a i t h 
including himself continued i n s in a f t e r baptism. ( f ) The 
seat of th i s inherited sinfulness was the f l e s h . This was only 
so because of Adam's f a l l , and not because of any Inherent e v i l 
i n the f lesh , as such, i n a dualis t ic or Manlchaean sense. 
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" I am carnal, sold under sin." (Rom.VII, 14.) "For I know tha t 
i n me, that i s , i n my f l e s h , no good thing dwelleth." (Rom.VII 
18.). " I see a different; law I n my members warring against t t e 
law of my mind, bringing me i n t o c a p t i v i t y under the law of s i n 
which i s i n my nembers. 0 wretched man that I am I who s h a l l 
deliver me from the body of t h i s death? .... So then with the 
mind I myself serve the law of God; but w i t h the f l e s h the 
law of s i n . " (Rom.VII. 23-25). (See also Galatians V.16) 
(g) H v i l permeates not only human but also sub-hunan and super-
human l i f e . "The whole ore a t ion groaneth and t r a v a i l e t h . i n 
pain together u n t i l now." (Rom. V I I I . 22.). The idea th a t 
Nature was corrupted by the f a l l of Adam was present i n the 
thought of pre-Christian apocalyptists, and was derived ultimately 
from the primal curse pronounced i n Genesis upon the earth. 
St. Paul speaks of "the princes of t h i s age." (I.Cor. i i , 8.), 
"the god of t h i s agp" ( I I Cor. l v . 4.), "messenger of Satan" 
( I I Gor. x l i . 7 . ) , etc., and i t may reasonably be assumed t h a t i n . 
hi s thought there l a y behind tba f a l l of Adam a more remote f a l l 
of s p i r i t u a l beings. The passage I I Cor. xi.S (the seduction of 
Eve by the serpent) suggests an already corrupt tempter. 
Such b r i e f l y i s St. Paul's main thought about sin, and,as 
such i t passed down in t o the l i f e of the growing Church t o 
become the groundwoik of doctrines, which J.n some cases were 
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but the legitimate a m p l i f i c a t i o n o f his own ideas, but which 
i n others were developments f a r removed from his own intentions 
and desires. To the consideration of the two main streams of 
Christian thought on t h i s great theme we' can now prooeed. 
Note on Bphesians i i . 5. 
"We ware by nature children o f wrath. H 
This has no reference t o the doctrine of o r i g i n a l s i n . 
"By nature" ( ) means no more than " i n ourselves," 
and "children of wrath" i s a Hebraism meaning objects of 
Divine wrath. There i s no suggestion of a h e r e d i t a r i l y 
acquired sinfulness antecedent to a ctual s i n . (See 
N.P.Williams, The T a l l and Ori g i n a l Sin, note on p.113.). 
Note on Romans V.13. 
"for t h a t a l l have sinned." The exegetical errors that 
were made i n connection w i t h t h i s t e x t are noted i n the 
chapter on Augustinianism. 
s 
15. 
I I . AUGUSTINIANISM 
1. St. Augustine*a views on Man summarised. 
St. Augustine based h i s r e f l e c t i o n s upon the f a l l of 
man mainly on a s t r l o t l y l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
Paradise story i n Genesis. The substance of those r e f l e c t i o n s 
i s to be found i n what are called his anti-Pelagian t r e a t i s e s , 
and may be summarised as follows. Adam, i n Paradise, was 
i 
exempted from a l l physical e v i l s , and endowed w i t h immortal 
youth. The tree of l i f e would have enabled him t o trans-
substantiate his earthly nature i n t o pure s p i r i t , so that he 
would have passed painlessly from t h i s l i f e to the f u l l e r l i f e 
of heaven, without passing through the horror of physioal 
death. His i n t e l l e c t was superior t o anything since known 
amongst men. He had freedom i n the sense that he was able 
not to s i n (posse non peocare). A tendency towards e v i l d i d , 
indeed, e x i s t i n Adam, but only i n a f a i n t degree, j u s t 
enough, . t o make oholoe r e a l when i t had to be exercised. I f 
he had remained i n Paradise he would have begotten children, 
but i n accordance w i t h the dictates of reason, and without 
any exoess of emotion. His w i l l was confirmed i n goodness 
by an implanted re c t i t u d e , a s e t t l e d bias towards v i r t u e , the 
equivalent of that oharaoter which the greatest saints have 
acquired through a l i f e time of struggle. His oharaoter was. 
s For quotations see end of Chapter. 
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presented t o him, as i t were, ready made by His Creator, and 
he had no temptation, as we are tempted. 
I t I s pointed out by Williams (The Ideas of the F a l l and 
of Original Sin, p.363) that some scholars t h i n k that St. 
Augustine drew no d i s t i n c t i o n between what the sohoolmen 
oailed donum supernaturale, and pura naturalia. Williams 
himself thinks i t safest to conclude that St.. Augustine 
never decisively made up h i s mind on t h i s point, and that the 
germs of both opinions (the distinguishing between, and the 
i d e n t i f y i n g , the donum supernaturale and the pura naturalia) 
are t o be found i n h i s w r i t i n g s . 
The malioe of the f i r s t s i n must thus have been i n f i n i t e , 
f o r obviously Adam was given every ohanoe of not sinning. 
St. Augustine excused himself from giving a l o g i o a l l y 
perfeot conception of transmitted s i n beoause of the 
d i f f i c u l t y of the subject. I n his eyes, conoupisoenoe i s 
both s i n and the penalty of our f i r s t fathers s i n and i t i s 
more or less i d e n t i f i e d w i t h sexual passion; hence, we are 
i n a l i t e r a l sense, born i n s i n , that i s , i n the s i n of our 
parents. Baptism, while cancelling the g u i l t of oonoupisoenoe 
yet leaves us with oonoupisoenoe, and of f s p r i n g are born w i t h 
i t plus the g u i l t of i t , while a l l unbaptised persons are 
s i m i l a r l y g u i l t y i n the sight of God. 
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St. Augustine*s language seems l o g i c a l l y to oontradiot 
the idea of freedom. The condition of man a f t e r the f a l l i s 
one of subjection t o a peooatum habendi dura necessitas. Tet 
he refuses to admit that f a l l e n man does not s t i l l possess 
free w i l l . The l i b e r t a s of the Paradisal condition ( I . e . 
freedom to remain i n Paradise and aoquire the g i f t of 
immortality) has perished, but liberum ar b i t r l u m remains. 
Tet man oannot be regarded as t o t a l l y depraved i n the 
Gal v i n l s t i o sense, fo r i n that everything i s derived from God, 
i t i s , i n a true sense, Good. E v i l I s therefore, not p o s i t i v e . 
I t i s a defeot of goodness. So we f i n d St. Augustine 
repudiating, as against Julian, the idea that human nature i s 
e s s entially, not accidentally good (see Confessions. B k . v i i . 
Ch. 18). 
The transmission of o r i g i n a l s i n (as vitium) i s by 
way of b i o l o g i c a l heredity, and i t s oommunioation, as reatus, 
i s by seminal i d e n t i t y . Adam included i n himself, i n a 
r e a l physiological sense, the whole of the human race, and 
St. Augustine vindicated t h i s idea by reference to 
Hebrews v i i , 9, 10. - where Levi i s represented as paying 
„ t i t h e s to Melohizedek, while s t i l l i n the l o i n s of his 
father Abraham. Prom t h i s idea i t follows that the whole 
of the human race i s born subject to the penalty of h e l l , 
and i t i s only the insorutable deoree of God's predestination 
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that singles out those who are to he saved. The Justioe of 
t h i s arrangement i s not to he questioned. No v i r t u e i s possible 
i n the unbaptised, and a l l suoh, inoluding personally g u i l t l e s s 
children, dying, are damned, though the punishment of 
unbaptised babes may be of the mildest kind. 
2. C r i t i c i s m of His Views. 
(a) Original Righteousness. ' 
The Augustlnian form of the dootrine of o r i g i n a l 
righteousness i s no longer tenable i n the l i g h t of our 
knowledge of man's p r i m i t i v e h i s t o r y . I n the desire t o rest 
wholly on the Bible narrative, St. Augustine oommitted the 
error of t r e a t i n g as l i t e r a l h i s t o r y what oan only be a 
mythological framework; even so, his picture of Adam goes fa r 
beyond what i s warranted only by the words i n Genesis, and 
what the e a r l i e s t Greek fathers said about man's o r i g i n a l 
condition as being one of infanoy. The unfalien Adam oan no 
longer be canonised as ideal athlete, philosopher, saint, 
f o r , as Sohleiermacher said, the higher Adam i s exalted, 
the more inoredible becomes the f a l l , the greater becomes 
his resistance to grace and the stronger the tendenoy t o 
disobedienoe which must be presumed to be already present i n 
him. 
Most soholars, while subjecting St. Augustine's thought 
about o r i g i n a l righteousness, o r i g i n a l sin,, and o r i g i n a l 
g u i l t to considerable o r i t i o i s m have at the same time 
acknowledged the aerate psychological Insight that 
characterises much of his analysis of man's s i n f u l nature. 
No one could reasonably disagree w i t h that judgment. Yet 
i t i s strange that while his p a r t i c u l a r doctrine of the 
pr i m i t i v e state i s c r i t i c i s e d by some t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s as 
being inconsistent w i t h the Bible narrative, w i th a 
considerable part of Church t r a d i t i o n , and wi t h our modern 
knowledge of man's animal anoestry, i t i s r a r e l y c r i t i c i s e d 
by them as being morally and psychologically impossible. 
(C.S. Lewis and F.H. Maycock thin k the dootrine of a highly 
endowed s p i r i t u a l state i n the f i r s t man i s not inconsistent 
with.our b e l i e f i n evolution. See Chapter 5). 
I t w i l l be a main part of our argument that any high 
degree of ready made goodness would not be r e a l goodness at 
a l l , that God was, i n fao t , under a moral o b l i g a t i o n to 
oreate self-centred oreatures at f i r s t , to make them 
gradually self-oonsoious, and God-oonsoious, and only then 
set to work to win them out of that self-oentredness i n t o 
God-centredness. We s h a l l also seek to argue that any high 
degree of goodness would preclude not only the deoeptlon 
implied i n the story of the serpent, but also the i n f i n i t e 
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malioe Implied i n the story of Adam's y i e l d i n g . The t e r r i b l e 
catastrophe, represented as the immediate consequence of a 
good man's f i r s t s i n i s , i n , r e a l i t y , only oonoeivable as the 
cumulative r e s u l t of years of sinning i n a oharaoter that 
has deteriorated progressively. A oreature as good as Adam, 
with the degree of nearness t o God which he i s represented as 
having possessed, would have been f i l l e d w i t h self-loathing., 
would have repented, and would have sought and found 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , as a Christian does now i n Christ. I t i s the 
moral I m p o s s i b i l i t y of what God i s said to have done i n 
oreating Adam p r a c t i c a l l y perfeot, and the moral and 
psychological absurdity of Adam's aotion and i t s consequenoes 
th a t we would o r i t l o i s e . 
We must not, however, anticipate one of our main arguments 
here. I t i s enough to note i t thus b r i e f l y . We can see, 
however, why a w r i t e r l i k e Williams, f o r example, does not 
c r i t i c i s e the dootrine of a highly endowed p r i m i t i v e state from 
t h i s moral and psychological angle, f o r to do so would undermine 
his own doctrine of a s i m i l a r l y highly endowed world-soul. 
There i s .one further point we must notloe i n oonoluding 
t h i s c r i t i c i s m of St. Augustine's dootrine of the p r i m i t i v e 
state. On page 362 of his Bampton lectures N.P. Williams notes 
that J.B. Mozley, i n drawing out the implications of the passage, 
v.61. i n Opus Imperfeotum contra Iulianum, concluded that 
Augustine believed there was a tendenoy towards e v i l i n Adam 
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r i g h t at the beginning, only i n a f a i n t degree, but s u f f i c i e n t 
to constitute his Paradisal condition a state of t r i a l or 
te s t i n g (J.B.Mozley Augustinlan Dbotrine of Predestination 
(1885) p.91). St. Augustine was here touching upon the v i t a l 
root of the problem of a l l r e b e l l i o n against God. He perceived 
that i t was necessary t o posit an already e x i s t i n g degree of 
self-adherence i n Adam at the very beginning i n order t o make 
temptation possible. God must, therefore, have put i t there, 
but He must be defended at a l l costs against any appearance of 
being responsible f o r s i n through having implanted too high a 
degree of self-oentredness. Henoe, i n St. Augustine* s view, 
the degree of self-adherence which God must have Implanted i n 
Adam i n order t o make v i r t u e as wel l as s i n possible through 
ohoice must be conceived as being the t i n i e s t possible. I n 
taking up t h i s p o s i t i o n , St.Augustine and the many theologians 
who have followed him i n i t , blundered perhaps unavoidably but 
none the less f a t a l l y . The blunder was perhaps unavoidable i n 
view of the idea of special creation: even the idea of a 
prenatal f a l l does not get r i d of the r e a l d i f f i c u l t y . I n 
seeking t o defend the character of God as love, they have i n 
eff e c t misrepresented i t , since they have conceived of Love as 
being p r i m a r i l y concerned t o make things easy'for man. This i s 
r e a l l y what l i e s at the back of t h e i r idea of the t i n i e s t 
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possible degree of self-adherenoe i n the f i r s t man. That 
Adam sinned at a l l proves one thing., namely, that the degree 
of self-adherence i n him was f a r greater than any degree of 
God-adherence. Moreover, however much blame may be plaoed on 
the serpent, Adam must have been self-centred i n a manner 
somewhat l i k e that i n whioh Satan was self-centred f o r i t was 
a desire t o be l i k e God that was appealed t o by the Tempter. 
When a man can be tempted i n t h i s specific way he oannot 
reasonably be said to possess only a small degree of s e l f -
adherenoe, f o r i t presupposes an advanced stage of s e l f -
oentredness not unworthy of the name di a b o l i o a l . I f Adam's 
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y i e l d i n g t o whatever degree of self-adherenoe he possessed oan 
be called I n f i n i t e l y malicious, then that degree of s e l f - . 
adherence can scarcely be called I n f i n i t e l y small. The nature 
of Adam's self-adherenoe, whioh made suoh a temptation possible 
at a l l would be equivalent t o that whioh we recognise as a 
highly advanced state of megalomania. God could scarcely have 
made Adam o r i g i n a l l y i n t h a t state! 
I t i s the idea of God making man p r a c t i c a l l y perfect that 
ought t o disturb us not only beoause of the psychological 
absurdity of suoh a creature being tempted and y i e l d i n g i n the 
way described, but o h i e f l y beoause of the implications involved 
regarding God's character. I t i s a misunderstanding of Love 
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which represents i t as ready t o be pleased with the obedienoe 
of a v i r t u a l puppet. God's way i s to win the love of men, and 
He oan scarcely be said to win what He creates p r a c t i c a l l y ready 
made. God i s r e a l l y represented as a moral coward prepared only 
to take the s l i g h t e s t r i s k of being disappointed, p r e f e r r i n g 
r e a l l y to make man a puppet, and prepared to aooept puppet 
worship, but arranging a t i n y degree of self-oentredness only 
as a kind of grudging admission that the ends of morality must 
somehow be served. What r e a l freedom t o be good would there be 
i n a creature created with 99.9$ of ready made goodness? What 
freedom would there be t o please s e l f i n a creature oreated with 
0.1$ of ready made self-oentredness? Far from any such idea 
safeguarding the conception of God's character as Love, i t 
completely destroys i t . Creative Love i s under an o b l i g a t i o n 
to give a creature every possible ohanoe of refusing t o respond 
with love: and 'every possible chance' means somehow weighting 
the scales heavily against the easiness of that response i n the 
beginning, so that when love at l a s t i s born there w i l l be no 
doubt about i t being the genuine a r t i o l e . 
Love oan never force i t s e l f on any person, and for God to 
have oreated Adam already i n Love with Him i n any degree, 
without consulting h i s w i l l and affeotlons, would have been 
an obvious forcing of his love. I t would seem that the reverse 
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of St. Augustine's picture would be truer to r e a l i t y , v i z . 
Adam oreated o r i g i n a l l y w i t h a high degree of self-oentredness, 
and w i t h only a very s l i g h t tendency i n any other d i r e c t i o n . 
Enough has been said here t o indioate the nature of t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r o r i t i c i s m . We s h a l l r e t u r n to i t l a t e r i n . 
disoussing the question of the r e l a t i o n between an i n i t i a l high 
degree of self-oentredness and God's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s i n . 
(b) The Dootrlne of Original Sin. 
St. Augustine's views have been o r i t i o i s e d as being 
strongly ooloured by Maniohaelsm. The idea that oonoupiscenoe 
i s now something s i n f u l i n i t s e l f , oannot be held I f we hold, as 
surely we must, t h a t ' i t i s part of the o r i g i n a l God-given human 
nature, and that our nature, as i t oame from God, was a good 
thi n g . Gonoupisoenoe, i f i t i s the fomes peooati, i s also the 
fomes boni, part of the morally neutral raw material of a l l 
character. 
The Augustinian b e l i e f t h a t " a l l have sinned i n Adam", w i t h 
the corresponding ideas of humanity as a s i n f u l mass, and of 
sinfulness being inborn by reason of seminal i d e n t i t y , rested 
on a mistranslation, by Ambrosiaster, of St.Paul's phrase i n 
Romans v. 12, ey> w rr<x.v/c-s 7/u*/>Toy a s m ^oo o^nts 
K t e c a v e r u n t . The oorreot t r a n s l a t i o n , given by the Pelagians 
and denounced by St. Augustine, was "propter quod". We may 
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notice here, what Williams has pointed out, that the slenderness 
of St. Augustine's B i b l i o a l foundation f o r his dogma i s 
realised when i t i s pointed out t h a t of his f i v e great proof 
texts (Ps. l i , 5, Job x i v , 4, 5. St.John H i , 5, Ephesians, 
11, 3 and Romans v. 12), three are mistranslations (Williams, 
op.olt. p.379). 
(o) Freedom. 
The d i f f i c u l t y of St. Augustine's language on t h i s 
subjeot has been, reoognlsed by many writer's. His p o s i t i o n 
r e a l l y resolved i t s e l f i n t o a b e l i e f t h a t the w i l l of f a l l e n 
man I s free., but i t always only f r e e l y chooses e v i l under the 
influence of oonoupisoenoe. We may be free to do what we l i k e , 
but we are c e r t a i n l y not free t o l i k e what we ought. His 
d i f f i c u l t y r e a l l y sprang from wishing to keep freedom i n order 
to preserve man's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r actual s i n yet wishing t o 
re j e c t i t to make way f o r the idea of i r r e s i s t i b l e grace. The 
re s u l t was much verbal subtlety which only had the effeot of 
denying free w i l l i n any except an abstruse and unnatural way. 
(d) The Doctrine of Original G u i l t . 
This dootrine has been so widely o r l t i o i s e d and rejected, 
and the o r i t i c i s m s seem so obvious and unanswerable t h a t i t i s 
Impossible t o add anything substantial to them. Williams 
(op.olt. p.381) says i t i s not neoessary to do more than point 
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out the absurdity of a theory which asserts t h a t "human beings 
are held responsible by an a l l - j u s t Judge f o r an act which they 
did not oommit, and f o r physiologioal and psychological facts 
which they oannot help." The theory of seminal i d e n t i t y 
"needs no serious r e f u t a t i o n " , and "no verbal manipulation of 
the 'universal' of human nature makes i t j u s t to punish a man 
for a s i n alleged t o have been committed several milleniums 
previously by another man." F.J*.Hall has said (Creation and 
Man, o.ix) that the theory can be dismissed as an aooretion to 
Cathollo doctrine whioh requires no defence at a l l . R.S. 
Moxon has called i t a shocking travesty of the Catholic f a i t h 
(the Dootrine of Sin, p.106), while Roman Cathollo theologians 
have distinguished between In d i v i d u a l and personal g u i l t , 
allowing t h a t human nature as such i s g u i l t y of the s i n of Adam 
but the i n d i v i d u a l i s not g u i l t y . (God and the Supernatural, 
ed. Cuthbert; C.7. The Problem of E v i l , by E.I. Watkins, p.150) 
J. S. Whale has remarked that the theory i s oontrary t o reason 
and morality, and i s incompatible w i t h our modern oonoeption of 
in d i v i d u a l personality and a r e a l i s t i c view of s i n (The 
Chr i s t i a n Faith, ed. Matthews, pp.122-3). 
(e) The Dootrine of Election. 
Perhaps the most cogent c r i t i c i s m of t h i s Augustinian 
dootrine comes from K a r l Barth, who finds i n i t a determinism 
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by whioh God appears to make Himself the prisoner of His own 
predestination. Eleotion I s not a determinism, a mystery 
l y i n g behind the gospel and threatening i t s nature as a gospel: 
i t i s rather the sum of the gospel; i t i s a decision of God's 
grace to ohoose man, every man, unless a man f i n a l l y refuses, 
and even i n h e l l he w i l l not be beyond the grace of God. Even 
the reprobation of a man would be. grounded on God's graoe, since 
He has not two w i l l s but one. 
The determlnist dootrine of predestination was based not 
on Jesus Christ as the completion i n time of God's o r i g i n a l 
purpose and decision t o save a l l men, but on a secret decree 
of God before the worlds began. I t went behind Christ, and 
found a basis f o r ethics as f o r theology, i n an absolute decree 
of God, whioh could only be known, so f a r as i t oould be known, 
i n i t s r e f l e c t i o n i n natural law. Barth rejeots any absolute 
decree whioh i s not i d e n t i a l w i th the concrete.decree of God 
i n Jesus Christ f o r man's election. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see 
how t h i s o r i t i o i s m oould be rebutted, (see "Reformation Old 
and New", ed. Camfield, pp.106. 118.). 
( f ) Sin The Punishment of Sin. 
St. Augustine's statement that s i n i s the punishment of 
s i n has been o r i t i o i s e d by R.S.Moxon (The Doctrine of Sin, p.106) 
as i l l o g i o a l , unjust, irreverent. I t i s i l l o g i c a l because i t 
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f a i l s t o explain the f i r s t s i n , and also because i t creates a 
chain of cause and e f f e o t , neoessarily endless and irremediable. 
I t i s unjust because the punishment f a l l s on innocent heads. 
Man i s compelled to s i n , and i s punished f o r undergoing 
punishment. I t i s irreverent because God i s made to appear 
responsible f o r sin's continuance. 
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QUOTATIONS FROM S. AtTOTOSTINB'S WORKS RELATING TO 
ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS. THE FALL, and ORIGINAL SIN. 
1. Adam i n Paradise exempted from a l l physical evils ; 
(de Gen. o. manioh. i i . 8 . ) . 
2. The g i f t of immortality wi th in his reach; 
(de Gen. ad l i t t . v i . 3 6 . ) . 
(op. imperf. c. Iu l i an . v i . 39 ) . 
3. The tree of l i f e would have precluded the necessity of 
physical death; 
(de Gen. ad. l i t t . l x . 6 . ) . 
4. Adam's great superiority of i n t e l l e c t ; 
(op. Imperf. o. I u l i a n . v . I . ) . 
5. Adam able not to s in as wel l as able not to die; 
(de oorrept. et grat. 33. ) . 
6. An or ig ina l f a i n t tendenoy to e v i l i n Adam; 
(op. imperf. o. I u l i a n . v .61 ; ) . 
7. The begetting of children i n Paradise would have been 
without excess of fee l ing . 
(de nupt. et oonoup. 1. I , 6 ,7 ,8 . ) . 
8. Adam*s w i l l confirmed i n goodness: a settled bias 
towards v i r tue ; 
(op. imperf. o. Iu l i an . v .61 . ) . 
9. The malice of the f i r s t Sin i n f i n i t e . 
(op. imperf. o. i u l i a n . 1. 71. ) . ' 
(enohirid. x l v . ) . 
10. The vi t lum of o r ig ina l s in i s the tyrrany of 
oonoupisoenoe: i t i s both sin and the punishment of s in . 
(de.peoo. mer. et rem. 11. 36.) . 
11. The act of begetting a chi ld stains i t wi th or ig ina l sin; 
(de.pecc. mer. et rem. i . . 5 7 . ) . 
12. Baptism oanoele the reatus of oonoupisoenoe, but 
leaves the actus i n existence; 
(de nupt. et cone. i . 29.) . 
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13. Free w i l l drast ioal ly affeoted, seemingly abolished; 
(enohirid. 30 . ) . 
(de perfect, l u s t . horn. 9 . ) . 
14. E v i l Is nothing posi t ive, only a defeot i n goodness; 
(de nat. boni 17.) . 
15. Human nature only accidentally, not essentially, e v i l : 
(op. imperf. i l l . 190.). 
16. Levi seminally shared i n the payment of t i thes to 
Melohisedek; 
(op. Imperf. o. I u l l a n . i . 48 . ) . 
17. Predestination to h e l l the penalty fo r or ig ina l sin; 
(de c iv . Dei. z l i i . 14 . ) . 
18. Humanity a lump of damnation; 
(enohirid. 26, 27. ) . 
19. Virtue Impossible i n the unbaptised; 
(c. I u l i an . Pel. i v . 17. ) . 
20. Personally gui l t less Infants doomed to eternal f i r e ; 
(op. imperf. o. I u l i a n . i i i . 199.)* 
31 
I I I . THOMISM. 
1. Summary of the Thamist Position. 
The position of St. Thomas Aquinas oan reasonably be 
called a modified Augustinianlsm. St. Augustine's d is t inc t ion 
between nature and grace was hardened by logic into the famous 
scholastic dis t inct ion between Adam's pura naturalia (human 
nature, as such), and the donum superadd1turn, or supernaturale, 
or indebitum, (the supernatural g i f t s of * or iginal pe r fec t ion ' ) . 
According to St. Thomas, the pura naturalia were necessary i f 
God was going to make a man at a l l , but the donum supernaturale 
was a g i f t which God was under no necessity to bestow upon man. 
I f man bad remained unendowed wi th the donum supernaturale he 
would s t i l l have attained to a certain natural knowledge of God. 
I f Adam had resisted temptation he could have passed on into the 
purely heavenly l i f e without having t o face the ordeal of 
physical death, and would have enjoyed the benefits attaching 
to the pr imit ive state as they were described by St. Augustine. 
The i n f i n i t e malioe of the f i r s t sin was assumed by 
St. Thomas, and i t s main effeot was the immediate loss of the 
supernatural endowment. Original Sin i s , formally, the la ok of 
o r ig ina l righteousness, and material ly, inordinate oonoupisoenee, 
and hence i t i s more than a mere laok or deprivation of g i f t s or 
graces onoe possessed. I t i s a real corruption of the pura 
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natural ia , i n the sense that they are subject to a disorder 
which need not have happened. 
St . Thomas held that or ig ina l sin involved g u i l t , but 
instead of the idea of seminal ident i ty he used the idea of 
'Motion*. The concupiscence which accompanied the act of 
generation was said to stain the resultant offspr ing wi th 
or iginal s i n . Sanctifying grace communicated through baptian. 
was said to abolish the g u i l t of or iginal s in , but i t l e f t 
concupiscence s t i l l exis t ing, no longer as s in , but as the 
fames peccati. 
So f a r as freedom i n f a l l en human nature i s concerned, 
St. Thomas's view was pract ioal ly the same as that of St. 
Augustine. He held that God was the prime cause of a l l 
motions of the human soul, even those we c a l l f r ee . No real 
change i n th i s connection was introduced by the f a l l , - man was 
just as muoh a puppet i n the hands of God as before the f i r s t 
s in . Yet the w i l l remains ' f r e e ' f o r "God moves the human w i l l 
in such a manner that i t s motion remains contingent and not 
necessary." 
As regards the fate of unbaptised children, St. Thomas 
took a milder view than the Augustinian one. He adopted the 
Pelagian idea of the limbus puerorum, and f o r t h i s purpose he 
regarded original s in on i t s negative side. Lack of the donum 
superadditum here meant lack of the Beat if ic vision there. 
Infants in th i s state enjoyed a purely natural happiness. Like 
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the righteous pagans i n limbo they were oontent without the 
Beatif ic Vision. 
2. H i 8 Views Cr i t ic i sed . 
(a) The Doctrine of the Donum Superadditurn. 
.i-
The doctrine of the donum superadd i t um is open to the same 
cri t icisms as were levelled against the Augustinian idea of 
man's pr imit ive state. I t is not warranted by the language of 
the B ib l i ca l narrative, and i t cannot be reasonably maintained 
in view of what is now widely delived to have been the lowly 
state of man's beginnings. Can we rea l ly believe that, i f 
St. Augustine and St. Thomas had known then what Darwin and 
succeeding scientists have d is covered, they would have persisted 
in the bel ief tha t one moment i n the story of evolution there 
was a self-centred anthropoid, the next a highly developed 
saint? The dootrine involves, the idea of the f a l l i n the same 
moral and psychological d i f f i c u l t i e s as already noticed i n the 
case of Augustinianism. We shal l deal la ter with modern 
attempts to vindicate i t in the l i g h t of a be l ie f in evolution 
(see C. i v & v ) . Meanwhile we have to notice the following 
fur ther points of o r i t io i sm. Haering (The Christian Faith, . 
English t r ans l . v o l . i . p.315) traoed the view of the donum 
superadditum to t r i f l i n g wi th the Hebrew words in Genesis i .26 . 
On th is point Niebuhr says that Irenaeus distinguished between 
the image and the likeness of God on the basis of Genesis i .26 , 
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a d is t inc t ion which persisted i n Christian Tradit ion u n t i l the 
Refonnation questioned i t s exegetioal v a l i d i t y . According to 
Irenaeus the f a l l destroyed the likeness but not the image. 
Luther was r ight in re ject ing the theory from the standpoint of 
exegesis. The or ig ina l text "Let us make man in our image, 
a f t e r our likeness" i s no more than a common Hebraic 
parallelism. (Nature and Destiny of Man, vo l . i . p .286) . 
Niebuhr then c r i t i c i ses the.doctrine as fol lows. "The dootrine 
of a donum supernaturale given to man beyond his natural 
endowments and los t in the f a l l leaving him thus with his natural 
vir tures unimpaired, is very confusing. Ostensibly i t i s a 
supernatural v i r tue which i s destroyed, but the capacity f o r i t 
is the same as that which leads to sin, namely, man's se l f -
transoendant s p i r i t . The structure of man i s therefore altered 
a f te r the f a l l . He has become an essentially Aris tote l ian man. 
He has a capacity fo r natural v i r tue which is subjeot to the 
l imi ta t ions of man immersed i n f ini teness . He lacks the 
capacity f o r the eternal. I f Hi i s were true he would also 
lack the capacity for the s i n f u l g l o r i f i c a t i o n of himself." 
(p.292). 
Niebuhr*s c r i t i c i sm may be expanded thus. The whole idea 
of a supernatural g i f t which God was under no obligation to give 
to man, which was not owed to man, is mechanical, a r t i f i c i a l , 
unchristian. I t breeds, and i s b u i l t upon, the idea that God, 
while being Perfect Love, could have created a creature capable 
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of apprehending Him to a certain.degree, and yet could have 
l e f t him in that imperfect state without doing anything unworthy 
of Love. God i s thus conceived too much a f t e r the fashion of a 
merely munificent Oriental potentate, whose essential nature 
f would not be contradicted by witholding a g i f t that would 
benefit a creature who had done nothing t o deserve i t s being 
withheld. God has t o be oonoeived as the Father who could no 
more withhold a g i f t whioh i t was possible and good to bestow, 
t« than He could murder each chi ld deliberately. I f i t was God's 
eternal purpose to create man and bring him into the blessedness 
of heaven, then i t i s meaningless to t a lk about God not being 
under an obligation to bestow the g i f t that would alone make 
that possible. I t would have been a sheer contradiction of 
love to have withheld i t . Anything which is said to have been 
done by God, cannot be said to have been unnecessary, nor when 
God has done i t can i t be said He was not under an obligation 
to do i t . God i s always under the obligation, - the se l f -
imposed obligation of Love, - to be true to His own, nature. 
X The misunderstanding i s c lear ly shown when the donum i s called 
indebitum, as though i t were a work of supererogation, as 
though there were a l i m i t of love beyond which the love of God 
need not pass. 
(b) The Doctrine of Sin as Defect. 
So far as the Thomist teaohing, about e v i l consisting in 
the a-bs^ noe of some ac tua l i ty or perf ection which belongs to the 
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f u l l and proper nature of a part icular thing, is concerned, we 
can notice the fol lowing c r i t i c i sm adduced by O.G.Quick (the 
Gospel of the New world pp.22,23). Ev i l when iden t i f i ed with 
privation i s nothing positive or actual; i t remains no more 
than a certain kind of incompleteness or lack. Four things 
can be said about such a view. F i r s t , "We must beware of 
confusing any part icular defect or lack with the results of 
which i t is the cause or condition sine qua non. A disease 
may be occasioned by a mere defect in bodily health, which 
lowers the body's power of resistance. I t does not follow 
that the disease i t s e l f is a mere defect i n health: on the 
contrary i t i s something positive.,!* Secondly, Adam as f i r s t 
created can have lacked nothing that belongs to the perfection 
of human nature. How then, on St. Thomas's theory, is his f a l l 
to be accounted fo r? "St. Thomas commits himself t o the 
assertion, "Malum quod in defeotu actionis consist i t semper 
oausatur ex defeotu agentis." (Summa theologica, l a , Q.49, Art 2 J 
But what defect can there have been i n Adam to cause the action 
by which he f e l l ? Thirdly, i f s in were a mere lack or 
pr ivat ion, " a l l that men could require fo r deliverance would be 
the supply of that which they lack or have been deprived of . 
I f , however, men need forgiveness, conversion, new creation, 
then t h e i r need i s other than a mere g i f t of something which the 
reoipient has not.!' Fourthly, i f a l l e v i l i s pr ivat ion of 
being, i t fol lows that "the greater the e v i l , the less being in 
37. 
the human soul," and so "souls which are f i n a l l y los t must be 
annihilated." But St. Thomas believed that the soul i s 
immortal by nature, so presumably he would hold tha t " i t can 
only be invaded by e v i l up to a certain point , and that a los t 
soul would retain only what was necessary to i t s existence. 
In that case i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o see how the existence of 
a lost soul oould be said to be in i t s e l f good, and the soul 
good in so f a r as i t ex i s t s / ' 
(o) Freedom. 
The d i f f i c u l t y of St. Thomas's position i n regard t o 
freedom i s the same as that in regard.to St. Augustine's. 
Man seems t o be wholly determined by God, yet t o retain freedom 
of w i l l . St. Thomas is content to leave the question l i ke th is , 
a v i r t u a l declaration that psychological freedom oan co-exist 
wi th .metaphysical determinism. He meets the objection that 
God would thus seem to be the author of sin by refer r ing t o the 
idea above o r i t io i sed , v i z , sin i s a defect and as such can neve3 
be conceived as caused by the author of a l l being, 
(d) The Idea of Limbo. 
We may add here a few reflections on St. Thomas's idea of 
unbaptised infants resting in a state of natural happiness in 
Limbo. I f souls exist at a l l , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to oonoeive of 
them as remaining static in the sense that they neither grow nor 
retrogress while being objeots of God's love. Whether baptised 
1 
or not they are the objects of God's love, and so i t i s surely 
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reasonable to conceive of an equivalent to baptism in the next 
world and of a process of growth in the Church there, or of 
deterioration, as in the case of baptised souls here. I t i s 
extremely d i f f i c u l t to oonoeive of God being responsible f o r an 
arrangement whereby souls are deprived of the poss ib i l i ty of 
the f u l l Beatif io Vision i n the next l i f e beoause of some 
accident i n their physical or mental state here. The fact 
that they would be ignorant of the Vision, or that they would 
not suffer consciously i n any way, does not somehow a f fec t the 
real question, which i s one of God's love. 
I t i s a mechanical and a r t i f i c i a l view of l i f e which sees 
the event of physical death as the end t o a l l real progress and 
growth, f o r a l l souls, which sees our capacity to enjoy God 
through a l l eternity doomed to remain at the level attained at 
the moment of physical death. As a ohild 's soul would have 
developed here on earth had i t l i ved , so surely i t w i l l develop 
in the beyond u n t i l by God's mercy i t enjoys Him f u l l y or by 
i t s own sin rejects Him and passes forever into "the outer 
darkness." 
Wherever a soul i s , whatever i t s condition, i t i s the 
object of God's love . . God is active towards i t , and that means 
He is oontinually seeking t o remove a l l hindrances to i t s f u l l 
enjoyment of Himself. The incentive towards missionary zeal 
provided by the old doctrine of the unbaptised and heathen being 
doomed to deprivation of the Beatif ic vision is not damaged by a 
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doctrine of the eternal progress or retrogression of a l l souls, 
f o r the pain and d i f f i c u l t y of repentance at any stage of 
alienation from God are too well recognised by Christians not 
to provide such incentive. 
The New Testament certainly suggests the idea that the 
Judgment i s concerned chief ly wi th deeds done in th i s l i f e , and 
that, our state on the other side of death depends much on the 
state of our relationships here, but the obviously speculative 
nature of the question permits of fu r the r meditation. The 
main d i f f i c u l t y i n i t centres around the'question of the nature 
of s p i r i t u a l l i f e . I t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to conceive of a 
soul remaining at the same level of sp i r i t ua l l i f e through a l l 
e terni ty , whioh i s what Is involved in the idea of Limbo. 
Even those who may be said t o enjoy the Beatif ic Vision cannot 
be conceived rea l ly as having readied the ful l^end of a l l 
s p i r i t u a l attainment. Such an idea would involve that of a 
created soul having exhausted the glory of the Being of God in 
contemplation and Communion and enjoyment, and t h i s i s f i n a l l y 
incompatible w i th the idea of the i n f i n i t y of that Being. Even 
the greatest saint cannot be conceived as having reached, in . 
his earthly pilgrimage, anywhere except the dimmest outer f r inge 
of the glory of the Triune God, and shall the incident of 
physical death suddenly immobilise his s p i r i t i n i t s onward, 
upward progress, l i m i t i n g i t in i t s capacity fo r the enjoyment 
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of God through a l l e te rn i ty to that stage of development 
reached during an in f in i tess imal ly small 'moment' i n e terni ty , 
which we c a l l mortal l i f e ? 
I s i t rea l ly possible for a Christian to conceive of any 
soul persisting through e l l e tern i ty not knowing God, or knowing 
Him imperfectly, and God being sat isf ied with such a state of 
a f fa i r s? I t oan scarcely be said that suelmsn idea re presents 
the summing up of a l l things i n Christ , the f i n a l glory of God, 
or the perfecting of creation. Bather i t ref lects inccmpletenes 
disharmony, f a i l u r e . I f we are to conceive of an end, i t must 
be a perfect end, with no Incompleteness, no r e f l e c t i on on God's 
i n a b i l i t y to bring a l l at length to the f u l l enjoyment of 
Himself. Limbo is i n the end, more of a l i a b i l i t y than an 
asset to a theology which seeks to hold at i t s centre the ideas 
of Sternal Love and the ultimate triumph of that Love over a l l . 
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QUOTATIONS FROM THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS (TRANSLATION BY THE FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH 
DOMINICAN PROVINCE) RELATING TO ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS. 
THtS FALL, and ORIGINAL SIN. : 
1 . The supernatural splendours of or ig ina l perfection. 
(Part I , qq.xoiv, xcv.) (Vol. 4, pp. 305 f f . ) 
2. Mankind's condition had Adam never f a l l e n . 
(Part I . qq. x o v i l - c i . ) . (Vol. 4. pp. 335 f f ) . 
3. Adam (moves' his descendants to s in by begetting them. 
(Part I I , f i r s t part , q.81, a r t . 3 . ) . (Vol.7, p.409.). 
4. Man jus t as much a puppet i n the hands of God af te r as 
before the Fal l . . 
(Part I , q.83, a r t . l . Misquoted by Williams as a r t . 2 . 
on p.404 of his Bampton Lectures). (Vol.4, p.149.). 
5. Yet God moves the human w i l l so that i t s motion remains 
contingent and not necessary. (Part I I . f i r s t part , 
q.10. a r t . 4 . ) . (Vol. 6. p. 141). 
6. God yet cannot be said t o cause s in , f o r sin i s a defect, 
(Part I I , f i r s t part , q.79. a r t . 2 . ) . (Vol. 7. p.389). 
7 The primit ive state was one of supernatural grace. 
As soon as man disobeyed God, he fo r f e i t ed tte grace 
(Part I , q.95, a r t . l . ) . (Vol. 4. p.318). 
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IV. MODERN AUGUSTINIAN3. 
We can now look at some modern representatives of 
these two d i f fe ren t sohools of thought and see how they defend 
thei r views. We oan take the Protestant sohool f i r s t . 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr. 
Niebuhr's aim i s to hold together what he considers to be 
the essential truths of the Catholic and Protestant positions, 
and to reject what he considers to be the errors i n both. 
Against Protestant thought, f o r example, he maintains that the 
image of God i s preserved i n spite of human s in , and i n 
d i s t inc t ion from Catholic thought he eliminates the d i s t inc t ion 
between a completely lost or ig ina l justice and an unoorrupted 
natural jus t ice . (The Nature and Destiny of Man, vo l . i .p .292) . 
He rejects the h i s to r i ca l l i t e r a l i s t i o i l l u s i o n by whioh 
or ig ina l righteousness and the f a l l have been t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
relegated to a remote h i s to r i ca l period, and oonoeived of only 
i n connection with the f i r s t man. : "The f a l l " , , he says, " is 
a symbol of an aspect of every h i s to r i ca l moment i n the l i f e 
of man" ( i b i d , p.285) "The la ter individual i s not 
s ign i f i can t ly .differentiated from the f i r s t man", (quoted from 
Kierkegaard, Begriff der Augst, (p.105). i b id p.280) 
"There is no h i s to r i ca l period to whioh we can assign 
or ig ina l righteousness" ( i b i d p.293). "Perfection before the 
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f a l l Is perfection before the act ." ( i b i d p.294). What Adam 
did and what he was are symbols "for the whole of human 
his tory ." (p.£96). 
Niebuhr believes that o r ig ina l righteousness i s present 
to sinners always and only by way of the perception of an 
ideal . I n the moment of self-transcendence ( i l l u s t r a t ed by 
Romans v i i , 14,17), s i n f u l man peroelves the t e r r i b l e contrast 
between what he i s and what he ought to be (p.295). The 
content of or ig ina l righteousness as th is i s perceived by 
s i n f u l man i s perfect f a i t h , hope, and love, "the v i r tue of 
the soul's perfect communion with God." (p.302). The question 
arises, does Niebuhr believe every man was once o r ig ina l ly 
righteous, before his f i r s t s igni f icant aotion? "Adam's 
sinlessness preceded his f i r s t s ignif icant aotion and his 
sinfulness oame to l i g h t i n that action", p.296). He would 
seem to argue that the f i r s t s ignif icant aotion of every man 
i s a s i n f u l one, and henceforth or ig ina l righteousness i s 
present only as a sense of something lacking (p.306). What 
was every man before becoming a sinner? Was he just innocent 
a f te r an a-moral fashion, or was he posi t ively , actually, 
o r ig ina l ly righteous, i n a state of f a i t h and hope and love? 
At the beginning of his chapter on or ig ina l rlghteouness, 
Niebuhr quotes, wi th apparent approval, Pascal's words about 
man's greatness being proved by his wretchedness. "Man's 
i 
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nature now being l i k e that of the animals, we reoognise he has 
f a l l e n from a better nature whioh was onoe h is . For who i s 
unhappy at not being a King except a deposed King?" 
(Pascal's Pensees, par.409. quoted by Niebuhr on p.281). 
Niebuhr then goes on immediately to speak of man's "memory" 
of a previous condition of blessedness. He repeats th i s 
expression (p.310), and, combined with other language about 
the contrast between man's true nature and what he has 
beoome, together with the idea that o r ig ina l righteousness i s 
not completely los t , th i s would seem to suggest that he 
believes that every man was once, even though only fo r a very 
short moment (see p.296) , what he now knows he ought to be. 
I t i s Niebuhr's analysis of the p r e - f a l l condition of 
man, however, which seems to oanoel out any idea that man 
could have been o r ig ina l l y righteous. There would thus seem 
to be two inconsistent strands of thought here. Let us look 
at his analysis of man's p r e - f a l l condition, and see how i t 
mi l i ta tes against any idea of or ig ina l righteousness. 
One hesitates to accuse a wri ter l i k e Niebuhr of a 
oareless use of terminology, but his language expresses two 
contradictory ideas about man's pre- fa l l . condi t ion , v i z . 
(a) that the human si tuat ion of flniteness and freedom, of 
which anxiety is an Inevitable concomitant, i s not, i n i t s e l f , 
a temptation, and (b) that the human s i tuat ion, i n I t s e l f , i s 
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a temptation. Here are the relevant quotations. F i r s t of a l l 
he says, "The s i t u a t i o n would not be a temptation of i t s e l f , 
i f i t were not f a l s e l y interpreted by the d e v i l " (p.194). 
"The idea that the s i t u a t i o n of fini t e n e s s and freedom i s a 
temptation, once e v i l has entered i t , and that e v i l does 
enter i t prior to human action, i s expressed i n B i b l i c a l 
thought by the conception of the d e v i l " (p.269). These 
statements p l a i n l y imply that the human sit u a t i o n i s not, of 
i t s e l f , a temptation to s i n . 
He also says, however, "Anxiety 1 1 (which i s part of the 
situation) " i s the Internal description of the state of 
temptation", (p.195), and "Anxiety, as a permanent 
oonoomitant of freedom I s . . . . a temptation to s i n " (pp.197,198), 
and "the temptation to s i n l i e s , as previously observed, i n 
the human si t u a t i o n I t s e l f " , (p.266). These statements 
p l a i n l y imply that the human si t u a t i o n i s of i t s e l f , a 
temptation to s i n . 
There i s a further instance of t h i s confusing use of 
language. He says "anxiety alone i s neither actual nor 
o r i g i n a l s i n " (p.266) and anxiety "must not be i d e n t i f i e d 
with s i n " (p.195). He also says, however, "Man could not 
be tempted i f he had not already sinned." (p.266). I f , however, 
anxiety i s of i t s e l f a temptation, then i t must mean, 
according to t h i s argument, that man must have sinned already. 
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Sinoe, however, anxiety i s a permanent oonoomitant of the 
human situation, s i n must be equally a permanent feature 
of i t . I f , on the other hand, anxiety i s not of i t s e l f a 
temptation, but temptation only oomes through the d e v i l 
misinterpreting the situation, then equally man must have 
sinned before the d e v i l misinterpreted the situation, and 
so likewise s i n would seem to be a permanent element i n 
man's make up. 
Niebuhr, moreover, drafts into the concept of anxiety 
a "tendency towards s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n " . " I t i s possible 
that f a i t h would purge anxiety of the tendency towards 
s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n " (p.195). Now i f anxiety i s a permanent 
oonoomitant of the human si t u a t i o n of fin i t e n e s s and freedom, 
and I f a tendenoy towards s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n i s always 
present i n anxiety, i t means that a tendenoy towards s i n f u l 
s e l f - a s s e r t i o n i s an o r i g i n a l element I n human nature. A 
tendenoy towards s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n can scarcely be ca l l e d 
a good thing. I t i s a different thing from a tendenoy towards 
se l f - a s s e r t i o n . Nothing, however, that i s o r i g i n a l i n man, 
i s a bad thing. An o r i g i n a l tendenoy towards s i n f u l s e l f -
assertion, present even before the dev i l ' s temptation, suggests 
there i s something of s i n i n man from the beginning. Nothing 
that i s o r i g i n a l i n man, however, can be c a l l e d of s i n . 
There i s t h i s further observation. Since t h i s tendenoy 
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towards s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n i s present i n the human 
sit u a t i o n i t s e l f , before those conditions are created which 
constitute o r i g i n a l s i n , v i z . the human sit u a t i o n , plus the 
faot of s i n , plus man's own f i r s t actual s i n , (see p.270) 
then i t means there was a tendency towards s i n f u l s e l f -
assertion before there was o r i g i n a l s i n , one single yielding 
to which would e s t a b l i s h i t as an i r r e s l s t a b l e tendenoy. Any 
tendency of nature which oan be conoeived as requiring but 
one act of ohoioe i n order to est a b l i s h i t as a permanent 
and i r r e s i s t i b l e feature, must necessarily be regarded as 
being present already i n a high degree of power. As o r i g i n a l 
righteousness was t r a d i t i o n a l l y oonoeived as requiring but 
one aot of ohoioe on the part of Adam i n order to e s t a b l i s h 
him i n possession of i t , so Ndebuhr oonoeives of t h i s 
tendenoy towards s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n , - one s i n and the 
tendency would become fixed and i r r e s i s t i b l e . There i s 
only one possible oonolusion to suoh thinking. Man must 
have been very nearly, though not quite, established i n 
self-oentredness by God i n the beginning. One cannot 
think that Neibuhr wished h i s language to oontain suoh 
implications, yet they are undoubtedly there, and are 
firmly opposed to anything l i k e a condition of o r i g i n a l 
righteousness. T r a d i t i o n a l i s t s implied or taught some 
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degree, at l e a s t , of aelf-adherence I n man, o r i g i n a l l y . 
This was necessary I n order to make that oholoe a r e a l one 
whereby God was ohosen before s e l f , and the s e l f thus became 
i 
established I n righteousness: but I t was a small degree of 
self-adherence, so small that only one act of choice was 
required to e s t a b l i s h man i n the opposite condition of God-
adherence. The implications of Nelbuhr's language about the 
p r e - f a l l condition are opposed to t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l view of 
o r i g i n a l righteousness, and cannot be made to cohere with 
any idea of o r i g i n a l f a i t h , hope, and love. 
There would, further, seem to be a tendency to blur 
moral d i s t i n c t i o n s , when i t i s assumed by Neibuhr that the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for s i n s which spring inevitably from a f i r s t 
s i n , i s exactly the same i n quality as the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for that f i r s t s i n which did not spring inevitably from the 
s i t u a t i o n of f i n i t e n e s s and freedom plus the f a c t of 
(someone else's) s i n . As l i n k succeeds l i n k i n the 
lengthening chain of inevitable s i n , can any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for the l a t e s t l i n k be of exactly the same degree as that for 
the f i r s t ? The moral sense surely r i s e s up i n r e v o l t against 
such a suggestion. Whether I begin the process or not, what 
follows i s sheerly determined, and determinism of any kind 
(self-inaugurated or not) unavoidably affeots the question 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
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Again Niebuhr assumes that while the f i r s t s i n was not 
inevitable, i t made others inevitable. This i s an 
unwarranted assumption. The ground on which i t i s assumed 
that the f i r s t s i n was not inevitable, i s c l e a r . God i s love, 
and therefore He must allow the p o s s i b i l i t y , i n the beginning, 
of choosing whether to s i n or not to s i n . The f i r s t s i n , 
therefore, oould not have been inevitable. Whence does 
Niebuhr get the idea, however, that once the individual s i n s , 
further s i n i s Inevitable? I t i s a non sequitur. We may 
only say that as the f i r s t s i n was not inevitable, but was 
highly probable, so succeeding sins were not inevitable but 
only highly probable. We may vary the degree of probability, 
but we have no right to assert i n e v i t a b i l i t y . 
Again, i f o r i g i n a l s i n i s only constituted by the 
addition of aotual s i n to the already e x i s t i n g human 
sit u a t i o n of fi n l t e n e s s and freedom and anxiety and a tendency 
to s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n and someone else' s s i n , (see p.270), ° 
then I t means that the individual does not beoome possessed 
of o r i g i n a l s i n u n t i l the f i r s t s i n i s committed. This means 
that each individual i s born without o r i g i n a l s i n , that he i s 
born, i n f a c t , o r i g i n a l l y righteous, and t h i s has obvious and 
serious repercussions on the doctrine of baptismal regeneration 
i n the case, of infants. 
Furthermore, o r i g i n a l s i n has always been differentiated 
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from aotual s i n . Niebuhr himself draws the d i s t i n c t i o n when 
he i s talking about anxiety. "Anxiety" he says, " i s neither 
aotual nor o r i g i n a l s i n " (p.266). I f , however, what 
converts the o r i g i n a l s i t u a t i o n of man into o r i g i n a l sin. i s 
the individual's f i r s t aotual s i n , then each person can be 
said to s i n o r i g i n a l s i n into existenoe, and aotual s i n i s 
an indispensable element i n o r i g i n a l sin,.and so the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two cannot be maintained as consist-
ently as i t has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y . 
The v a l i d i t y of Niebuhr*s arguments from Scripture i s 
sometimes questionable. I n seeking to show that the s i n of 
Unbelief i s not necessary, he quotes Romans, 1-30, (p.268), 
and describes the Pauline psychology exhibited there, as 
"penetrating and s i g n i f i c a n t " . "Man's freedom which tempts 
to anxiety also contains the i d e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of knowing 
God. Man i s without excuse, St. Paul declares, because "the 
i n v i s i b l e things of him from the oreation of the world are 
c l e a r l y seen, being understood by the things that are made, 
even h i s eternal power and Godhead." Niebuhr, i f he r e a l l y 
agrees with St. Paul here, commits himself to the b e l i e f 
that from the beginning man was able to perceive through 
external oreation, the nature and oharaoter of God s u f f i c i e n t l y 
to warrant perfect t r u s t i n Him. That man's f i r s t 
apprehension of God through Nature was anything l i k e a d e a r 
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seeing of Him, suoh as would encourage a response of t r u s t 
cannot be supported by anything that we know, or surmise from 
what we know, of man*s beginnings. Man's f i r s t r e l i g i o u s 
perceptions resided i n a vague and disturbing sense of the 
numinous: the reaotion c a l l e d out by that can soaroely 
legitimately be regarded as having been one of t r u s t . St. 
Paul had no knowledge of evolution.as we understand i t . He 
believed i n the s p e c i a l creation of man apart from the 
beasts. He oould only, naturally, believe i n man as having 
been created with an immediate a b i l i t y to perceive God, 
through the medium of Nature, as being One whom he oould t r u s t . 
This Pauline psychology, i n the context of Niebuhr's argument, 
can soaroely be c a l l e d "penetrating" or " s i g n i f i c a n t " . That 
i t i s so oalled r e f l e c t s adversely upon the position which i t 
i s employed to defend, and not a l i t t l e upon the psychology 
of the one who so defends i t . 
Again, on page 269, he says "The idea that the 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y of s i n i s not due merely to the strength of 
the temptation i n which man stands by reason of h i s r e l a t i o n 
to both the temporal process and et e r n i t y i s most perfectly 
expressed i n the so r i p t u r a l words: "Let no man say when he 
i s tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted 
with e v i l , neither tempteth he any man: But every man i s 
tempted, when he i s drawn away of h i s own l u s t and enticed. 
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Then when l u s t hath oonoeived i t bringeth forth s i n : and s i n , 
when i t i s finished, bringeth forth death." (James, 1, 13-15). 
A l l that St. James i s saying here i s that man i s 
tempted by reason of c e r t a i n desires i n him: when these 
desires are yielded to, s i n follows, and when s i n i s persisted 
i n , i t leads to death. He says nothing about s i n becoming 
inevitable a f t e r a f i r s t s i n , or about the f i r s t s i n being 
the r e s u l t of yielding to something which i s extra to the 
« 
o r i g i n a l human situation. When c e r t a i n things happen c e r t a i n 
other things follow, but i t i s not inevitable that they 
s h a l l happen. Sin may be committed many times, but i t i s 
by no means inevitable that i t w i l l be persisted.in u n t i l 
the end. We are not e n t i t l e d to. speak of i n e v i t a b i l i t y i n 
connection with s i n , only of probability. Actually t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r utteranoe of St. James oould be made to f i t an 
evolutionary account of temptation f a r better than a 
.traditional account (temptation due to Satan). God oannot 
be said to tempt man deliberately to do e v i l , but He can 
be said to be responsible for the s i t u a t i o n i n which 
temptation i s inevitable, whioh temptation, however, He i s 
pledged to help man to r e s i s t by His graoe. 
There would seem to be l i t t l e doubt that Niebuhr (p.195) 
i n passing straight from a disousslon of the anxiety which 
i s the inevitable oonoomitant of the o r i g i n a l p r e - f a l l human 
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situation, to consider Jesus* words "Be not anxious..." 
i s confusing two e n t i r e l y different psychological conditions. 
Kierkegaard's 'Angst', to whioh Niebuhr r e f e r s i n a note, 
represents a premonition, an unoanny apprehension of a 
somewhat impending. I t i s directed towards nothing i n 
pa r t i c u l a r . What might be experienced i s unknown, unguessed. 
The only content of the premonition i s sheer p o s s i b i l i t y . 
The anxiety whioh Jesus depreoated was, however, f u l l of 
past experience, of memories of starvation, nakedness, 
privation, and so forth. We oannot equate the f i r s t vague 
shuddering apprehension of freedom i n the f i r s t man before 
the f a l l , with the very concrete economic worries of a f i r s t 
century Galilean peasant! 
There i s one further oritloism. Niebuhr attempts to 
distinguish between "the equality of s i n , and the inequality 
of g u i l t , (pp.233 f f ) i , but h i s attempt has been severely 
c r i t i c i s e d by E. D. Lewis (Morals and the New Theology, 
pp.61 f f ) and by 0. G. Quick (The Gospel of the New World, 
note on p.48). He says we must continue to respect "the 
r e l a t i v e achievements of history", but t h i s must somehow be 
done without prejudice to "the proposition that a l l 
men are sinners equally i n the sight of God." He does t h i s 
by a ourious d i s t i n c t i o n between s i n and g u i l t . " A l l men 
are sinners" but "there i s nevertheless an ascertainable 
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inequality of g u i l t among men i n the a c t u a l i t i e s of history. 
Guilt i s distinguished from s i n i n that i t represents the 
objective and h i s t o r i c a l oonsequenoes of s i n , " and " i t i s 
important to recognise that B i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n has 
emphasised t h i s inequality of g u i l t j u s t as much as the 
equality of s i n . " "Men who are equally sinners i n the sight 
of God need not be equally g u i l t y of a s p e c i f i c act of wrong 
doing i n which they are involved: I t i s to the g u i l t of 
men that the l e s s and more of h i s t o r i c a l judgments r e f e r s . " 
I t i s s u f f i c i e n t here to notice Quiok's answer. He 
says that Nlebuhr "strangely maintains that g u i l t i s 
distinguishable from s i n i n that i t represents the objeotive 
and h i s t o r i c a l oonsequenoes of s i n . " (Niebuhr) seems to have 
f a l l e n into a confusion between (a) what the sinner's aot 
causes and may loosely be said to be responsible for, and 
(b) that ( i n the aot and i t s oonsequenoes) for which the 
sinner i s personally responsible. I n a moral universe, g u i l t 
i s p r e c i s e l y that which makes a man l i a b l e to the s t r i c t l y 
penal operations of God's law, or, as St. Paul would put i t , 
to the imputation of s i n . " 
I t i s i n view of such oritiolsms that Nlebuhr's attempt 
to r e s t a t e the doctrines of o r i g i n a l righteousness and 
o r i g i n a l s i n must be regarded as unsatisfactory. 
2. Bff BwyjwfrT. 
Brunner may be c a l l e d the continental counterpart of 
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the American Niebuhr. So. f a r as they both represent a 
determined effort to hold " i n tension" the b e l i e f i n man's 
freedom and sin' s i n e v i t a b i l i t y , they represent an attitude 
which finds i t s extremest expression i n K a r l Barth, with 
whom both disagree so f a r as h i s extremism i s concerned. 
Brunner agrees with Niebuhr i n holding that the image 
of God i n man i s revealed i n the very perversion of s i n . I t 
i s beoause a man can s i n that he can be said s t i l l to 
r e t a i n the imago del. " I n h i s s i n he shows the supernatural 
s p i r i t power whioh issues from the primal image of God" 
(Man i n Revolt, p.132). Like Niebuhr he re j e o t s the 
Catholic dootrlne of the donum superadditum. He c a l l s i t 
the doctrine of the double imago (sim i l i t u d e , imago), and 
desoribes i t as "the f a t a l fundamental error of a l l the 
anthropology of the Church." (appendix i , p.513). 
Unlike Niebuhr he does not attempt even a p a r t i a l 
and conditional j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t . He holds that while 
e s s e n t i a l nature i s not unoorrupted human nature, as 
taught by the Roman Catholic Church, neither i s i t merely 
a r e l i o of the o r i g i n a l human nature, as was taught by the 
Reformers. He agrees with Niebuhr i n r e j e c t i n g the 
Protestant doctrine of the r e l i c , and i s opposed to extremist 
ideas of t o t a l depravity, whioh represent the humanum as a 
profanum. I n t h i s they both disagree with K a r l Barth, whom 
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Niebuhr quotes as conceding only that "man i s man and not a 
cat", so f a r as hi s s i n f u l state i s oonoerned (Man i n 
Revolt, appendix i , p.513: also p.95: Nature and Destiny of 
Man, vol. i , p.285). 
Brunner agrees with Niebuhr i n disavowing the h i s t o r i o a l 
l i t e r a l i s t l c error. "The Adam who was created i n the image 
of God i s not a far off primitive being, but you, me, 
everybody. The primitive state i s not an h i s t o r i o a l period, 
but an h i s t o r i o a l moment, the moment of the di v i n e l y created 
ori g i n , which we only know i n oontrast with s i n " (op.oit. 
pp.110-111). This agrees with Niebuhr*s idea that o r i g i n a l 
righteousness i s only known to sinners i n the moment of 
self-tranaoendenoe. 
At f i r s t sight there would appear to be a diVergenoe 
between the two, i n the matter of describing the f i r s t s i n . 
Niebuhr, as we have seen, holds that the basio primal s i n i s 
mistrust, lack of f a i t h towards God. Brunner states quite 
p l a i n l y that he believes i t i s presumption, arrogance, 
rebel l i o n , the attempt to measure s e l f against God. 
(op.cit., p.129), yet he says, a l i t t l e l a t e r , that "man i s 
led astray i n such a way that, once desire i s aroused, i t 
m i l i t a t e s against confidence i n God." This would appear to 
introduce the s i n of mistrust, though i t i s not dealt with 
s p e c i f i c a l l y . 
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Both agree that human s i n i s not wholly Satanio. I t i s 
not pure undiluted arrogance. I t i s part weakness, part 
r e b e l l i o n . They attribute t h i s to the fact that man i s led 
astray by e v i l forces already at work. "Man, by himself, i s 
not great enough to discover s i n and introduce i t into the 
world." (Brunner, op.oit. p.131). The f i n a l ground of s i n , 
however, i s , "we love ourselves more than our Creator" 
(p.132). The significance of that l a s t sentence i s v i t a l . 
I f i t i s f u l l y accepted i t r e a l l y excludes any doctrine of 
o r i g i n a l righteousness, and i t supports the idea of o r i g i n a l 
self-oentrednesa. Brunner, however, as we s h a l l see i n our 
l a s t chapter, i s inconsistent i n h i s retention of o r i g i n a l 
righteousness I n view of the distance he i s prepared to go i n 
support of the evolutionary account of man*s origin. There 
i s also agreement between Brunner and Niebuhr on the point 
that man sins inevitably and i s yet responsible for h i s s i n . 
Man i s not a sinner because of h i s s i n s . He s i n s because he 
i s a sinner, yet i s responsible for being a sinner. He i s 
responsible for o r i g i n a l s i n , which I s the souroe of his 
aotual sins now. Brunner's own version of t h i s doctrine i s 
oontained i n h i s words "man i s responsible for h i s s i n , but 
also for the f a c t that he i s a s i n f u l creature " i . e . that he 
has a s i n f u l nature, (op.cit. o.vi.) 
We remember that, for Niebuhr, sinfulness was i n i t i a t e d 
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by the f i r s t s i n which set going the process of inevitable 
s i n . Brunner holds that when man sins he destroys the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of doing what he oould have done. He c a l l s t h i s 
"the mystery of the irreparable.•" (op.oit.p.132). 
Again, Brunner argues that a l l human s i n has an element 
of weakness: i t i s mingled with anxiety (p.131). "Man 
oannot s i n " he says, "simply from arrogance...the mixed 
character of primal s i n i s desoribed i n an inimitable way i n 
the story of the f a l l . I t i s a f r u i t which a t t r a c t s , i t i s 
a whispered doubt which s t i r s , i t i s the dream of being 
l i k e God which turns the s c a l e . " 
We are j u s t i f i e d , i n view of these words, i n asking 
whether Brunner has unconsciously implicated himself i n 
Niebuhr's idea of a tendency towards s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n 
e x i s t i n g prior to that bias to s i n , which, i t i s held by 
both, was originated by man? Brunner admits there i s 
"weakness mingled with anxiety." With t h i s we can compare 
Niebuhr's words about the i d e a l p o s s i b i l i t y that " f a i t h might 
purge anxiety of the tendency towards s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n " . 
This idea of weakness i n man's i n i t i a l state argues the 
presence of some factor i n h i s very o r i g i n a l constitution 
which tends to weaken him i n a s i t u a t i o n where strength i s 
required. The s i t u a t i o n i s that of temptation, and weakness 
i n the face of temptation means only one thing, an at t r a c t i o n 
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towards what i s forbidden. Brunner admits as much - " i t i s 
a f r u i t which a t t r a c t s " . Man cannot help t h i s attraotiveness 
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of the forbidden. He oannot, at f i r s t , help h i s desires. He 
i s made l i k e i t ; i t i s a constitutional thing, and for i t 
he cannot be held responsible. Both writers thus find a plaoe 
for self-oentredness i n man at the beginning, and both, at 
one time or another, imply the preponderance of t h i s element. 
I n t h e i r own ways these two theologians give expression 
to a truth whioh most men reoognise, namely, that s i n has a 
cumulative ef f e c t , and i n i t s onward course moves towards 
a v i r t u a l " i n e v l t a b l i s l n g n of i t s e l f . This i s expressed by 
Niebuhr, as we have seen, i n h i s idea of the f i r s t s i n making 
subsequent s i n inevitable, and by Brunner i n h i s idea of the 
mystery of the irreparable.. They i n c o r r e c t l y represent t h i s 
truth i n that they attribute to the f i r s t s i n the effect whioh 
i n r e a l i t y oan only be allowed to t i e heaped up sinning of 
years. Their motive i n taking up t h i s position i s , presumably, 
to defend God against any possible charge of having made man • 
In suoh a way that s i n , i n the beginning, was harder to r e s i s t 
than to. commit .We s h a l l speak of t h i s later., 
3. Karl Barth. 
Barth i n s i s t s that we view man exclusively i n the 
oontext of graoe and the w i l l of God. Man i s a creature i n 
t o t a l dependence of being upon the gracious w i l l of God, 
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a dependence which can be reokoned as from moment to moment 
(The Reformed doctrine of Creatio Gontinua). Barth has 
expressed t h i s continual r e l a t i o n of the creature to the 
Creator i n h i s teaching about the Holy S p i r i t . "The 
creature requires the Creator i n order to l i v e . He thus 
requires r e l a t i o n to Him, but t h i s r e l a t i o n he cannot create. 
God oreates i t through His presence to the creature, i . e . i n 
the form of a r e l a t i o n of Himself to Himself. The S p i r i t of 
God i s God Himself i n His freedom to be present to the 
creature, and so to oreate t h i s r e l a t i o n , and thereby to be 
the l i f e of the creature." (Dootrine of the word of God, 
pp.515 f f . ) . 
The image of God i s not to be understood as a doctrine 
about man's being i n himself: i t i s rather an acknowledgment 
that he depends e n t i r e l y on the w i l l of Another whose grace 
and truth he images i n a knowledgeable and obedient r e l a t i o n to 
the word of Graoe. This image i s grounded i n God's w i l l to 
create man i n fellowship with Himself, and that o r i g i n a l 
intention remains no matter what happens. Were i t not to 
remain, man would simply pass out of exlstenoe. The 
objeotive basis of the image i s , therefore, the graoe of God. 
Subjectively i t i s man's thankful witness to that graoe, and 
the power and substance of h i s witness l i e i n what he 
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witnesses t o , not i n his witness i t s e l f . I t i s essentially 
supernatural, grounded i n grace, possessed only i n f a i t h . I t 
i s that which God has put in t o us, not by nature, but by 
graoe. 
Barth repudiates St. Augustine's idea that i n the mind 
i t s e l f , even before i t i s a partaker of God, His image i s 
found (De T r i n i t a t e 14, 8 ) , and oa l l s i t the discovery of 
anti-C h r i s t . Man cannot arrogate the image of God to 
himself as though i t were a natural possession of his own 
being. This i s the root motion of o r i g i n a l s i n . We must 
maintain the B i b l i c a l view of graoe, w i t h i t s account of 
the dynamic r e l a t i o n between man and God. 
As regards o r i g i n a l righteousness Berth's view would 
appear t o be that Adam was neither the perfect paragon of 
manhood, nor the merely amoral innocent. Adam*s righteousness 
was found i n the word of God i n t o whioh he was brought by 
creation i n a lovin g personal rela t i o n s h i p . He lyas 
o r i g i n a l l y oreated righteous i n the sense tha t he was i n 
obedienoe t o the Word and W i l l of God. For Barth, the whole 
notion of evolution i s quite i r r e l e v a n t when we understand 
oreation and the f a l l properly,.for evolution is> grounded 
upon seoondary causes, and theology oannot thi n k i n those 
terms. I t i s a confusion t o t h i n k the two together. Barth, 
i n e f f e o t , treats the idea of evolution w i t h something l i k e 
oontempt. 
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So f a r as the temptation and f a l l of man are oonoerned, 
he believes I n a prehuman order of angels, and I n the f a l l 
of some of them, and i t i s one of these, the Devil, who i s 
behind the temptation and f a l l of man. Theologically Barth 
would say nothing about a pre-human perversion of. l i f e . He 
holds s t r i c t l y t o the S o r i p t u r a l view of the cursing of the 
world with the f a l l , whatever that may e n t a i l . I n a very 
d e f i n i t e sense he believes that the s i n of Adam i s the 
o r i g i n of the sinfulness of the race. As regards any theory 
of the o r i g i n and effects of s i n , he may be said t o be 
c a l l i n g men back t o the Reformed theological outlook as 
that i s c h i e f l y presented by Calvin. 
Barth guards against misunderstanding the doctrine of 
depravity by planting i t f i r m l y i n the context of grace 
(Credo, pp.43 f f . Doctrine of the Word of God, p.466). God 
does not delight i n man's depravity. The sinner i s s t i l l 
maintained i n being by the very graoe which he contradicts. 
A l l his v i r t u e s and endowments are due to graoe. The t o t a l 
judgment of grace, therefore, does not mean a Judgment upon 
these i n themselves, but means they have been wholly 
polluted i n the active perversity of sin . Grace indicates 
that the whole r e l a t i o n between man and God, called the imago 
dei , has been perverted i n t o i t s opposite so that the t r u t h 
of God i s turned i n t o a l i e . "The re v e l a t i o n of God i n Jesus 
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Christ means the discovery of the darkness which i s man, the 
discovery not of something which he lacks, but of who and 
what he i s . To be man means now to be an enemy of God, and 
t h i s means t o be the destroyer of one fs own proper glory. 
What i s our sin? I t i s what we are and what we do." (The 
knowledge of God and the Service of God. pp.49-54). 
Barth i s at one w i t h Niebuhr and Brunner i n i n s i s t i n g that 
the image of God i n man ought t o be conceived dynamically. I t 
i s a oer t a i n q u a l i t y of personal r e l a t i o n s h i p between man and 
God. He d i f f e r s from them i n his b e l i e f that s i n completely 
destroys that r e l a t i o n s h i p . They believe that the image 
rel a t i o n s h i p i s only marred. Barth's i n s i g h t i s surely the 
more profound, a oonviotion whioh springs from an 
examination of the meaning of the image of God i n man, and 
of what happens when man sins. 
God loves man, and i t i s His w i l l t h a t man should 
respond w i t h f a i t h , hope and love. The image i s seen i n man 
when he so responds. When God made man i n His image, i t does 
not mean that man loved God at f i r s t p e r f e c t l y , f o r i f he had, 
he could not have loved himself more than God, and so have 
sinned. No man yet has loved God p e r f e c t l y , save Jesus 
Christ. I f God made man i n His own image, i t means therefore 
that the image re l a t i o n s h i p existed even while man was not 
yet perfect i n f a i t h , hope and love. This i s important f o r i t 
enables us to see th a t man learned t o love God while being to 
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some degree i n love w i t h himself. Man, I n love with himself 
at f i r s t , began t o f a l l i n love w i t h God by the graoe of God. 
A new love, however, does not at once obmpletely oust an old 
love. A b a t t l e begins, and i s waged over a period between 
s e l f and the new object of love. The duration and i n t e n s i t y 
of the struggle i s i n dlreot proportion to the strength of 
the hold which the f i r s t love has gained over s e l f . I n the 
moment of self-love's v i c t o r y , love of God oannot be said t o 
exist at a l l . Man oannot love himself and God equally at one 
and the same time, and c e r t a i n l y i n the moment of disobedience 
and r e b e l l i o n , f a i t h hope and love u t t e r l y perish. They are 
simply non-existent i n that moment of the consummation of 
self-love. I n that moment, therefore, there can be no 
image-relationship i n man. 
Brunner and Niebuhr base t h e i r claims that the image i s 
not t o t a l l y destroyed but only damaged, on the evidence of 
man1s feelings of g u i l t , remorse, and what he ought to be. 
These feelings are the a o t i v i t y of the marred image, they 
believe, but we have t o notioe that they only succeed the 
moment of self-love's consummation. They do not exist 
during t h a t moment I t s e l f , and they are, therefore, 
separated from the condition of Image re l a t i o n s h i p by that 
moment. We have to stress the fact that i t i s an I n t e g r a l 
part of the triumph of s i n t h a t t o be enjoyed, i t banishes, 
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or rather simply does not permit, these feelings of g u i l t , 
e t c , i n the moment of actual consummation. That moment may 
be but a f r a c t i o n of a second i n duration, but i t i s of the 
essence of s i n that f o r so long, s e l f - w i l l triumphs u t t e r l y . 
I t may happen t h a t , as time goes on, through the 
pressure of God's graoe, s i n may oome t o be enjoyed less and 
less, and the moment of enjoyment may consequently shrink, 
t i l l i t can soaroely be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from the overwhelming 
sense of g u i l t ; but at f i r s t , at any r a t e , s i n has i t s 
triumph i n the complete exclusion of t h i s sense from the 
moment of consummation. That i s why s i n i s r e b e l l i o n . I t 
shuts the door i n the face of God's pleading or accusing 
love. I t enjoys i t s e l f completely at f i r s t . 
I n suoh a moment the image perishes, but God's grace 
does not cease. The fashion of i t s oountenanoe may be 
altered to that of wrath, but i t i s s t i l l redeeming love 
and i t i s t h i s love, whioh, at work on the soul that has 
sinned, brings to b i r t h i n that soul, by a miracle of 
recreation, the image of God, though now w i t h the fashion of 
i t s oountenanoe altered, through the experience of g u i l t , 
fear, sorrow, s e l f - l o a t h i n g , e t c Slnoe these things are 
signs of the s e l f turning away from sel f - l o v e , they must 
be signs of the s e l f turning towards love of God, whloh love 
i s God's image i n man. 
Brunner and Niebuhr, i n estimating the effeot of s i n 
upon the image, pass immediately i n t h e i r analysis from the 
moment of the image unspoiled by s i n , t o the moment of the 
recreated image i n the sinner, now mingled f o r the f i r s t time 
w i t h the memory of sin . I n doing so they pass over t h a t v i t a l 
moment of sin's consummation, i n which the image i s non-
existent, not spoiled but completely destroyed. I f the image 
i s t o be conceived dynamically, not s t a t i c a l l y and 
meohanioally, then i t i s not a question of a bowl being broken, 
and the broken pieoe being cemented back i n t o plaoe by the 
maker, or anything l i k e t h a t . I t i s a question of something 
exis t i n g one minute, and not exi s t i n g at a l l the next. I t i s 
not a question of man's unalterable basic struoture, but of 
his loving and not loving, of being f a i t h f u l and not f a i t h f u l . 
The reoreatlon of the image does not mean a going back 
to the o r i g i n a l s i t u a t i o n , making man as he was before s i n 
happened, f o r the o r i g i n a l s i t u a t i o n oannot happen again. 
Henceforth the image of God has to be created i n a creature 
d i f f e r e n t from the one i n whom the image was f i r s t created, 
namely, one who i s now g u i l t y of having destroyed i t . The 
feelings of remorse and g u i l t , and the sense of what one 
ought t o be but i s not, are not, as Niebuhr suggests, what 
i s l e f t of the o r i g i n a l image: they are the reaction of a 
s i n f u l man, i n whom s i n has completely destroyed the image, 
to the recreation i n him of that image. As the o r i g i n a l 
s i t u a t i o n oannot happen again, so the way i n whioh the image 
i s possessed by sinners oannot be the same as the way i n 
which i t was possessed o r i g i n a l l y . 
Berth's analysis i s surely the more profound, 
psychologically, s p i r i t u a l l y . Brunner and Niebuhr may claim 
that they are out to establish a dynamlo concept of the 
image, but so long as they hold that s i n only mars the image 
but does not destroy i t , so long are they g u i l t y of r e t a i n i n g 
the idea t h a t the image i s something substantial, almost 
meohanioal. They seem t o t h i n k that the image i s some basic 
substance i n man's soul, which w i l l endure so long as the 
soul endures, and which may be weakened by s i n , as a body 
i s by disease, but whioh s t i l l endures beneath the assault, 
r e q u i r i n g only a r e s t o r a t i o n t o f u l l health. They seem to 
believe that the image i n s i n f u l man i s l i k e a sick body and 
sin the disease whioh needs curing. Barth believes that the 
image i n man's soul at the moment of sin's consummation i s 
l i k e a dead body, which needs God's miraculous act to 
restore i t to l i f e . (We are here oonsoious of the l i m i t a t i o n s 
of our analogy but we believe the point i s d e a r whioh we 
wish to make). The image relationship i n s i n f u l man, i s , 
for Barth a s i t u a t i o n of continual destruction and recreation. 
I t i s not a question of something whioh, i n essenoe, exists 
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beneath a l l the weight of s i n , kept a l i v e a l l the time, l i k e 
the soul, by the graoe of God. 
Nlebuhr and Brunner are r i g h t i n holding that what we 
have of the image of God i s marred and imperfect, but they 
are wrong i n thinking that the marred and imperfeot image 
exists permanently i n s i n f u l man even i n the moment of 
deliberate sin. The image of God i s not as tough as that. 
I n the moment of sin's commission i t simply ceases to be. 
i 
"Ye cannot serve God and mammon" 'said Jesus. "Either 
we hate the one and love the other, or else we despise the 
one and hold to the other." We oannot love both at the same 
time, and i f we love s e l f we are not loving God, tha t i s , i n 
the moment of self-love's consummation, which i s s i n , we are 
completely out of the image r e l a t i o n s h i p , which consists 
solely i n loving God. 
4. J. S. Whale. 
We may oonolude t h i s section on modern Augustinians by 
r e f e r r i n g to J". S. Whale, whose views on s i n may be found i n 
h i s essay i n "The Ch r i s t i a n F a i t h " , edited by Matthews 
(seoond e d i t i o n 1944), i n an a r t i o l e i n the Expository Times 
f o r A p r i l 1940, and i n Chapter Two of hi s book, Christian 
Doctrine (1941). He i s consistent throughout these. He 
agrees with Niebuhr i n r e j e c t i n g the l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the Genesis story. Like him, he makes the p r e - f a l l period, 
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and the f a l l i t s e l f i n Genesis symbols of what i s true f o r 
every man. "Every man i s his own Adam", and " a l l men are 
s o l l d a r l l y Adam" (Expository Times p.317). 
He agrees w i t h Niebuhr and Brunner i n holding that 
man's very s i n t e s t i f i e s t o the Image which i t defaces. Sin 
presupposes the imago del. Man could not be godless without 
God, a faot whioh, he says, has an important bearing on the 
doctrine of t o t a l corruption. He also agrees that the Imago 
del i s present t o man by way of wrath, judgment and the 
conception of 'ought'. The Image of God i s man's responsible 
awareness, hi s addressability (Anspreohbarkeit) as Brunner 
c a l l s i t . The essence of s i n i s man's self-centred denial of 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i v e endowment: i t s f i n a l ground i s pride, and i t s 
active manifestation self"love (oonouplsoenoe). 
Total corruption he holds t o mean (and always t o have 
meant i n spite of Luther's extravagant outbursts), not that 
the stream of h i s t o r y i s s o l i d mud (a person t o t a l l y 
oorrupt i n t h i s sense would be incapable of s i n ) , but that 
i t i s d i r t y i n every part of i t s oourse. The dootrine 
represents the t r u t h t h a t though man can do many wonderful 
things, he cannot reconcile himself t o God, obtain dominion 
over s i n , and over the world by himself, without Christ. 
His formulation of the subject of universal sinfulness, 
however, i s unsatisfactory. He holds that the Augustiriian 
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dootrine of o r i g i n a l s i n only made actual sins inevitable. 
I t was, i n f a c t , a kind of determinism, and i n t h i s i t was 
resembled by modern psychological bio l o g i o a l and sooiologioal 
"explanations" of s i n . Yet i n spite of.these assertions, 
Whale would appear to play very l a r g e l y i n t o the hands of 
determinism; where he appears t o avoid doing so, i t i s only 
by leaving the question of the bias to e v i l f i n a l l y 
unexplained. Here, we must examine his p o s i t i o n a l i t t l e 
more i n d e t a i l . 
The faot t h a t s i n i s an empirically universal f a c t 
leads him to suspeot a bias or perversion of the human w i l l . 
He c a l l s t h i s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aspect of the problem, and -. 
holds that i t was t h i s t o which St. Paul was r e f e r r i n g i n 
Rom. 7.13. when he spoke of s i n "where no law i s " . Whale 
desoribes t h i s as "that deadly s p i r i t u a l wrongness which 
pervades a l l humanity", and which, being obj e c t i v e l y contrary 
t o God's, purpose, and glory, alienates men from God even 
though they are not s t r i c t l y blameworthy. Sin i s there, he 
says, but " i t i s not imputed." 
He i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s unconsoious, non-guilty kind of s i n , 
by quoting the case of a cannibal who though "he could not 
possibly have known any better" yet "grieved the Holy S p i r i t " 
by his cannibalism. (The Christian Faith, ed. Matthews, p.124). 
We have to notice that "grieving the Holy S p i r i t " i s an 
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expression reserved i n Scripture to describe the effects of 
conscious sin: i t s transference t o the oase of a cannibal 
i s questionable. Be that as i t may, i f the cannibal could not 
possibly have known any better, then what he did was (as Whale 
has already half-suggested by aotually using the word) 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . But i f his c o n s t i t u t i o n was displeasing to 
God, God oould hardly be responsible f o r i t . Who; then, 
was responsible? 
At t h i s point we should expect Whale to have recourse, 
l i k e Brunner and Niebuhr to the idea of the f a l l of Satan. 
He does not do so, however. Instead, he substitutes the idea 
of " s p i r i t u a l s o l i d a r i t y ^ i n e v i l " ; Ritsbhl's "Kingdom of Sin", 
i n f a c t , by which the e v i l aots of each i n d i v i d u a l are 
reinforced. He quotes St. Augustine's phrase "massa 
peooatrix", Sohleirmacher's " i n each the work of a l l , i n 
a l l the work of each," and Dostoievsky's "we are each 
responsible to a l l f o r a l l " (pp.46,47 C h r i s t i a n Doctrine). 
He r e f e r s to the psychologists* disoovery of the c o l l e c t i v e 
unconscious, whioh shows that even below the unconscious 
l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l there i s a deep layer (as i t were) 
of hidden inborn forces: i t s content i s not i n d i v i d u a l , but 
universal, and, as suoh, beyond the oonsoious control of the 
w i l l . He conoludes that I n speaking thus, psychology i s only 
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confirming the witness of the New Testament th a t humanity i s 
subject t o a possession or i n f e c t i o n by e v i l from which no 
in d i v i d u a l oan dissociate himself. This possession i s so 
s i n i s t e r , ounning, and strong, that the New Testament can 
only describe i t i n terms of demonic powers. "The 
per s o n i f i c a t i o n of e v i l as Satan, d l f f i o u l t though i t i s for 
our thoughts, stands f o r the fact of s p i r i t u a l s o l i d a r i t y i n 
e v i l whioh w i l l not be evaded or ignored." (p.47 Chris t i a n 
Dootrine). 
Whale thus mentions Satan only i n order to i n t e r p r e t him 
soolologioally and psychologically, an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n whioh I s 
p l a i n l y against the sense i n whioh he was t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
conceived, and which cannot therefore be equated w i t h what 
Satan "stands f o r " . I f there i s no such being as Satan, and 
I f the deeply hidden e v i l tendencies i n human nature are " 
connected with the i n t e r l o c k i n g of l i v e s t o form an organlo 
system of e v i l , then what becomes of the f i r s t beginnings of . 
e v i l i n the f i r s t human beings? I f the f i r s t men appeared 
w i t h t h i s characteristic of submerged e v i l , already i n them, 
whenoe came i t ? Whale dismisses the explanation of "necessary 
appetites Inherited from the sub-human world t o which man i s 
akin by evolution" (p. 127 The Christian F a i t h ) . Yet i f t h i s 
bias of our nature oan be called a condition of sinfulness 
mysteriously c o n s t i t u t i v e of our empirical make up, who i s 
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responsible for the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l fact? I t did not come from 
God, f o r God would not create what would "grieve His Holy 
S p i r i t " . I t did not oome from Satan, for that name apparently 
does not represent a person. I t could not oome from man 
himself i f he was born w i t h i t , and i f i t l i e s i n th a t area of 
l i f e - below even the unconscious - f o r which no i n d i v i d u a l 
can be held f u l l y responsible. Whale thus leaves the question 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y hanging i n the a i r . He does, indeed, say that 
the i n d i v i d u a l i s u l t i m a t e l y responsible f o r every f u l l y 
s i n f u l disposition, and f o r muoh of the content of the 
unconsoious (p.128. The Christian F a i t h ) , but the words " f u l l y " 
and "muoh" reveal his mental reservations concerning a oertain 
degree of inborn c o n s t i t u t i o n a l tendency t o e v i l , and mans 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t . Whale may thus be said to conclude 
that there are e v i l forces at work i n man when he f i r s t 
appears, but who or what i s responsible for them, he does not 
p l a i n l y say. He goes as f a r as he oan i n defining man's 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r suoh o r i g i n a l s i n , but he stops short of 
pos i t i n g f u l l and unqualified r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n t h i s he i s 
less bold than Niebuhr and Brunner, and, although he says 
that s i n i s a oonoept involving the language not of 
philosophy, or of law, or of ethios, but of r e l i g i o n , one 
feels i t i s beoause of his i n a b i l i t y to dissociate 
hi s r e l i g i o u s thought, as muoh as he might wish, from h i s 
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e t h i c a l thought, that he takes up t h i s p o s i t i o n towards the 
question of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
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V. MOliiERN THOMISTS. 
We can now look at three modern exponents of the Thomist 
doctrine concerning man's o r i g i n a l condition, h i s f a l l , and the 
consequences, v i z . , F.H/'. May cock, F.J. H a l l , and C.J. Lewis. 
1. F. H.. Mayoock. This w r i t e r gives a clear and w e l l defined 
picture of the Catholic view i n h i s book "Original Sin." We 
sh a l l look a t what he has t o say about the f a l l of the angels, 
o r i g i n a l righteousness, and o r i g i n a l sin., 
(a) The F a l l of the Angels* 
The main quarrel that we have w i t h his account of how e v i l 
f i r s t entered the universe, of the nature and fun c t i o n of the 
angels, of the f a l l of some of them, and of the e f f e c t s of t h a t 
f a l l , i s the same as that which we would sustain against C.S. 
Lewis i n his account of the f a l l of Paradisal man. I f words 
are t o be taken to mean what they say, i f moral questions are 
to be treated seriously, then i t must be affirmed that such 
creatures as these angels could not possibly have been tempted 
i n the way desoribed, l e t alone have yielded t o temptation. 
The angels are said to be "perfect i n beauty" (pi38). 
Since they are pure s p i r i t s , that means perfect s p i r i t u a l beauty 
and since beauty is something that i s beheld, i t means they were 
b e a u t i f u l , not only to themselves and to other angels but also 
t o God who et e r n a l l y beheld them. S p i r i t u a l beauty refers t o 
one thi n g , v i z , character. Perfect beauty of character i n God's 
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eyes - i s thus the only meaning t h a t oan.be given t o t h i s phrase. 
They are also said to be perfect i n wisdom, and that means, 
amongst other things, unable to be deceived. Theirs i s a "perfed 
and harmonious s p i r i t u a l world","WitJioCibblemish", " s p i r i t u a l l y 
perfect", "where God is a l l i n a l l " , and "His w i l l i s j o y f u l l y 
done(p.39j. Now f o r such a creature i t would be impossible 
even f o r God to raise them to any greater perfection than t h a t 
which they already enjoyed. This description alone, when i t i s 
careftJLy studied, i s seen to preclude -any necessity f o r 
establishment i n righteousness. They are already f u l l y 
righteous. For such a creature, temptation, such as that 
described l a t e r , would be psychologically impossible. 
I f each rejoioed equally i n the d i f f e r e n t excellences of 
other angels, how would they not rejoioe the more in the 
excellency of God who was " a l l i n a l l " (p.39). This " a l l i n 
all-ness" of God i s a t o t a l l y exclusive phrase, the ( s p i r i t u a l ) 
implications of which have simply not been discerned by men who 
say that temptation and sin were possible f o r such oreatures. 
I f love was without pbssessiveness how could any desire arise 
to possess e i t h e r God's excellence, or another angel's, or, 
even, to r e t a i n t h e i r own i n any s e l f i s h way? I f admiration 
was without envy, how could covetousness (of any excellency) 
arise ? I f t h e i r pure and God-given ch a r i t y was unselfed 
r e j o i c i n g i n a l l good (p.45) how could pride, which i s the 
essence of a l l selfishness, arise I I f t h e i r l i b e r t y was 
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Imperfect, i n the sense that one choice remained to be made 
between self and God i n order to secure establishment in 
goodness (p.47) then they could not t ru ly be described as 
completely selfless, and they could not thus be perfect ly 
s p i r i t u a l l y beaut i ful in God's eyes. Some t iny element of 
self-adherence must be assumed, in order t o make the choice a 
r e a l i t y , (c.p. Lewis's account of the Paradisal man). I t 
simply was not possible,- as May cock asserts i t was for God to 
create beings who could pass from imperfect l i be r t y to perfect 
l i be r ty by only one act of decision of Hie w i l l , f o r to oreate 
such would be ( i f we are to be, psychologically, rea l is ts ) to 
create v i r t u a l puppets. How could charity be misunderstood, 
when wisdom was perfect ? (p.38). How could i t s nature be 
distrusted by oreatures who were themselves unique centres, of 
chari ty, and who rejoiced unselfishly in such nature ? (p.44). 
How. could a self real ly desire complete independence, and 
prefer Hie mainfestation of i t s own glory before God's, while i t 
self less ly rejoiced in others glory, and when, fo r i t , God was 
a l l in a l l ? 
How could such a creature f a i l to see and desire i t s own 
perfection, which, because i t was perfeotly wise, i t would 
i n t u i t i v e l y perceive was to be gained only by the continued 
exercise of unselfed re joic ing in God's glory ? 
To ta lk of such created unselfishness beooming gu i l ty of the 
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most heinous selfishness i s t o reduce moral terms to 
meaninglessness. I t i s just sheerly unconvincing. 
We can now look at the ideas of. the function of the 
angels p r io r to their f a l l , and of the results of the i r f a l l . 
Some of the angels - only a small f raot ion of the i r t o t a l 
number - are conceived as being concerned with this world, (p.39) 
I t i s surely a rather amazing coincidence, which cannot f a i l to 
s tr ike one as somewhat suspicious, that i t i s precisely only 
those angels whose part icular concern was said to be with th is 
planet who are conceived as having rebelled', (p.42). I t is 
s imilar ly a suspicious coincidence that though their subsequent 
malicious ac t i v i t y is described as p a r t i a l l y v i t i a t i n g the l i f e -
force at i t s source, yet i t is not held to be necessary to 
suppose that the disaster affected more than a small part of 
God's to ta l creation, that small part being, of course, th i s 
immediate environment of ours I (p.42). I f the l i f e - f o r c e 
• i t s e l f were v i t i a t ed at i t s source (p,42) then surely a l l 
creation, and not only a part of i t , would be affected? 
Again, i f the idea of the l i f e - f o r c e i s to be conceived 
dynamically, and not s t a t i ca l ly and mechanically, can we 
separate i t i n thought completely from the a o t i v i t y of God 
Himself? I f not, how are we to conoeive of the l i f e - f o r c e at 
i t s source? Can we possibly speak of a oreature corrupting 
that? The Being of God is the' source of the l i f e - f o r c e , and 
He cannot be corrupted. The question i s only needlessly 
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complicated by introducing the idea of the l i f e - f o r c e . 
Further, i t is contrary to plain B ib l i ca l teaching, - and i t i s 
to such teaching that Mayoock appeals - to hold that any 
corruption of the sub-angelic order of l i f e took place pr ior 
to the a r r iva l of man on the scene, and that Whatever features 
in nature appeared to be changed f o r the worse, so far as man 
was concerned, were so changed by the dev i l himself (p.Gen.3. 
17.18.). I t i s , moreover, by no means clear why and how they, 
who had been so perfect ly good, should pass by one single sin, 
into such determined antagonism towards God. The supporters 
of the f a l l e n angel theory nowhere sa t i s fac to r i ly explain how 
i t is that repentance and shame f i n d no place in the hearts of 
the rebels. The psychology of the f a l l e n angels seems to be 
t o t a l l y d i f fe ren t from the only psychology we know. "For 
reasons viiich we cannot know with c l a r i t y ther.e was not f o r the 
angels a poss ib i l i ty of forgiveness" (p.85). The better a 
sp i r i tua l being, the more l i k e l y i t is that shame and se l f -
loathing and repentance w i l l fo l low upon s in . Any hardening 
in opposition to God is the result of continuance in s i n . 
I t cannot be said, as Maycock says (p.42) that there were two 
poss ib i l i t i e s f o r the angels a f te r the i r rebel l ion, either t o 
be deprived of the i r function and so cease to be, or to be 
allowed to continue t o exist - i n rebell ion, with power over 
the world. There are no such things as alternatives f o r God. 
I f the angels were i r re t r ievably hardened, in s in, than God must 
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withdraw His sustaining power or grace, and they would simply 
oease to be, f o r God cannot be conceived as sustaining eternally 
in being that which is I r re t r ievably , i . e . , eternally, opposed 
to Him. i f , however, they were not i r re t r ievably hardened i n 
sin, and i f , therefore, God s t i l l exercised His love towards 
them - only now i n a redemptive form, then He must sustain them 
in being, fo r God cannot be conceived as ceasing t o sustain in 
being what may s t i l l turn to Himself in love. Haycock assumes 
that the wicked angels would cease to be, simply, i f their 
funct ion of concern wi th th is world were withdrawn. This does 
not fo l l ow , f o r i t is overlooked t hat the he l l into which 
rebellious sp i r i t s are cast i s precisely the he l l of restr icted 
function, and of the loss of the functions of a previous state 
of p r iv i lege . The h e l l of the f a l l e n angels could have 
consisted i n the res t r ic ted function cf>mea&Ly l i v i n g together, in 
enmity against Him by whose just laws they were now condemned to 
l ive i n the agony of remembered happiness. That enmity could 
wel l have found expression in continued h o s t i l i t y towards the 
good angels, i n never-ceasing attempts to seduce them, and 
possibly i n the contemplated corruption of that creature, half 
matter, ha l f s p i r i t , whom they might, with the i r intell igence, 
i 
know God intended to create. 
An idea against which we must especially set our. faces is 
that of the power which the angels are said to have had over 
the sub-human world, which i t is said was retained by them 
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a f te r they f e l l , and which they used in order to divert the 
developing order of l i f e in to ungodly foxms, such as self-
assertion, and that whole* method of survival which has been 
called the struggle f o r existence, (p.49). 
We must maintain that there are certain functions, which, 
a p r i o r i , must be conceived as being peculiar to God. Such are 
the i n i t i a l act of creation ex n i h i l o , and the sustaining in 
! 
being of a l l created l i f e . Another is the ordering of a l l 
ore a ted sub-human l i f e in the way or ig ina l ly designed f o r i t . 
The only realm of l i f e in which a creature oan be conceived as 
able t o interfere with God's design f o r that realm, i s the 
moral realm. The reason f o r a b i l i t y to interfere there i s 
obvious. In the sub-moral, realm, however, i t cannot be 
ra t ional ly conceived that any interference should take place, 
by a moral creature, with the basio mechanics or consti tution 
of nature. Power in that direction must be held to be a 
specific function of dei ty. Moral creatures may misuse sub-
i 
moral creatures. They cannot possibly de-constitute them. 
Mythology, i f i t is to be respected and retained, must not 
contradict basic theological ideas. To a t t r ibute to the angels 
the power to disorder physical nature is to invest them with 
what belongs to God alone, and only t o confuse, instead of 
c l a r i f y i n g , an already d i f f i c u l t s i tuat ion. Nor must mythology 
run counter to the only knowledge of vir tue and the only 
psychology of sin that we possess. Such creatures, as these 
82 
angels are said to have been, could scarcely be tempted, l e t 
alone sin, and I f they did s i n , then their shame and s e l f -
loathing and repentance would surely have been deeper than any 
we have known. On such grounds we re ject th is exposition of 
the doctrine of the f a l l of the angels and of the i r ac t iv i ty 
in the universe afterwards. 
(b) Original righteousness and or ig ina l s in . 
Maycock makes the- fol lowing important points: 
(1) The destiny of man i s the f u l l enjoyment of the Beat i f ic 
Vision (p.p.59. 79. ) . 
(2) The purpose of the g i f t of the do num. superadditum is t o 
enable man to realise this end (p.54). 
(3) I t is reasonable to believe the f i r s t man had the a b i l i t y 
to f u l f i l this destiny while yet on ear th . (p .6 l . J . 
(4) The g i f t raised him as far as i t was possible t o raise 
him without his compliance, (p.62.) . 
(5) The g i f t was subject to the laws of growth, (p.62). 
(6) The g i f t was conferred on human nature. I t s retention 
depended on man's action i n obeying God. He disobeyed 
God and he and a l l his descendants los t the g i f t (p .55.) . 
In c r i t i c i s i n g these positions we must notice f i r s t what 
Maycock says on p .51. " I t is dear that nature produces and 
reproduces i t s e l f on principles which i t is d i f f i o u l t t o 
suppose could have been excogitated by chari ty ." This 
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sentence reveals a v i t a l l y important factor i n our considera-
t i o n of these doctrines, namely, that i t i s an idea of what 
Love could and could not do, that f i n a l l y determines much 
t rad i t iona l thought ah out man's or iginal nature. May cock 
thus e x p l i c i t l y refers to what is generally assumed and deemed 
to be so patently true as to require no demonstration or even 
mention. Not only the natural processes of production and 
reproduction, but also man's consti tutional proneness to se l f -
oentredness is considered to be patently out of tune with any 
original divine plan of love. Both are considered to be 
marks, hot of that original plan but of a deviation from i t . 
I t i s the main contention of th is thesis that t h i s 
assumption about what Love could and could not do, so f a r as 
the o r ig ina l consti tution of man is concerned, needs to be 
seriously examined, not c h i e f l y because of any apparent con f l i c t 
with what science teaches about man's animal ancestry but 
because of the real nature of love and of the moral obligations 
which love was bound to observe i n the creation of responsive 
love. We would hold that the t r ad i t i ona l d i s t inc t ion between 
what i s and is not or ig ina l i n the universe has been based upon 
an ult imately untenable idea of love, an idea which, i n i t s 
simplest expression, is r e a l l y the be l ie f that love would never, 
make virtue hard and vice easy. We must not, however, 
anticipate our conclusion at th i s point , by c r i t i c i s i n g that 
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idea. 
We have already mentioned Niebuhr's and Brunner's 
the 
cr i t ic ism of the doctrine of/donum superadditum. I t remains 
to make the following observations i n the l i g h t of Haycock*s 
points noted above. Nothing is subject to the law of growth 
that i s not also subject to the law of deterioration,, To 
speak of the poss ib i l i ty of growth and to re jec t the poss ib i l i ty 
of deterioration i s meaningless. The two things go together, 
and no experience or knowledge of l i f e j u s t i f i e s us i n 
separating them. I f the g i f t of the donum superadditum was 
subject to the law of growth i t must mean that i t was also 
subjeot to the law of deterioration. The law of growth i n 
things moral and sp i r i tua l i s that of growth from small . 
beginnings, according to r ight choices, and the law of 
i 
deterioration i s also by stages from snail beginnings according 
to wrong choices. A l l forms of such l i f e either grow or 
deteriorate I n this manner, and no good reason can be shown why 
a super-natural endowment should be exempt from this law. I t 
i s a quite arbi t rary and un jus t i f i ab le assumption to state that 
one act of wrong choice would remove the a b i l i t y or g i f t from 
Adam. The f i r s t wrong choice would be the f i r s t stage i n the 
process of deterioration. I t would not immediately destroy 
the a b i l i t y , no,more than the f i r s t r ight choice would 
l 
establish man i n the possession of i t for ever. 
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I t would be generally agreed that the stage of growth at 
which' one single right choice would confirm a creature i n the 
permanent possession of some sp i r i t ua l g i f t or a b i l i t y would 
be an advanced stage. Such an advanced stage of s p i r i t u a l 
growth oould have been attained only by a series of r igh t 
choices. Attained i n any other way, that i s , without man's 
compliance, the s i tua t ion would have been immoral. Likewise 
i t would be generally agreed that the stage of deterioration 
at which one single wrong choice would confirm a creature i n 
the irreversible loss of some sp i r i t ua l g i f t or a b i l i t y would 
be an advanced one. Such an advanced stage of sp i r i t ua l 
deterioration could have been reached only by a series of 
wrong choices; reached i n any other way, that i s , without 
man's compliance, the si tuat ion would have been immoral. The 
a b i l i t y i n man to ar r ive f i n a l l y at the f u l l en joyment of the 
Beat i f ic Vision was, i n the beginning, at a stage neither of 
advanced growth* nor of advanced deterioration. Both growth 
and deterioration lay yet before him as poss ib i l i t i e s , and each 
could only be begun.by an act of choice, either r ight or wrong. 
May cock defends the be l ie f that " i n Adam" mankind sinned 
and so los t the g i f t of sanct ifying grace, by re fe r r ing to the 
idea of Adam as the head and representative of the race (p .78. ) . 
This idea, however, originated before man's ascent from the 
beasts was real ised. Against the background of the bel ief 
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that nan was specially created, the idea was natural . Without 
that background, however, the idea cannot stand. I n spite of 
C. S. Lewis's elaborate myth of the Paradisal man we cannot 
regard that shuff l ing shaggy ape-like creature, who was the 
f i r s t man, as the head and representative of the human race. 
That d igni ty must be f i r m l y removed from the claimant to mere 
chronological p r i o r i t y i n the evolutionary l i n e , and given 
over once and f o r a l l to that man i n whom the purpose of God 
for man was f i r s t perfect ly real ised. He only can be t r u l y 
called the head and representative who was f i r s t perfect ly 
united with God, i . e . , who f i r s t realised the destiny of man i n 
his own person. In other words, only of Christ can i t be t r u l y 
said, He is our head and representative. I f the be l ie f that 
Adam's s in was the sin of human nature, the sin of humanity i n 
which each shares by vir tue of his humanity, i f th is be l i e f i s 
bound up with the bel ief i n Adam's headship and representative 
character i t i s consequently undermined. 
May cook further defends th is idea of "the s in of human 
nature i n which we a l l share", by pointing to the corporateness 
of the Divine T r i n i t y as an analogy of human corporateness i n 
Adam. (p .79. ) . Our Lord prayed "that they may be one as we 
are one: I i n them and Thou i n me, that they may be made 
perfect i n one . . . . that the love wherewith Thou lovest me may 
be i n them, and I i n Them". May cock concludes (p. 79.) that 
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these words and others indicate a communion between Christ and 
His followers of a kind which we can but dimly appreciate: 
some measure of the mystery of charitable inter-change which 
exists I n i t s perfection i n the l i f e of God the Blessed 
T r i n i t y is to be disclosed, some share i n i t is to be given. 
He quotes various Christian writers to i l l u s t r a t e the 
persistence of the conviction that a l l men are mystically one, 
through the possession of a common nature. 
We are only too aware of the a t t rac t ion which th i s idea 
holds for many Christian thinkers today. I n c r i t i c i s i n g i t , 
we would not wish to be understood to mean that the heights and 
depths of the meaning of personality can be wholly compassed 
by human reason and intelligence at their present stage of 
development. A l l that we would seek to do i s to indioate why 
we believe this mode of thought is impossible. 
We would begin by stating the be l ie f that there are only 
two kinds of corporateness. There i s what may be called the 
ontologioal corporateness of the Divine T r i n i t y , and there is 
the moral and Spir i tual corporateness i n which a community is 
bound by virtue of the pursuit of a common ideal . While we. 
are aware of the d i f f i c u l t y , i n speaking of the mystery of God's 
Being, of avoiding t r i t h e i s t i c implications, we believe that 
between the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost i n Heaven 
there exists a relationship of love. God may thus be said to 
experience both kinds of corporateness. 
Created human society was never constituted l ike the un-
created Divine Being, and has never experienced the beatitude 
, n e c e s s i t y 
of ontological corporateness. The necessary- f o r individual 
separateness precluded th i s from the beginning. I n a created 
society constituted by a number of separate individuals, the only 
kind of cbrporateness possible was the moral and sp i r i t ua l 
corporateness which we have described. I t would be achieved 
but not i n i t i a l l y possessed. 
I f these dist inct ions be accepted as generally t rue, then 
we have to examine the i r bearing upon the language i n which the 
mystery of human corporateness has been t r ad i t i ona l ly described. 
That language is best exemplified i n St. Augustine's words, 
quoted by May cock: nWe were a l l i n that man when we were that . 
man". "The Sin of humanity i n which each shares by vir tue 
of his humanity" i s another way of putting i t . 
We would say that such language has crossed the boundary 
that separates' moral and sp i r i t ua l corporateness from 
ontological corporateness. There i s th i s continual s t r iv ing 
on the part of t r ad i t i ona l writers to leave the area of merely 
human social corporateness and press on into the mysterious 
corporateness of the Divine T r i n i t y i n Unity and Unity i n 
T r i n i t y . The terms i n which each man i s described as being 
related to Adam are pract ical ly ident ical with those i n which we 
describe the relationship between the members of the Divine 
T r i n i t y : - we sinned i n Adam because of our oneness with him i n 
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the mystery of cor per at en ess. The Father suffered i n the Son 
because of the i r oneness i n the mystery of corporateness. 
We were i n Adam because we were Adam. God was i n Christ because 
Christ was God, and so f o r t h . 
* 
We do not say that an ontological corporateness w i l l not, 
cannot grow out of that developing moral and s p i r i t u a l 
oorporateness whioh Christians know i n Christ already. I t may 
be not i l l eg i t imate to use the analogy of the Divine Tr in i ty 
i n Unity to point to "Hie supra-personal destiny, the ultimate 
m u l t i p l i c i t y i n unity of the human race. But i n created 
beings, oneness must begin by being moral and s p i r i t u a l , and 
move onwards t o whatever other corporateness may l i e i n store. 
We cannot conceive of ontologioal corporateness without at 
the same time implying the existence of perfect moral and 
sp i r i t ua l oorporateness. Since man was not made immediately 
morally and s p i r i t u a l l y perfect he could not hare been made 
o r ig ina l ly i n ontological corporateness, and since Adam refused 
to make the choice that would have established him i n the path 
of moral and s p i r i t u a l perfection, i t means that he himself was 
never morally and s p i r i t u a l l y perfect . Hence we cannot 
reasonably conceive of any incorporation of the race i n Adam 
a f t e r an ontologioal fashion: and there was no corporateness 
of the race i n him of a moral and s p i r i t u a l k ind . For that 
kind of corporateness, individual existences are necessary, and 
as t r ad i t i ona l ly conceived the race did not then exist to be 
90. 
so incorporate i n him. 
Our Lord's words about the oneness of His disciples i n Him 
as He was i n the Father cannot be pzessed to mean exclusively 
more than the moral and s p i r i t u a l oneness of community i n love. 
To make them refer to the ontological corporateness of the. 
Divine T r i n i t y would be to involve ourselves i n the question 
of Christ 's consciousness of His Person, which is too 
uncertain ground upon which to build such a thesis. 
The old way of conceiving human nature as a kind of 
separate enti ty i n which we; all .share, a kind of substratum of 
a l l individuals, a least common factor of humanity, together 
with the habit of abstracting and hypos ta t ising i t , and 
treating i t as a kind of moral agent whose responsibility is 
coterminous with every soul who shares i t , th is can no longer 
be held i f we are to conceive of human nature no longer i n 
terms of substance, as something static and mechanical, but i n 
terms of l i v i n g dynamic personal relationship. Along these 
l ines we are j u s t i f i e d , we believe, i n reject ing the old mode of 
conceiving a mystical unity of the race " i n Adam". 
D. M. B a i l l i e c r i t i c i ses Moberley's statement ("Atonement and 
Personality" p .86 . ) , "Christ was not generically, but i n -
clusively man". He says " I t i s nonsense to say that He is 
"Man1" unless we mean He is a man. "Man" i n any inclusive sense 
can only mean either the whole human race, or human nature, 
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which i n i t s e l f is an abstraction". ("God was i n Christ" 
D. M. Bed H i e pp. 86.87.). Bai l l i e also quotes H. R. 
Mackintosh (The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p.389), 
" I n the domain of r e a l i t y , there is no such thing existing 
independently as human!tas, or "man i n general". No one can 
represent a man who also is the nature common to a l l members of 
the olass "man"." 
Under his thought about o r ig ina l righteousness, t h i s 
modem Thomist also includes the ideas of the w i l l being 
o r ig ina l ly established i n the desire to f u l f i l i t s destiny, of 
an o r ig ina l condition of unstable equilibrium, and of o r ig ina l 
imperfect l i b e r t y (p.72). B r i e f l y , we may say that perfeot 
l i b e r t y is conceived as the complete and f i n a l establishment of 
the w i l l i n the love of God. Imperfect l i be r ty is that 
condition of the w i l l wherein i t remains s t i l l to establish 
that, perfeot l ibe r ty by the f ree exercise of the power of choice. 
The unstable equilibrium refers to the presence, alongside the 
desire to serve God, of a degree of self-adherence which 
remains to be eliminated by r ight choice. 
In considering th is group of ideas we are at the heart of 
the problem. We begin by af f i rming the presupposition that 
man i s organically linked with the animal world. Original 
(psychological) self-centredness was. on the scene long before 
God brought to b i r t h i n one or a number of His creatures, the 
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consciousness of the supernatural. We would assert, therefore, 
that i n that creature the w i l l and the desire to please self 
would vastly outweigh any desire to please another. I t s 
" l ibe r ty" would thus be almost wholly imperfect, rather than 
just s l i g h t l y imperfect. I t could not be said to be 
established i n anything except self -centre dness. 
I t would be agreed that before man could desire and w i l l 
to serve God, he must know God. God must take the i n i t i a t i v e , 
and make Himself known to man. Upon the moral quali ty of 
man*s f i r s t conception of God would depend the moral quality of 
his f i r s t obedience. Love can only be called out by a vision 
of love, and while t radi t ional theology has always implied that 
God made Himself known to man a t f i r s t i n such a way that man 
should have responded with loving obedience, we cannot 
disregard the picture presented by science of man's gradual , 
growth i n the knowledge of God. In introducing the scientis t 
here we would not commit the error of wishing to measure the 
individual ' s sp i r i tua l condition by sc ien t i f i c tes ts . Man did 
not begin by knowing God as we know Him. God was not f i r s t 
conceived as a Person, and the supernatural powers with which 
man believed his world was f i l l e d , were cer tainly f a r below the 
level of love. The supernatural was f i r s t conceived not i n 
any clear personal fashion, and cer ta inly not i n any high moral 
fashion, but vaguely, f e a r f u l l y , ina r t i cu la te ly . Man, we 
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may say, was o r ig ina l ly disposed to obey the supernatural, but 
i t was a largely self-centred obedience prompted more by fear 
of the consequence of disobedience than by any moral conception 
of duty; 
I f this picture be aooepted as more probably true,, 
h i s to r i ca l ly , than not, then we have to move on to a much la ter 
stage in history in order to f ind the beginning of man's desire 
to love and obey God f o r His own sake. Righteousness was not 
man's or ig ina l s p i r i t u a l condition, and the w i l l could not be 
said to be or ig ina l ly established in the desire to f u l f i l i t s 
destiny when that destiny was only properly known at a la ter 
stage. 
There i s this farther consideration. For God to dispose 
the desire or w i l l of a creature without reference to the 
creature's w i l l and desire in the f i r s t place would be 
inconsistent^ wi th love. The ensuing obedience would be 
worthless to the degree that i t was conditioned, apart from 
i t s own response to a vis ion, and the human mechanism f o r 
apprehending God i n His fullness was only gradually developed. 
Of man's religious beginning, therefore, the word righteous 
oannot legit imately be used. We shal l have occasion t o 
return to t h i s theme la ter from a much more important point of 
view. At the moment i t w i l l suff ice to express the bel ief 
that May cook and those who think l ike him have got the matter 
the wrong way round. Man slowly became disposed towards 
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righteousness. He was or ig ina l ly disposed to please s e l f 
i 
rather than t o please any other. He was or ig ina l ly sel f -
centred, not o r ig ina l ly righteous. 
The only ground upon which man oan be said to have been 
oapable of envisaging God as a God of Love in Hie beginning, 
and to have been therefore desirous of obeying Him f o r sheer 
love's sake, i s an a p r i o r i conception that that would be the 
i 
only way in which i t would be f i t t i n g and possible f o r Divine 
Love to create a creature f ran whom i t was desired to e l i c i t a 
response of Love. We oaniiot overlook the f ac t , however, that 
such an a p r i o r i conception of how love would create sueh a . 
oreature, was fashioned against a background of ignorance of 
man's animal ancestry. Given that ignorance, given the idea 
of special creation, that conception of how God would 
or iginal ly create man was almost inevitable. That conception, 
however, needs remoulding not only in the l i g h t of our new 
knowledge of man's animal ancestry, but also i n the l i g h t of 
serious thinking about the moral obligation undervihich love 
must place i t s e l f i f i t chose to create man by means of 
evolution from the beasts. 
There is one more idea in this wr i te r ' s book, which we 
must examine, the idea, namely, that man has a rac ia l memory of 
a lost state of or ig ina l righteousness. Man's constant state 
of discontent is oalled by May cock "one of the strongest 
empirical supports f o r the doctrine of o r ig ina l righteousness" 
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(p.64.) . He speaks of "re l ics of the los t digni ty and 
memories of the royal palace which haunt the soul, causing 
boundless desire and disoontent". This, and the fact of the 
t r ad i t ion of a los t paradise among a l l peoples of the earth, 
he says, make i t , to say the least, a reasonable be l i e f . 
He quotes Pascal. "The greatness of man is so evident that 
i t is even proved by his wretchedness. For what in animals i s 
nature, in man we ca l l wretohedness; by which we recognise 
that his nature now l ike that of the animals he has f a l l e n from 
a better nature which once was h is . For who is unhappy at not 
being a King except a deposed King?" ((Pense'es, 409.) (Also 
quoted by Niebuhr Vol . i , p.281. Nature and Destiny of Man). 
To t h i s , however, we may reply. Satan Was once unhappy in 
heaven because he was not the King, yet his unhappiness sprang 
not from being a deposed King, and remembering a lost d ign i ty , 
but because of a vision of what he thought he could become. 
I t was a vis ion of a fu ture , not a memory of a past, that made 
him discontented w i th the present. This is our own belief about 
man's disoontent (man's motive being d i f f e ren t from Satan's). 
I f , by nature, Pascal meant the basic stock of animal 
ins t incts , then, what is nature in animals Is hot wretohedness 
in man, but the fomes bohi as wel l as the fomes peccati, the 
indispensable raw material of morali ty. I f , however, by nature, 
he meant the proneness, to sat isfy those inst incts against the 
demands of the higher law, then there is no obligation to regard 
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th is unruliness of nature as a sign only of a f a l l from a 
higher state, i t could equally well be a sign of a se l f 
struggling with God's assistance out of or ig ina l God-ordained 
self-oentredness into a future of God-oentredness. 
The t r ad i t ion among a l l peoples of a lost Paradise, being 
based upon th is d i soon tent, is open to the same interpretat ion. 
I f these considerations, adduced by many wri ters beside Mayoook, 
appear to make the doctrine of or iginal righteousness a 
reasonable be l i e f , i t cannot be denied that they make a doctrine 
of or iginal self-oentredness equally reasonable. 
I t is olaimed by Mayoook that (p.65) the doctrine of 
or iginal righteousness "corresponds with our sense that we were 
not made so that sin was too probable not to happen". This 
claim implies the bel ief that we were made so that s in was eithei 
possible but less probable than v i r tue , or possible but equally 
as probable as v i r tue . The more you diminish the degree of 
probabil i ty of sin, however, the higher you raise the i n i t i a l 
degree of God-oentredness, but the more you raise that i n i t i a l 
degree of God-oentredness, the more you raise the problem of a 
high moral condition which has not been attained by individual 
,moral e f f o r t . This problem is nowhere adequately dealt w i t h 
by May-cock* nor, so fa r as the present wr i t e r can see, by those 
who share his view. We shal l discuss i t fur ther , l a t e r . 
We oan conclude our discussion of this particular idea with 
the fol lowing observation. Insofar as man's sense of what he 
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ought to be is described as a mormory of what he once actually 
was, a great mistake is made, Man ought to be perfect ly loving 
towards God, but i f he had ever been perfect ly loving towards 
God, he would not have sinned, therefore he was never perfect ly 
loving towards God, and, consequently, he oannot remember such 
a state, and, therefore, vhat he ought to be does not represent 
a memory of what he once actually was. 
2. F. J . H a l l . 
The sole purpose i n referr ing to t h i s wri ter is to 
i l l u s t r a t e how i t i s sometimes proposed to reconcile the 
knowledge of evolution wi th the doctrine of the donum super-
additunu He is concerned c h i e f l y to defend that doctrine in 
the face of F. ft. Tennant's evolutionary theory of the o r ig in 
and propagation of s in . He does so by adduoing the notion of 
gaps in the evolutionary series, and he asserts that t h i s notion 
alone leaves ample room for the operation of super-physical 
factors . I t i s into the gap between the f i r s t man and his 
immediate animal ancestor that Hal l would presumably insert a 
high degree of ac t iv i ty of these super-physical factors in 
order to acoount f o r the sudden appearance of Adam's highly 
endowed sp i r i tua l nature. The g i f t of the donum superadditum 
is thus represented as but one more example of that direct 
personal creative action of God which, lower down the chain of 
l i f e had resulted in those amazing variations of l i f e which 
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are described as leaps or mutations. 
,He fur ther maintains that every previous order of l i f e had 
been able to f u l f i l the law of i t s being, and that every 
ancestral precedent thus suggested that man was also to be 
enabled to f u l f i l the law of his being, v i z . , righteousness. 
I f man were to be l e f t only to the condition of a moralised 
animal, i t would be an anomaly, an unprecedented missing of the 
mark, which would surely viola te not only the wisdom but also 
the justice of God. 
Here we meet wi th that recurring idea that i t would be 
impossible f o r God, since He i s love, t o arrange only f o r the . 
gradual growth, from small beginnings, of moral and s p i r i t u a l 
power, when there was already so deeply entrenched i n man a 
nature of clamorous animal desire. I t seems that God, because 
He i s love, must have given to man, at the outset, su f f i c i en t 
s p i r i t u a l vis ion and power to enable him to enter immediately 
into f u l l and perfect communion with God. 
I t i s i n order to defend th i s idea of how Love would surely 
create souls i n the beginning that we are faced with such 
remarks as that by N, P. Williams: "There would seem to be no 
a p r i o r i reason why chronological poster ior i ty of development" 
( i . e . of man's sp i r i t ua l power) "should involve weakness", and 
that of F.H.Maycock: "Belief about the sp i r i t ua l condition of 
the f i r s t man does not and indeed cannot con f l i c t wi th 
anthropological discoveries about pr imit ive man — I t i s a 
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statement about his s p i r i t u a l powers and one cannot assess the 
sp i r i t ua l condition of any man alive or dead by sc ien t i f i c 
tests", (p.64. Original Sin) . 
The attempt i s thus made to j u s t i f y a high degree of 
i n i t i a l s p i r i t u a l endowment either by asserting that such 
endowment would be independent of the stage of evolution 
reached, or by seeking to show that the endowment would actually 
be i n keeping with the principle of evolutionary growth. 
The doctrine of the donum superadditum i s a pre-sc ient i f ic 
speculation about the sp i r i t ua l endowment of the f i r s t man, 
determined, naturally, by a pre-conceived idea of what Love 
would and would not do. This idea we shall c r i t i c i s e la ter 
as being untenable. Here we need only observe that while our 
knowledge of evolution i s quite consistent with the idea of the 
sudden appearance of a sp i r i t ua l facul ty which i s an absolutely 
new thing not explicable solely i n terms of antecedents, i t i s 
not consistent with the idea of i t s appearance i n immediate 
plenitude of power and content. 
F.J .Hall may say that every previous order of l i f© had 
been enabled to f u l f i l the law of i t s being, and that th i s 
i 
suggested man was also to be enabled to f u l f i l the law of his 
being, but i t does not fol low that because the law of se l f -
centredness i n animals could be realised by endowing them with 
a high degree of i n i t i a l self-centredness, therefore the law of 
righteousness i n men could be realised by endowing them with a 
high degree of i n i t i a l righteousness. Hal l ' s language ref lec ts 
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the be l ie f that God made a moral creature immediately good i n 
the same way as He made inst inct ive creatures immediately se l f -
centred. There i s no need to elaborate the untenabil i ty of 
t h i s be l i e f . 
To the statement that there would appear to be no a p r i o r i 
reason why chronological poster iori ty of development ( i . e . , of 
man's s p i r i t u a l power) should involve weakness, i t i s su f f i c i en t 
to reply that there is no a p r i o r i reason why i t should involve 
a capacity immediately strong enough to res is t the appeals of 
self against the higher laws demands, and also that there would 
seem to be no a p r i o r i reason why we should accept a pre-
sc i en t i f i c account of man's primitive condition when that 
conf l ic t s wi th the plain implications of s c i en t i f i c knowledge. 
(This i s discussed more"fully l a t e r ) . 
I t i s clearly very much open to question whether theologians 
would have constructed the i r doctrine of the donum superadditum 
had they known the t ru th about man's animal ancestry- Both the 
Adam story and this doctrine were constructed by men who believed 
that the f i r s t man was made by God with a body and mind and 
s p i r i t at least as.developed as those of a man of their own 
(respective) days. That they imagined him to be more perfect 
jjhan themselves i s extremely probable because of their 
interpretat ion of the word "good". (God made everything, 
including man, good, i n the beginning). A 'good' man could 
mean, for them, no other than one with at least their own 
feelings and understanding about God, but i t would probably seem 
to them blasphemous to think of God making man at f i r s t as unable 
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as themselves to f i g h t against and overcome e v i l . 
Against the background of the s c i e n t i f i c picture of early 
man we have to ask, i f the physical side of l i f e has developed 
slowly,over mil l ions of years, i f the mental side of l i f e has 
s imi lar ly developed, is there any good reason why the sp i r i t ua l 
can be held to be exempt from the same principle of growth, 
namely, from small to great, from weak to strong, from low to 
high? 
Our notion of how l i f e was constituted in i t s beginnings 
has to be checked primarily against the background of our pre-
conceived idea of what Love would and would not do. Where th i s 
idea clashes wi th the obvious Implications of the s c i en t i f i c 
knowledge of man's beginnings, then there are two things we must 
not do. We must not force,and so abuse, the categories of 
physical soience i n order to make them f i t into our conception 
of love, and we must not refuse the challenge of God through 
science to re-examine that conception. The a p r i o r i reason 
which disabled Williams and May cock and Hal l from seeing why 
sp i r i tua l l i f e in i t s beginnings would be weak rather than strong, 
was a pre-conceived idea that love was bound by i t s very nature 
to create man i n the beginning more God-centred than self-oent.red. 
This idea we would reject as mistaken. The reasons for 
rejeoting i t we hope to make p la in . 
3. 0. S. Lewis. 
We can now look at C. s. Lewis's remarkable myth of the 
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Faradisal man in chapter f ive of his "The Problem of Pain". 
There i s reason to believe that t h i s part icular myth has 
supplied many Catholic Tradit ionalists w i th a convincing answer 
to the question - how can we reconcile the Bibl ica l story of 
Adam with the s c i en t i f i c knowledge about man's animal ancestry? 
7. H. May cock in the preface of the Mir f i e I d book on 
Original Sin says (p.13) " In my view there is no better book 
on the subjeot . . . . indeed i t s excellence has been-a constant 
embarrassment to me . . . . i t s f i n a l i t y has led me to deal wi th 
the matter more theologioally than I f i r s t intended". 
0. C. Quick also commends the myth. He says "As h i s to r ica l 
and s c i e n t i f i c research advances we need fresh myths not, of 
course, to take the place of the story of Genesis, but to 
interpret i t in the l i g h t of new knowledge. G. S. Lewis's book 
contains some interesting suggestions on the subject". (The 
Gospel of the New World, p.43). 
Before proceeding to outline and c r i t i o i se the myth as 
Lewis presents i t , t h i s much must be said. Even though 
agreement may be found to be impossible, i t must be acknowledged 
that i t is an ingenious construction, and, given the Thomist 
pre-supposition of the dootrine of the donum superadditum, i t 
could provide an admirable resting place for minds troubled by 
the d i f f i c u l t y presented to orthodoxy by scienoe. 
The main points in the myth are as fol lows: 
He paints a pioture of man emerging out of the brute 
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creation, possessed of reason before be became either se l f -
conscious or God-conscious (p.65.) . He was wholly subject to 
God in every way, bodily, mentally, s p i r i t u a l l y . His organic 
processes obeyed the law of his own w i l l , not the law of nature. 
His organs sent up appetites to tiae judgement seat of w i l l , not 
because they had t o , but because he chose. Wholly commanding 
himself, he oommanded a l l lower l ives with which he came into 
contact. His consciousness reposed on the Creator. God came 
f i r s t in his love and in his thought J His love and worship 
were perfect , and in th i s sense, though not in a l l , man was then 
t r u l y the Son of God, the prototype of Christ, perfectly 
enacting in joy and ease of a l l the facul t ies and a l l the senses 
that f i l i a l self-surrender vhioh our Lord enaoted in the 
Crucif ixion (pp.66.67.). 
Judged by some things, e.g., language, artefacts, he may 
have seemed naturally a savage, but the holiest of us would have 
glanced at him again, and. then f a l l en down at his fee t . The 
self which Paradisal man had to surrender contained no natural 
reoalcitranoy to being surrendered. His data, so to speak, were 
a psychological organism wholly subject to the w i l l , and a w i l l 
wholly disposed, though not compelled to tu rn to God. The s e l f -
surrender whioh he praotised before the F a l l meant no struggle, 
but only the delicious overcoming of an inf ini tess imal se l f -
adherenoe which delighted to be overcome. He had no temptation 
( in our sense) to choose se l f . (pp. 67- 69). The turning from 
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self to God was however a s in possible even to the Paradisal 
man, because the mere existence of self;:- the mere fact that we 
c a l l i t "me" - includes from the f i r s t the danger of se l f -
idola t ry . Since I am I , I must make an act of self-surrender, 
however small or easy, in l i v i n g to God rather than to se l f . 
This is the weak spot in creation, the r i s k whioh God 
# apparently thinks worth taking (p.68). (See also May cock 
pp.47^48. footnote). 
Such, according to Lewis, was the nature of or ig inal man, 
and we do not know how many of these were made by God, or how 
long they continued in the Pardisal state, but sooner or la ter 
they f e l l . Someone or something whispered that they could 
become as gods. We have no idea in what particular act or 
series of acts the self-contradictory impossible wish found 
expression. This aot of s e l f - w i l l on the part of the creature, 
whioh constitutes an ut ter falseness to i t s true creaturely 
position is the only sin that can be conoeived as the F a l l , 
(p.68). The sin was very heinous because as already stated the 
self which Paradisal man had to surrender contained no natural 
recalcitrancy to being surrendered. The f a l l was a loss of 
status as a species. What man lost was his or ig ina l speoiflo 
nature, and th is condition was transmitted by heredity to a l l 
la ter generations, f o r i t was not simply what biologists c a l l an 
acquired var ia t ion . I t was the emergence of a new kind of man. 
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A new species had sinned i t s way into existence. The change 
was a radical a l terat ion i n his const i tut ion. 
5 This present condition of man as a member of a spoiled 
. species Lewis calls or ig inal s in , nor merely original mis-
fortune. Our condition may not be out f a u l t (here he d i f f e r s 
from Niebuhr, Brunner) but i t is a greater shame and grief 
than any of the part icular acts which i t leads us to commit. 
I t may not be a boy's f a u l t that he is a bul ly or a coward, 
but i f he begins to mend, he w i l l inevitably fee l shame and 
g u i l t at what he i s just beginning to cease to be (pp.73.74). 
Such i s his 'myth' , and G.S.Lewis calls i s a "myth" i n the . 
A 
Sooratio sense, i . e . , a not unl ikely ta le , an account of what 
may have teen the h is tor ica l f ac t . I t would seem that i t is 
open to -the fol lowing oritioisas: i 
(a) Orthodox Christian teaching about the Incarnation i s 
that Christ took upon himself unfallen human nature. I f , 
however, unfallen human nature was as described by Lewis, 
then Christ would be ab le to control a l l His organic 
prooesses, his natural appetites, feel ings, e tc . The 
whole of His physical l i f e would not be under the.control 
of the laws of nature, but under the control of His w i l l . 
What then becomes of His hunger and t h i r s t in the wilderness 
of His.fatigae and pain ? Did He fee l these things 
because He chose to., even when He could have remained in 
the situation without feeling them? I f so, then i t oan 
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hardly be denied that we are presented with a new problem in 
relat ion to His "sufferings?. I f , of course, Christ f e l t these 
things becaise, l i ke ourselves, He could no other, then, 
according to Lewis, Christ 's human nature was " f a l l en" , and 
so He was "gui l ty" of original s i n . 
) The Par a di sal man, i n surrendering himself to God, 
n d j elidiously overcame an infini tessimal self-adherence vhioh 
delighted to be overcome" (p.69). In other words, se l f -
surrender constitutedeostatio pleasure. I f so, then self-
adherenoe as oommonly understood must have meant self-denial 
as commonly understood. The phrase self-adherence, or se l f -
g ra t i f i ca t ion is normally used of creatures whose 'selves' are 
such that when they are gra t i f ied or adhered t o , sin i s 
committed. Pleasing self i s , with them, synonymous with 
displeasing God. 
But acoording to Lewis, the Paradisal man was completely 
(pp.66.69) a God-pleasing se l f . He pleased himself when He 
pleased God. In his case, therefore, "self" pleasing meant 
the opposite to what i t means in our case. I t meant God-
pleasing. So he was never real ly "ungodly" u n t i l he denied 
his ' s e l f ! ! 
Moreover, to such a creature, the very idea of self-worship 
would repel , and so i t oould soaroely constitute a temptation 
i n the sense of something a t t rac t ive . The very meaning of 
temptation is the attractiveness of some pleasure whioh we know 
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to be forbidden. The only pleasure that oould at tract him 
was already determined by his constitution, v i z . , the 
pleasure of doing God's w i l l , and the pleasure of over-
coming an " inf ini tess imal" temptation to disobey God's w i l l . 
I f he oould not be tempted " i n our sense" how could he be 
tempted ? 
I t would seem that in thus describing the Faradisal man, 
G0 S. Lewis constructs a creature fo r whom s in would have 
been a psychological impossibil i ty, and i t is upon such a 
one that he fastens the responsibi l i ty for the primal sin ! 
I f the "something" or someone" who whispered was the 
" inf ini tess imal self-adherence" which delighted to be over-
come then i t would whisper only in order that i t might be 
so overcome. I f , however, i t was not this that whispered 
but some one outside, then the whisperer oould only 
stimulate and appeal to that inf ini tess imal self-adherence 
which would hear only in order that i t might be deliciously 
overcome, and the whisperer would be aware of t h i s faot ! 
Whether the whisper, then, was from within or without, i t 
could not possibly have produced the disaster of the F a l l . 
("God came f i r s t i n his love and thought: in perfect cyclic 
movement, being, power, and joy descended from God to man in 
the form of g i f t , and returned from man to God in the form 
of obedient Love and estatio adoration"). I f William Temple 
with his "evolutionary" view of sin 's or ig in oould refer to 
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sin as too probable not to happen, i t might be said that on 
Lewis's view of the nature.of the f i r s t man, s in was too 
Improbable to happen at a l l . 
For God to oreate such a creature, means that goodness 
and worship was 99.999? automatic and const i tut ional . The 
creature could scarcely help being "good". I t is hardly 
complimentary to the moral sense of God to picture Him as 
being sat isf ied with such "love" and "worship". He might 
as wel l have made puppets. A smaller r i s k than that 
involved in the inf ini tess imal self-adherence of the f i r s t 
man can scarcely be imagined. I t does no oredit to God, t o 
have taken the smallest possible r i sk , though the use of 
the word r i sk is presumably intended to imply oredi t . The 
fact that such a negligible degree of self-adherence over-
came such an overwhelmingly high degree of God-centredness in 
the oreature, suggests that the ensuing larger degree of 
self-adherence w i l l v i r t u a l l y automatic a l ly win over the 
ensuing lesser degree of God-oentiedness. There is no sure 
principle of religious thinking by which we can argue that 
the grace of Christ w i l l ef fect against a colossal array of 
entrenched s in what the i n i t i a l grace of God was powerless 
to effeot against the t in ies t possible speck of se l f -
adhe ren oe. 
Lewis says (p.72) that God realised what was going to 
happen. This, of course, negatives the idea that God took 
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a r i s k . "He saw the c r u o i f i x i o n i n the act of creating the 
f i r s t nebula". The o o n f l i c t between the good descending 
from God and the e v i l a r i s i n g from the creature " i s resolved 
by God's assumption of the s u f f e r i n g nature which e v i l 
produced". This suggests that Christ did take the f a l l e n 
nature of man and so must have been burdened w i t h o r i g i n a l 
sin ! He also says "the doctrine of the free F a l l asserts ; 
that the e v i l which thus makes the f u e l or raw material f o r 
the second or more complex kind of good i s not God's 
contribution but man's", (p.72). He i s here completely o f f 
the track. E v i l never was. aid never, oould be the "raw 
material" f o r goodness. He has completely misunderstood the 
olassical phrase "fames boni" which refers to the non-moral 
raw material of man's animal nature, the i n s t i n o t s and 
passions not normally subordinate to reason. 
Of the condition of o r i g i n a l s i n , he says (p.73) "our 
sufferings are not a punishment f o r being what we cannot now 
help, nor are we reponsible f o r the r e b e l l i o n of a remote 
ancestor". He thus avoids oertain excesses of St .August ine's 
thought. He goes on, however, to say t h a t our r e l i g i o u s 
experience does not allow us to regard our present oondition 
as one merely of o r i g i n a l misfortune but of o r i g i n a l s i n . 
We "cannot help i t " - but, i f we begin t o mend ( l i k e a boy 
who has been brought up badly) we ine v i t a b l y " f e e l shane and 
g u i l t " at what we are "beginning to oease to be", (p.74). 
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I t w i l l s u f f i c e to notioe here that Lewis allows we f e e l 
g u i l t y for what we know we oannot help I 
His attempt t o , f i t the appearance and the f a l l of t h i s 
creature in t o the categories of evolutionary science make 
strange reading and must surely involve him i n a oharge of 
abusing the terminology of physical science. Physically, 
his Paradisal man connects up quite n a t u r a l l y with i t s 
evolutionary background, but psychically the whole organism 
is completely and f a n t a s t i c a l l y removed from i t . The 
picture of the immediate new r e l a t i o n between mind and body, 
and between s p i r i t and God surely constitutes a sheer 
carioature of a l l s c i e n t i f i c ideas of "evolution". That 
which was only an animal because a l l i t s physical and psychical] 
processes were directed to purely material and natural ends 
(p.65) became, i n the t w i n k l i n g of an eye, (Lewis- c a l l s i t 
" i n the fullness of time" ! ) , a God-centred s p i r i t , God 
coming f i r s t i n a l l his thoughts, obediently loving and 
e s t a t i c a l l y adoring, a true Son of God, a prototype of 
Christ, enacting p e r f e c t l y the f i l i a l self-surrender of 
Christ on Calvary. . To become possessed at a l l of a God-
oonsoiousness i s wonderful enough. The emergence of such, 
even i n i t s t i n i e s t beginnings i s s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y the 
term mutation, but t h a t a saint should suddenly appear 
immediately busy with perfect s p i r i t u a l worship, where a 
moment before, was a creature wholly immersed i n purely 
I l l 
s e l f i s h and material a f f a i r s - t h i s is too much, surely, 
for reason ! I f one borrows the categories of evolutionary 
science, one must surely l i m i t oneself to that degree of 
p o s s i b i l i t y denoted by s c i e n t i s t s ! 
Similarly w ith the F a l l , there is no gradual process of 
deter i o r a t i o n , only an immediate change i n the organism, 
i 
so deep-reaching that i t can be called "not p a r a l l e l t o the 
development of a new organ or a new habit, but a radical 
a l t e r a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n . ' I t was not simply an acquired 
v a r i a t i o n : i t was a new species", (p.71). I t is a l l abrupt, 
and, immediately, greatly perfect, or greatly corrupt. 
That the f i r s t of a series.of acts, possible by v i r t u e of a 
creature's constituted nature should e f f e c t an immediate 
change of species i s a supposition which can surely by no 
means be f i t t e d into the framework of our e x i s t i n g s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge . 
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VI. THE PHB-NATAL FALL THEORY. 
l a J u l i u s Muiler. 
Mailer's exposition of the theory o f a m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
pre-natal f a l l s i s to lie found i n h i s "The Doctrine of Sin" 
(Book 4, Chapter 4, 3rd e d i t i o n , translated by W. Pulsford, 
1855). The main statements of i t are as follows. " I n the 
existence of every man there must he some moment i n which the 
f i r s t r e a l s i n was committed. But t h i s i n d i v i d u a l f a l l does 
not present i t s e l f t o the i n d i v i d u a l as the entering i n of an 
e n t i r e l y new element into the youthful l i f e , hut much rather 
'as the developing and revealing of a hidden potency, as the 
awakening of a power slumbering i n the deeps. ' Sin does not 
f i r s t of a l l originate i n him, i t only steps f o r t h . " (op.olt. 
p.290). "We must admit t h a t i n every human in d i v i d u a l there 
i s .... an innate propensity t o e v i l " and " i t can only have i t s 
ground i n a free f a l l i n g away, i n one's own offence." (op.cit. 
p.293). 
M i l l e r observes t h a t we count man as g u i l t y i n s i n , yet we 
acknowledge t h a t he i s born with the sinfulness from which 
actual s i n proceeds, and that t h i s would be a contradiction " i f 
there were not timelessly preceding our ea r t h l y temporal 
existence some existence of our personality as the sphere of 
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that self-decision by which our moral condition from the 
beginning i s conditioned 1 1 ( o p . c i t . p.400). He concludes, 
"We are j u s t i f i e d i n regarding the propensity to e v i l ... as 
one waioh we have ourselves contracted, i f each one has i n h i s 
extra-temporal condition turned away his w i l l from the Divine 
l i g h t t o the darkness of self-hood absorbed i n i t s e l f . " 
( o p . c l t . p.401). 
L i t t l e can f u r t h e r be added t o the c r i t i c i s m s of t h i s 
theory adduced by N. P; Williams, (The Ideas of the P a l l and 
of Original Sin. p.p. 507-12), which, so f a r as one can see, 
> have never yet been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y answered by any upholder 
of i t . 
(1) Muller, though appearing to expound a theory of extra-
temporal f a l l s , does, i n f a c t , speak throughout i n terms which 
cannot be emptied of a temporal reference, e.g. "This were now 
a manifest contradiction, i f there were not (timelessly) 
preoeding our e a r t h l y temporal existence..." (The Doctrine of 
Sin, p.400), and "the recognition of a p r i m i t i v e f a l l preoeding 
the i n d i v i d u a l t i m e - l i f e " ( o p . c i t . p.401). 
(2) I n spite of t h i s pie-natal f a l l , Muller yet t r i e s t o f i n d 
a place f o r a h i s t o r i c a l f a l l of Adam and Eve ( o p . c l t . pp.427-9). 
Williams remarks of t h i s t h a t i t is q i i t e unnecessary 
l o g i c a l l y , but "since the supposed h i s t o r i c a l s i n of our f i r s t 
parents must I n accordance ,with his main theory, be a t t r i b u t e d 
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to pre-creatlonal transgressions on t h e i r p art, the story of 
Genesis i l l i s r e a l l y , though he w i l l not admit i t , nothing 
but an excrescence upon tiie main f a b r i c of h i s theory. 
(Williams, p.509). 
(3) One of the most serious c r i t i c i s m s of Muller's theory 
i s t h a t to which h i s idea of the o r i g i n a l pre-natal self i s 
open. "Man," he says, "did not begin from an o r i g i n a l 
disunion with God, since before the o r i g i n a l self-decision he 
was non-determinate, and yet e s s e n t i a l l y e x i s t i n g by God. 
Therefore he adhered t o h i s eternal o r i g i n , but such an 
adherence, because i t i s affirmed by no selfrdeoision, has as 
yet no moral significance." Muller says that "an o r i g i n a l 
n e u t r a l i t y between fellowship w i t h God and departure from God i s 
out of the question: i t i s i n fact an empty abstraction. So 
also i s a v a c i l l a t i o n between love of God, and love of s e l f , 
which would Include a power of e v i l i n man, therefore a sin 
before the s i n " (Doctrine of Sin V o l . i i . p.157). 
Muller had already committed himself to the assertion that 
the essence of the f i r s t s i n was self-love i n preference t o 
Love of God (p. 101 also pp. 133-140). How such a creature as 
that described above could possibly commit sue h a s i n i t i s 
impossible t o perceive, f o r i t was capable of no a t t i t u d e 
towards i t s e l f or towards God, and so must have been conscious 
neither of s e l f nor of God. The psychological d i f f i c u l t i e s 
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of the idea are immense. Williams remarks " I f we are t o make 
the conception of a pre-natal s i n i n t e l l i g i b l e at a l l , we 
must regard the pre-existent soul as a monad or atom of soul-
s t u f f , containing the p o t e n t i a l i t y of i t s f u l l y developed adult 
structure . . . t h i s , of course, means th a t the conception of 
heredity ... i s a pure i l l u s i o n , (p.511). 
(4) Again, the theory i s open to the objection that i t 
involves a view of the o r i g i n a l condition of l i f e on t h i s 
planet which i s opposed t o the fundamentally'Biblical Christian 
view. According t o t h i s l a t t e r view, the world, as God made 
i t , was thoroughly good i n the beginning - Including man 
himself, whereas on Muller's view, t h i s l i f e i s "a penitentiary 
of f a l l e n souls", wherein eaoh expiates a s i n of which he 
possesses no memory. I n t h i s connection Williams makes the 
t e l l i n g remark, " I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how Christian parents 
could rejoioe that a man i s born into the world i f they were 
under the necessity o f regarding t h e i r new-born of f s p r i n g as a 
small c u l p r i t who had j u s t been banished from the i n t e l l i g i b l e 
sphere i n consequence o f some gross defiance of the majesty of 
God." (p.512). The theory i s pessimistic, almost Manichaean, 
i n i t s implications, so f a r as t h i s world's o r i g i n i s 
concerned. 
(5) Muller was prevented by h i s Lutheran orthodoxy from 
breaking decisively with the Augustinlan conception o f o r i g i n a l 
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g u i l t , which i s an indefensible doctrine. (Muller v o l . i i p.293). 
(6) I n addition t o these c r i t i c i s m s , however, we have t o 
notice the following point. Muller l i v e d at a time when the 
s c i e n t i f i c doctrine of evolution was not generally received. 
He was l i m i t e d to the pre s c i e n t i f i c view of the special 
oreation of man. The tendency t o s e l f - l o v e , now viewed as 
inh e r i t e d by man from h i s animal ancestry, was then regarded as 
a disturbance of the o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of man'. I t was so 
regarded because men were incapable of reconciling i t with the 
conception of a loving Creator. Love, i t was thought, could 
not possibly have arranged the very thing whioh made virtue so 
hard and s i n so easy. To think l i k e that appeared tantamount 
to making God responsible f o r sin. 
I t i s t h i s basic preconception, th a t God could have 
nothing t o do wi t h the o r i g i n of self-love, t h a t determines 
Muller'8 theory. The evidence f o r t h i s i s found on pp.292-293 
of the second volume of his Doctrine of Sin. He had been 
considering the opinion th a t i n the ea r l i e s t years of childhood, 
man was possessed of absolute innocence and perfect p u r i t y , and 
that the dualism of human nature, i.e. the struggle between the 
s p i r i t and the sense-nature, was s u f f i c i e n t t o account f o r the 
appearance of s i n and a weakened w i l l . Muller c a l l s t h i s 
weakness a bad disposition and i n answer he says t h a t , while 
the Churoh doctrine has always considered t h i s d i s p o s i t i o n as 
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a disturbance and corruption foreign t o the o r i g i n a l God-
ordained nature of man, t h i s opinion "finds nothing i n t h i s 
d i s p o s i t i o n which i s not compatible with the good order of 
human nature, and which might not follow from the neoessary 
laws of i t s development. B u t . . . i t not only receives, the 
burden of placing at the "very ground of human nature, an impure 
notion, which does violence to the Holiness of the Creator,.... 
etc." (p.893). 
life may note here t h a t while the i n i t i a l d i s p o s i t i o n i n 
man to love s e l f before other may follow from the necessary 
laws of (human) development, i t does not follow t h a t that 
d i s p o s i t i o n w i l l be yielded t o necessarily i n the case of the 
c a l l t o man to love God before s e l f . God may arrange the 
i n i t i a l self-centred disposition as the morally necessary 
prelude for the ultimate response of love, but so soon as He 
ca l l s man to love Him He gives t o him the grace to overcome 
the s o l i c i t a t i o n s of that d i s p o s i t i o n , i n other words, t o change 
his o r i g i n a l d i sposition. I t cannot be denied t h a t God i s 
responsible f o r arranging the moral struggle, but neither can 
i t be denied that He supplies graoe to man i n that struggle. 
The concept of Mvine grace shuts the door f i r m l y i n the 
face of any idea of necessary sinning. 
Miiller agrees i n p r i n c i p l e with the idea t h a t God arranges 
moral struggle as the morally necessary prelude to the 
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attainment by man t o the B e a t i f i c v i s i o n . "The creature must 
f i r s t of a l l by self-development i n fellowship with the 
believed God grow strong i n himself and i n t h i s fellowship i n 
order to become capable of the v i s i o n of God." (o p . c i t . p.328). 
Why, i f t h i s be tr u e , God should f i r s t create a creature such 
as t h a t described by Muller ( o p . c i t . p.157), empty of a l l 
capacity f o r moral struggle, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see, f o r as soon 
as God iaunched I t on the moral l i f e He would have to invest 
i t with that capacity. No purpose would be served by God 
deferring the moral struggle, by creating the soul i n t h i s way 
at f i r s t . 
Muller has, of course, made the mistake (due to his 
l i m i t e d idea of special creation) that any o r i g i n a l s e l f -
centre dness would mean "a power of e v i l i n man", and, therefore, 
"a sin before the s i n . " ( o p . c i t . p.157). His i n a b i l i t y t o 
conceive of an already existing g u i l t l e s s self-centredness 
p r i o r t o the f i r s t moral choice led to h i s "naked and vacuous 
pre-existent ego, ... a pure form, ... empty of a l l content, 
possessing merely the p o t e n t i a l i t y of self-consciousness, without 
any s e l f of which t o be conscious." (Williams, op . c i t . p.511). 
His "pre-natal soul" must be conceived as being suddenly 
presented simultaneously w i t h a p e r f e c t l y new consciousness of 
se l f and a p e r f e c t l y new consciousness o f God, and, on the basis 
of t h i s consciousness, - wi t h no previous experience of God or 
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of s e l f , - having to choose between them a t the l e v e l of 
morality. The s i t u a t i o n i s psychologically f a n t a s t i c , and, of 
course, i n view of our reasonably well-established b e l i e f t h a t 
man was self-conscious long before he was God-conscious (to say 
nothing of our equally reasonable b e l i e f t h a t man was conscious 
of the supernatural as mere a r b i t r a r y power long before he was 
conscious of i t as a God of Love), i t i s quite inaccurate and 
untenable. 
2. D. R. Da vies. 
A more recent attempt to defend the idea of a m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of pre-natal f a l l s i s to be found i n D. R. Davies book "The 
Two Humanities." (pp.64-79). The main steps i n his arguments 
are as follows: The doctrine of the f a l l implies c l e a r l y a 
f u l l y developed personality, for to choose independence from 
creative Being i s the act of a highly developed personal s e l f -
consciousness. Human beings i n h i s t o r i c a l beginnings were so 
undeveloped as to be Incapable of such personal decision.' ' Theirs 
was mere undifferentiated t r i b a l consciousness. The beings who 
were the o r i g i n a l creation of God must have been therefore f u l l 
developed self-consoious s p i r i t s , the proof of waioh i s they 
personally sinned. They were God-like, e t e r n a l l y youthful, 
angelic. Ihen they sinned t h e i r personality descended i n t o the 
p r i m i t i v e consciousness of the t r i b a l man. They appeared i n 
time as Neanderthal man or Pithecanthropus, and history i s the 
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record of an agonising psychological r i s e from dark 
unconsciousness to personal awareness. The f a l l i s thus a change 
i n species and i t s catastrophic nature can be witnessed t o i n 
our own experience of e v i l inducing profound psychological 
ohanges amounting t o a difference i n being. Christ did not 
appear t i l l man had recovered the psychic p o t e n t i a l i t y of his 
o r i g i n . The universal myth of a golden age may be the embodiment 
of a dim r a c i a l memory of man's c e l e s t i a l o r i g i n and f a l l . 
Children are nearer the roots of being, and heaven l i e s about them 
i n t h e i r infanoy: i t was i n man's infancy that he was uneasily 
s t i r r e d by the memory of the f a r o f f and long ago. 
I n answer t o Da vies's argument we may make the following 
observations. I t only becomes necessary to postulate a highly 
developed personal self-consciousness for Hie being who f i r s t 
sinned, i f i t i s believed that the f i r s t s i n was that of a being 
who realised the f u l l significance of his deliberate r e b e l l i o n 
against God. I t only becomes neoessary, however, so to conceive 
the f i r s t sinner because of the p r i o r b e l i e f that only such a s i n 
could bring such catastrophic consequences i n i t s t r a i n . This 
b e l i e f i n turn l i n k s up w i t h the b e l i e f that t h i s whole present 
mode of l i f e i s not God's o r i g i n a l design for man. 
We have t o r e j e c t the idea t h a t the sin of a highly 
developed personal self-consciousness would have such an e f f e c t , 
and also the idea t h a t t h i s present scheme of things, man's s i n 
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and I t s known ef f e o t s apart, does not represent God's o r i g i n a l 
plan. The reasons f o r r e j e c t i n g these ideas are as follows. 
I f man had attained, by the time of Christ, to the psychic 
p o t e n t i a l i t y of his o r i g i n , then any s i n committed thereafter 
would have been as serious, and, therefore, would have had 
effects s i m i l a r to those produced by, the f i r s t sin committed 
by such a developed self-conscious being. Each choice of 
independence from the Divine Being made by men with such a degree 
of self-consciousness would have meant a reversion to the 
pr i m i t i v e consciousness of t r i b a l man. That no such r e s u l t s do, 
i n f a c t , take place argues t h a t no such r e s u l t s can be said t o 
have taken place i n the case of any creature supposed to have 
been created with such a high l y developed self-consciousness. 
Moreover, i f those souls who have passed into the purely 
s p i r i t u a l l i f e beyond the grave commit any sins of deliberate 
r e b e l l i o n against God while possessing the self-consoiousness of 
a person who l i v e d on earth about the time of Chr i s t , then, on 
Da vies's argument, i t would seem they would f a l l back from t h e i r 
purely s p i r i t u a l state into t h i s material l i f e and s t a r t o f f 
again as a 'prim i t i v e * w i th an undifferentiated t r i b a l 
consciousness. The d i f f i c u l t i e s of such a view are obvious. 
Again, there is no p a r a l l e l i n our experience of s i n , of 
the supposed catastrophic r e s u l t s of the f i r s t sin of the f i r s t 
human soul. To adduce, i n support of these r e s u l t s , the 
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profound psychological changes, amounting to a difference i n 
being, which are induced by our sinning, i s pointless,' since 
one thing we know f o r c e r t a i n i s t h a t any "difference i n being" 
re s u l t i n g from s i n , i s a progressive change i n character, which 
i s nowhere near a change i n species, as that word i s customarily 
understood. The great difference wrought by s i n i n any person 
does not take place i n i t s devastating t o t a l i t y immediately, 
that i s , as the r e s u l t of one s i n , but only as the cumulative 
e f f e c t of prolonged sinning. This I s true i n the case of Dorian 
Gray, whom Davies quotes to support the opposite, idea of an 
Immediate catastrophic change i n species. Moreover, the more 
God-like a soul, the more penitent and ashamed i t i s a f t e r s i n . 
This i s the only psychology of sin we know; the burden of proof 
is on those who assert there i s another kind. 
The r e s u l t s of the f i r s t s i n are pictured by Davies as 
"appearing i n time" i n contrast to the f i r s t s i n i t s e l f which was 
committed i n pre-existence." This contrast between "pre-
existence* and "time" suggests the pre-existence was a timeless 
state, and t h i s would expose Davies's argument t o the c r i t i c i s m s 
which Williams levels against Kant's theory of the noumenal s e l f , 
v i z . a timeless act i s meaningless, and a timeless state would 
mean there was an eternal e v i l p r i n c i p l e which would involve 
Manichaeism. 
Daviess presentation of the pre-natal theory, l i k e 
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Muller*s, represents the whole process i n time as the r e s u l t of 
e v i l . This, as has been noted, contradicts the main B i b l i c a l 
Christian b e l i e f t h a t t h i s creation came o r i g i n a l l y from the 
hand of God 'a good t h i n g . ' Christians may believe that beyond 
and p r i o r to t h i s world, there was a world of pure s p i r i t s , even 
that some of those s p i r i t s corrupted t h i s world of time, but 
such b e l i e f s are held alongside the b e l i e f t h a t o r i g i n a l l y t h i s 
world i s the good creation of God, that everything i n i t was 
f i r s t of a l l good as i t came from His hand, and only afterwards 
became Infected with e v i l . 
I n conclusion we may note that the pre-natal theory 
contradicts the B i b l i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c b e l i e f s t h a t man, as a 
l i v i n g s o u l , o r i g i n a l l y appeared after the r e s t of t h i s material 
creation, that as he f i r s t appeared he represented the crown and 
climax o f the material universe, and also the b e l i e f t h a t though 
he has corrupted himself through s i n , his o r i g i n a l state was not 
c e l e s t i a l but t e r r e s t r i a l , not God-like but bru t i s h . 
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V I I . THE PRE-MONDANE FALL THEORY 
1. The need to d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h i s theory from the pre-
natal f a l l theory. 
The Pre-Mundane F a l l Theory, as presented by P. Green 
i n "The Problem of E v i l " (1920), and i n "The Pre-Mundane 
F a l l " (1944), by W. Formby i n "The Unveiling of the F a l l " (1923), 
and by N. P. Williams i n "The Ideas of the F a l l and of Original 
Sin" (1927), ought to be distinguished o l e a r l y from the theory 
of the Pre-Natal F a l l , whioh we have j u s t o r i t i o l s e d . The 
former t i t l e i s better reserved t o indicate the idea of one 
single c o l l e c t i v e or representative f a l l of a l l humanity i n 
Time; the l a t t e r to Indioate that of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
i n d i v i d u a l extra-temporal f a l l s . P. Green i n hi s pamphlet 
The Pre-Mundane F a l l (p.20) has Indiscriminately joined together 
as teachers of "The Pre-Mundane F a l l " , Origen, Kant, Coleridge, 
Muller, Formby, Williams. The d i v i s i o n would better be, 
(a) Pre-Mundane F a l l , - Coleridge, Formby, Williams, 
(b) Pre-Natal F a l l , - Origen, Kant, Muller, though we have to 
notice the difference between Origen and Kant, v i z . Origen's 
f a l l s , though pre-natal, are, s t r i c t l y , i n Time, whereas 
Kant's belong to the i n t e l l i g i b l e world, i n whioh, as Williams 
says, The idea of Time has no v a l i d i t y . This d i s t i n c t i o n , 
between the two groups of w r i t e r s helps to c l a r i t y of thought. 
2. S. T. Coleridge. 
We must notice that a l l that Coleridge says about t h i s 
matter i n Aphorism X i n Aids to Reflection, i s that man's 
resistance to God has long been acknowledged as a mystery, 
which, by the nature of the subject, must ever remain such, -
"a problem of which any other solution than the statement of 
the faot i t s e l f i s demonstrably impossible".' (p. 189). " I t 
belongs to the very essence of the doctrine that i n respect 
of o r i g i n a l s i n , every man i s the adequate representative of 
a l l men. Even i n Genesis the word Adam i s distinguished 
from a proper name by an a r t i o l e before i t . I t i s the Adam, 
so as to express the genus, not the individual, or rather 
as w e l l as the individual." (p.194) " I t would have been 
possible to enter into the momentous subject of a s p i r i t u a l 
f a l l or apostacy antecedent to the formation of man, a b e l i e f , 
the S c r i p t u r a l grounds of which are few and of diverse i n t e r -
pretation, but whioh has been almost universal i n the 
C h r i s t i a n Church." (p.195). 
These are the main statements by Coleridge on the 
i 
question, and i t i s on the basis of them that (a) Tennant 
remarks "Coleridge regarded the universal prevalence of e v i l 
as an expression of the timeless aot of the whole race, the 
e v i l not of any one man's w i l l , but of a l l human w i l l s 
c o l l e c t i v e l y . " (Origin and Propagation of Sin, Lecture I I , ) , 
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and (b) Williams says "Coleridge seems to hint at some suoh 
theory" (that i s , a c o l l e c t i v e f a l l of the race soul of 
humanity i n an i n d e f i n i t e l y remote past) "when he speaks of 
*a s p i r i t u a l f a l l or apostacey antecedent to the formation 
of man.*" We s h a l l not neglect any Important aspect of the 
theory i f we attend to i t as i t i s elaborated by the 
Bampton lecturer. 
3. The theory as presented by N. P. Williams. 
Williams's main position may be outlined as follows. 
S i n presupposes the moral law to s i n against, and the b i r t h 
of the moral law must have taken place thousands of years 
after the emergence of man as a d i s t i n c t species, (p.516). 
The f i r s t known sinner must have been merely one amongst 
thousands of brethren whom he could only i n f e c t by example 
not by heredity. Even supposing the descendants of t h i s 
primeval sinner to have intermarried with the descendants of 
h i s ex :hypothesi s i n l e s s or non-moral brethren so that a l l 
beoame polluted by h i s i n f i r m i t y , suoh an idea presupposes 
the transmlssability of acquired as d i s t i n c t from congenital 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , whloh i s too uncertain an idea on which to 
build any f a l l dootrine. (pp.516-7). The f i r s t s i n , even i f 
we could i s o l a t e i t , would not thus explain subsequent s i n s . 
I t would be, not the oause, but the f i r s t known effeot of the 
hereditary inf i r m i t y , the f i r s t r e s u l t i n human history of the 
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ultimate f a l l . The f i r s t s p e c i f i c a l l y human creature did not 
f a l l : he only f a i l e d to r i d himself of the anachronistic 
ape and t i g e r s t r a i n i n the blood, to emancipate himself from 
the deficiency i n 'herd-instinct 1 or gregarious feeling (p.517). 
Innate weakness of herd-instlnot i s due to an arrested 
development. This a r r e s t points to an e v i l agenoy ex i s t i n g 
i n the nature of things before man was. This e v i l power i s 
the same as that mysterious power which v i t i a t e s the whole 
of sub-human l i f e with cruelty and s e l f i s h n e s s . 
Williams defends the use of these moral terms i n 
r e l a t i o n to sub-human l i f e by saying that not a l l e v i l i s s i n . 
He applies the term ' e v i l * to a l l phenomena which our moral 
consciousness t e l l s us ought not to e x i s t . We only describe 
such phenomena as 'sins* i f they are due to consoious 
Voluntary aotlon. He desoribes c e r t a i n f a m i l i a r features of 
animal and plant l i f e which offend the refined moral 
consciousness and oonoludes that we would not have oreated 
them l i k e that i f we had had the power. Suoh things are 
against our idea of a loving Creator, (p.522). 
To explain t h i s underlying e v i l i n a l l creation we must 
assume a pre-oosmic s e l f - v i t i a t i o n of the world-soul, whioh 
we must conceive as having been oreated free, personal, s e l f -
conscious, the image of i t s Maker, most mighty, and good, 
most f a i r and perfect. The idea of ' o r i g i n a l righteousness 1 
I 
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oan here be employed. (525-6) At the beginning of Time t h i s 
world-soul turned away from God to s e l f I n some transcendental 
and Incomprehensible fashion. I t thus shattered I t s own 
i n t e r i o r being and l o s t i t s unitary self-consciousness which 
i t has only regained after aeons of myopic s t r i v i n g i n 
sporadic fragments whioh are the separate minds of men and 
perhaps of superhuman s p i r i t s , (p.526). 
There was an intimate oonneotion between the oreated 
world-soul and the eternal Logos, i t was meant to consist 
i n the continuous penetration, inspiration, and guidance of 
the world - soul by the -Logos. The S p i r i t of C h r i s t has 
gone on helping the blinded and marred world-soul to 
recover i t s o r i g i n a l harmony, peace, and unified s e l f -
oonsoiousness. (p.529). I n the f u l l n e s s of time the Logos 
entered into a oloser bond with the f a l l e n world-soul by 
uniting humanity to His d i v i n i t y . Through the Church, the 
defeot of herd-instinct, of love, - i t matters not how i t be 
named - may , toe-remedied through the direot transfusion into 
our souls of His own l i f e . (p.530). 
Such i s h i s theory, and i n the sweep and comprehensiveness 
of i t , one cannot deny a oertain i n i t i a l attractiveness. 
There are oertain features, however, i n the theory which 
cause us to r e j e c t i t , and the reasons for that rejeotion 
we s h a l l now endeavour to make plain. 
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4. Orltiolams of the Theory. 
The f i r s t point whioh we would o r l t l o i s e i s h i s 
location of the inherited i n f i r m i t y i n an arrested development 
of the herd-instinct. Even i f he did not intend i t , he 
c e r t a i n l y uses the terms love, s o c i a l feeling, gregariousness, 
herd-instinct, the soo i a l instinot, the moral sentiment, 
i 
interchangeably. We can notice i n t h i s connection e s p e c i a l l y 
his phrase "the defect of love, of so o i a l feeling, of 
gregariousness, of herd-instinot, i t matters not how i t be 
named (p.530 op.oit.). We know that these features of 
l i f e are c l o s e l y connected, being stages i n man's growth. 
The moral sentiment i s connected with the herd-instinot, and 
love i s only possible on the basis of the moral sentiment, 
but to i d e n t i f y a f a i l u r e i n love with a defect of herd-
i n s t i n c t , and t h i s i s the p l a i n implication of h i s language, 
i s obviously untrue. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to avoid the conclusion that 
Williams's argument amounts to t h i s , that i f man's herd-
i n s t i n c t had been stronger, i t would by i t s e l f have been able 
e f f e c t i v e l y to combat the sex and s e l f - a s s e r t i v e i n s t i n c t s 
as these found greater opportunities and inducements to 
express themselves through the rapid growth of sooial and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e . I f man's v i c t o r i e s over temptations to 
sel f i s h n e s s i n these directions, however, had been due to the 
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operation of an i n s t i n o t , how could we designate those 
v i c t o r i e s as moral v i c t o r i e s ? 
I t i s pr e c i s e l y the greater strength of the i n s t i n c t s 
of self-assertiveness and sex over against the herd-instinot 
i n man, that makes possible any moral struggle and any moral 
growth at a l l . I f the n i c e l y calculated pre-human balance 
of animal i n s t i n c t s had been maintained l a t e r i n human beings, 
no moral struggle oould have taken.place. What the herd-
i n s t i n c t did for the beast i n enabling i t to curb i t s sex and 
ego i n s t i n c t s , has to be done i n man by something quite 
different from i n s t i n c t , namely, by free moral choice. Far 
from weakness of herd in s t i n o t being an in f i r m i t y i n man, i t 
i s the very condition of moral growth. I f i t had remained or 
developed s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to combat the self-centred 
nature i n man, then man would have been incapable of r e a l 
moral action: i n f a c t , he would not have been a man at a l l . 
I f love would have been easier because of a stronger herd-
ins t i n o t , i t r e a l l y means that love would have been easier 
because i t would have been more i n s t i n c t i v e . I t i s p r e c i s e l y 
the d i f f i c u l t y of love's struggle i n creatures that i s the 
hall-mark of the o r i g i n a l divine plan. That i t should be easy 
for love right from the beginning i s an idea based, as we 
hope to show, on a wrong conception of the task and 
obligations facing creative love. 
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The seoond point which we would c r i t i c i s e i s h i s 
description of the behaviour of oertain plants and animals 
and Insects as s e l f i s h , c r u e l , d i a b o l i c a l , that suoh behaviour 
can only be due to an e v i l force pervading sub-human nature. 
I f , however, as he says, the theory of the transmissability 
of acquired, as apart from congenital, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s too 
uncertain an idea on which to build any theological f a l l -
dootrine, surely, also, the idea of cruelty and hatred i n the 
sub-human world i s too uncertain on which to build suoh a 
dootrine! He admits that the oreatures are not morally 
oulpable for t h e i r behaviour, and confesses that the ultimate 
ground of h i s judgment of th e i r behaviour as e v i l i s a 
feeling that such behaviour i s not i n acoord with the w i l l 
of Creative Love. We are thus faced once again with the old 
preconceived idea that Love oould never arrange for the r i s e 
of moral oreatures out of a prelude of self-oentredness, that 
Love would make unselfishness easy and se l f i s h n e s s hard. I t 
i s our contention that t h i s pre-oonoeption i s mistaken but we 
s h a l l defer the defence of our view t i l l the l a s t chapter. 
A t h i r d point i s , Williams oarries back the'problem of 
the or i g i n of e v i l beyond man, beoause of h i s agreement with 
Muller that the f i r s t human s i n was not the F a l l . . " I t was 
merely the f i r s t r e s u l t i n human history of the F a l l " (p.519). 
The e v i l was there prior to man. I t only stepped forth i n 
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him. I t i s no solution, or better explanation of the problem 
of the o r i g i n of e v i l , to trace i t s presence i n man to a . 
defect i n love, and to trace that defect to the s e l f -
corruption of a world soul which oorrupted I t s e l f through a 
defect i n love. You cannot get r i d of the root of s e l f - l o v e 
by transferring the f i r s t s i n from a human soul to a world-
soul. The mistake i s to think that i t i s necessary to get 
r i d of the root of s e l f - l o v e inherited by man from h i s 
animal predecessors. 
I n t h i s connection we must observe that while Williams 
may c r i t i c i s e the soul i n i t s pre-natal state (as described 
by Muller) as too vaouous an entity to be capable of s i n , 
h i s own world-soul can c e r t a i n l y be c r i t i c i s e d as being too 
good a creature ever to be able to s i n i n the way described. 
There i s t h i s further point, the pre-natal f a l l theory i s 
more i n l i n e with the t r a d i t i o n a l Catholio b e l i e f that man i s 
responsible for the weakness i n himself that makes s i n seem 
inevitable. I t was man's s i n that caused h i s present 
oonditlon here. The Pre-Mundane F a l l Theory, on the other 
hand, exempts man, as man, from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the 
weakness i n himself. I t was not man who sinned the weakness 
into existence, but the world-soul. 
A fourth point i s , Williams regards the innate 
psyohologioal self-centredness which man has inherited from 
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the brutes as being somehow an e v i l thing, (p.527). This 
o r i g i n a l self-oentredness i n man must, however, be firmly 
dissooiated from any idea of a t a i n t of e v i l , from any idea 
of something having gone wrong with the o r i g i n a l scheme of 
things. It'must be held to be the o r i g i n a l plan of God, and to 
be the necessary prelude to the creation of un-selfoentredness. 
Of t h i s we s h a l l speak l a t e r (see l a s t chapter). 
Further, we have already referred to N. P. Williams's 
remark that there would seem to be no a p r i o r i reason why 
temporal p o s t e r i o r i t y of development should involve 
weakness. He goes on to say, "An omnipotent God presumably 
might and could.have so ordered matters that, the moral 
consciousness when i t did appear should have sprung into 
existence endowed with the f u l l e s t power and oontrol over the 
animal impulses, l i k e Athene Springing f u l l y armed from the 
head of Zeus." (p.532). I t i s not long before we learn to 
be suspicious of arguments which begin i n the s t r a i n "God i s 
omnipotent so presumably He might..." I t i s r e a l l y the 
appearance once again of that which we have already noticed, 
namely, a pre-oonceived idea - and, as we believe, a wrong 
one, - of what Love would and would not do. I t i s surely 
most s i g n i f i c a n t that Williams here invokes the idea of Divine 
Omnipotence to support the argument that God cannot be 
responsible for the d i f f i c u l t y of the moral struggle, and that 
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he i l l u s t r a t e s the idea of omnipotence whioh he has i n mind 
by a referenoe to pagan mythology, wherein divine power i s 
represented as being of the magical autooratio kind which i s 
able to take short outs to the r e a l i s a t i o n of i t s purposes 
by overriding the moral obligations of love and disregarding 
the contingencies of natural laws. This i s an unchristian 
conception which oan hardly commend i t s e l f to us, and which 
must be held to undermine somewhat the position which i t i s 
intended to defend. Moreover, i f we assume that God i s 
omnipotent i n such a way that He could arrange that the moral 
,consciousness should be able immediately to have the f u l l e s t 
power and control over animal impulses, then surely we must 
also assume He would arrange that the world-soul should be 
able Immediately to have the f u l l e s t power.and control over 
i 
the e v i l Impulse to r e b e l . You oannot, l o g i c a l l y , defend 
God against a charge of being responsible for the weakness 
of our mortal nature by saying that i f He had o r i g i n a l l y 
arranged i t s emergence by a prooess of development He would 
have seen to i t that i t should emerge immediately able to 
overcome a l l e v i l opposition, - you cannot argue l i k e t h i s -
without involving God i n a charge of being responsible for 
the moral weakness i n the world-soul, for presumably He 
oould also have seen to i t that the world-soul should appear 
immediately able to overcome temptation. The fact that even 
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the world-soul did not appear immediately l i k e that, suggests 
that God was not able to make i t appear l i k e i t ! 
The whole idea of a world-soul oreated good, free,, 
personal, self-conscious, yet corrupting i t s e l f , i s open to 
the same oritioism as was l e v e l l e d against the idea of the 
good angels, and the good Paradisal man. Suoh oreatures 
could not s i n i n the way they are said to have sinned. The 
idea involves s p i r i t u a l and psychological happenings which 
are t o t a l l y unrelated to, and completely indefensible by any 
reference to, the f a c t s of s p i r i t u a l l i f e as we know i t , and 
i f terms, borrowed from that l i f e , are to be used to describe 
such.events, then those events must be, i n a l l reason, 
b a s i c a l l y related to our own s p i r i t u a l experience, to desoribe 
which those terms were o r i g i n a l l y s p e c i f i c a l l y invented. I t 
i s t h i s t o t a l unrelatedness between these so-oalled primal 
events and the knowledge gained from moral and s p i r i t u a l 
experience i n t h i s l i f e that forces us to put them aside as 
im p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n t h i s connection i t i s surely not without 
significance that Williams himself can only r e f e r to the f a l l 
of the world-soul as happening i n "some transoendental and 
incomprehensible manner." 
We must also notice the bearing of the theory on the 
doctrines of Redemption and Incarnation. How can we be 
assured of the effioacy of the Atonement i f what we are being 
136. 
redeemed Into i s that personal goodness which characterised 
the world-soul i n the beginning, and which was powerless to 
r e s i s t the enticements of e v i l ? What, moreover, are we to 
think of the human nature that C h r i s t took i n the Inoarnation? 
I f j j as the advocates of the premundane f a l l theory suggest, 
human nature was never anything other than a corrupt and 
struggling fragment of a disintegrated world-soul, what kind 
of human nature was i t that the Second Person i n the Divine 
T r i n i t y assumed at Bethlehem? Orthodox Catholicism has 
always assumed that i t was unfalien human nature, as o r i g i n a l l y 
oreated by God, but according to t h i s theory there never was 
suoh a thing! Thus the theory s t r i k e s at the heart of the 
Ch r i s t i a n f a i t h . I t reduces the Inoarnation to a mockery. 
Would God, clothed i n the very robes of catastrophe, enact . 
what could, at the most, only succour men to become what 
had o r i g i n a l l y proved to be powerless to r e s i s t temptation? 
How could a corrupted fragment of a f a l l e n world-soul be 
united to Deity, and how could the r e s u l t i n g union of natures 
be said to have r e s i s t e d the subtlest temptations to which 
s p i r i t u a l nature can be subjected, unless suoh resistance 
was due only to the Deity within, and not i n any way to the 
corrupt humanity? How, thus, oould the "Inoarnation" be 
anything other than a docetic and monophysitic oharade? What 
becomes of the Divine Voice speaking through the mouthpiece 
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of t h i s corrupt nature exhorting a l l who share that nature to 
"be perfect as God I s perfect," when even the o r i g i n a l world-
soul created good by God had f a i l e d to remain good? I f there 
i s no other goodness which God can offer to human nature 
than that of the world-soul which was powerless to remain good, 
why should He be at pains to devise the elaborate drama of 
the Incarnation? I f , however, there i s a goodness, other than 
that whioh was powerless to remain good, why did He not; endow 
the world-soul with i t i n the f i r s t place, instead of only 
offering i t to i t now at the cost of such l o s s and suffering? 
I n conclusion, we can notice the following contrasts 
between t h i s theory and t r a d i t i o n a l Catholio b e l i e f , i n the 
l i g h t of Williams's statement that "Catholic C h r i s t i a n i t y i s 
committed to no more than the bare assertion that there was 
a f a l l , i . e . a primal r e b e l l i o n of a created w i l l against God." 
Traditional Catholio b e l i e f asserts that man himself was 
created o r i g i n a l l y good by God. The Fre-Mundane f a l l theory 
holds that man, as such, was not created o r i g i n a l l y good by 
God, but was, l i k e the r e s t of the physical universe, a 
struggling remnant of an already self-oorrupted world-soul. 
Traditional Catholio b e l i e f asserts that man was made i n 
God's image, that he i s responsible for endangering that 
image, that he has dragged himself down through the mire, 
that he i s a miserable wretch, worthy of death and destruction, 
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and i s only redeemed from s i n , which i s h i s f a u l t , by the 
meroy of God. I t i s impossible to believe, on the Pre-Mundane 
f a l l theory, i n the dootrlne of the or i g i n a l imago del i n man. 
That theory represents man as a hero to be p i t i e d , a victim 
struggling against tremendous odds, the creation of which 
were i n no sense h i s own f a u l t . He i s the r e s u l t of a 
mysterious transcendental oalamity, and redemption i s the 
rescue of an innocent from an undeserved fate. 
Traditional Catholic b e l i e f asserts that the several 
pre-human orders of oreation, as we know them were created 
good by God. The Pre-Mundane f a l l theory teaches that these 
orders were not created good themselves, but are the 
oorrupted and struggling remnants of a f a l l e n world-soul whioh 
was created good by God. 
Traditional Catholic b e l i e f asserts that whatever 
pre-human f a l l there may have been belonged to an order of 
being organically separate from t h i s t e r r e s t r i a l order. The 
Pre-Mundane f a l l theory teaches that the pre-human f a l l 
pertained to what was organically r e l a t e d not only to the 
o e l e s t i a l but also to the t e r r e s t r i a l order. (Williams 
op.cit. p.527, 528) 
Traditional Catholio b e l i e f asserts that man's 
temptations and struggles are connected with the malicious 
a c t i v i t y of a supernatural f a l l e n being, and with the 
weakness brought about through the f i r s t y ielding to that 
being. The Pre-Mundane f a l l theory teaches that those 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and temptations are due to the self-corruption 
of what i s organically conneoted with h i s very essence, for 
the consequent o r i g i n a l corruption of which he cannot be 
held responsible and also possibly to the a c t i v i t y of 
creatures who have since ooluntarily increased i n themselves 
that o r i g i n a l corruption from whioh they, too, suffered. 
I t i s i n the l i g h t of suoh considerations that we would 
put aside the theory as unsatisfactory. 
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V I I I . THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
Few writers would disagree with the statement that the 
greatest exponent of the evolutionary theory of the o r i g i n 
and propagation of s i n i s FJ R. Tennant. We can begin our 
discussion of t h i s theory by i s o l a t i n g the main statements 
from h i s Hulsean lectures of 1901-2. 
1. F. R. Tennant 1 s Views Outlined. 
Can we find the ground of the p o s s i b i l i t y and oooaslon 
for s i n i n our natural constitution, regarded as the perfectly 
normal, r e s u l t of a process of development through which the 
race has passed previously to the acquisition of f u l l moral 
personality, and can we assign the r i s e of e v i l i t s e l f simply 
to the d i f f i c u l t y of the task which has to be encountered by 
every Individual person a l i k e , the task of enforcing h i s 
inherited organic nature to obey a moral law which he has only 
gradually been enabled to discern? This i s the view which 
Tennant. seeks to support, and his main position i s as follows. 
He warns us more than once, that i n discussing the i n i t i a l 
stages of s i n we must necessarily use language whioh would 
seem t e r r i b l y inadequate to describe s i n as i t i s present to 
the mind of the C h r i s t i a n penitent. He assumes physical and 
mental continuity between man and beast (p.86. op.oit.) Man 
did not at f i r s t think of himself so much as an individual 
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as part of a system. The idea of moral personality i n terms 
of which theology has been wont exclusively to formulate i t s 
doctrine of original sin emerged extremely late i n human 
thought, (p.89. opoCit.) The awakening of man's moral sense 
was an advance aooomplished by a long series of stages, and the 
origin of e v i l was a gradual process, not an abrupt and 
inexplicable plunge. I t s appearance would consist i n the 
oontinuanoe of man i n oertaln praotioes, the satisfying of 
certain natural impulses, after those things had come to be 
regarded as conflicting with a recognised sanction of ethical 
rank as low as that of t r i b a l oustorn (p.91 op.olt.) 
The f i r s t sins of humanity would be as the sins of 
ohildhood, not the most heinous, but rather the least gu i l t y . 
The motions i n men which the f i r s t reoognised sanction 
condemned were natural and non-moral, not s i n f u l . Many of 
man's native propensities are inevitably strong because they 
are or were useful or necessary, and were therefore intensified 
by natural seleotion. There i s no need to refer their 
clamorous importunity to an e v i l bias or oorrupted nature, 
(pp. 94, 95, op.olt.). To the evolutionist sin i s not an 
innovation, but i s the survival or misuse of habits or 
tendencies incidental to an earlier stage of development, whose 
sinfulness l i e s i n their anachronism. 
A bias to e v i l can only be predicated of the w i l l , and 
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the w i l l , emerges after the nature i s inherited. I t i s the 
basal proposition of the evolutionary theory of sin that u n t i l 
the w i l l has emerged and the l i f e begins to be self-directed, 
no germ of e v i l oan be said to exist i n the individual 
(p.105. op.oit.). Morality consists i n the formation of the 
non-moral material of nature into oharaoter, i n subjecting 
the seething and tumultous l i f e of natural tendency, of 
appetite and passion, affection and desire, to the moulding 
influence of reflective purpose. , Here, and not i n any 
universal and hereditarily transmitted disturbance of man's 
nature i s to be found the oooaslon or souroe of universal 
sinfulness (p.109, op.oit.) 
In thus naturally aooounting for the o r i g i n and 
universality of sin, we neither excuse sin, nor explain i t 
away. I f t h i s account of sin sees i n i t something empirically 
inevitable for every man (these words Tennant later altered 
to "universally present i n some degree i n the lives of man") 
i t by nomean s implies that sin i s theoretically or on a p r i o r i 
grounds an absolute necessity. I t asserts that the 
realisation of our self, beoause of our nature and surroundings 
i s a stupendously d i f f i c u l t task, and thus emphasises, l i k e the 
old doctrine of Inherited depravity, man's crying need of 
graoe, and his oapaoity for a gospel of redemption 
(op.oit. p.113). 
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The f a l l Is exchanged for an animal origin and a 
subsequent superposition or aoquiaiton of moral r a t i o n a l i t y . 
Taint of sin i s replaced by normal self-directed tendencies 
onoe naturally but now wrongly oalled s i n f u l (op.oit. p.114). 
That man*s performance lags behind his aspirations, i s to be 
attributed not to a defection from a sinless yet moral state, 
but to the fact that he i s r i s i n g i n moral oulture, whilst his 
inherited psychioal and physical constitution i s making no 
evolutionary progress. The theory preserves the t r u t h of. 
sol i d a r i t y of race, both i n nature and i n environment along 
with that of individual responsibility and g u i l t (op„oit.p.ll5) 
Such, b r i e f l y j i s Tennant*s position. 
2. Common Criticisms of his views. 
The charges most commonly brought against his views are 
as follows. (1) His theory does not explain why sin happens 
always and everywhere. We have to presuppose a bias to e v i l 
r i g h t at the beginning. (2) I t seeks to explain what i s , ex . 
hypothesi, inexplicable. (3) I t minimises sln*s seriousness 
by making i t inevitable. (4) I t is a godless naturalism. 
(5j) Spiritual sins oannot be made to depend on animal ancestry. 
(6) I t makes sin purely negative, a mere fa i l u r e to moralise 
the raw material of a l l morality. (7) I t offers no adequate 
explanation of the sense of g u i l t . (8) I t Involves God i n 
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responsibility for sin, i f God i s responsible for lack of 
moral illumination. 
3. These Criticisms Criticised. 
Let us deal with these oritiolsms separately. (1) " I t 
does not explain why sin happens always and everywhere: we 
have to presuppose a bias to e v i l right at the beginning." 
I n answering this oritiolsm we may observe that any theory 
whloh "explained" completely why the human w i l l acted i n 
certain ways, would explain such aots away by introducing 
determinism into human conduct. That Tennant's theory does not 
do this can soaroely be adduced;as a deficiency; How far he 
explains sin w i l l be seen when we deal with the next criticism, 
viz. that his theory seeks to explain what i s , ex hypothesi, 
inexplicable. 
Before we pass to that c r i t i c i s m we have to notice what 
is said further i n this f i r s t orltloism, namely, "we have 
always to presuppose a bias to e v i l at the beginning." I t was 
S. C. Gayford who put forward the following criticism, which 
Tennant reoorded i n the preface to the second edition of his 
"Origin and Propagation of Sin", - "Is the w i l l found from the 
f i r s t i n sympathy and alliance with the impulses whloh i t ought 
to curb! Is i t neutral? or does i t incline towards that 
higher law whioh i s just beginning to dawn upon the consciousness? 
This r e a l l y goes to the root of the matter. Tennant r e a l l y 
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evades i t . He assumes without proof that the w i l l from the 
f i r s t has been neutral as towards the lower impulses." 
Tennant's reply inoluded the following remarks. " I f the 
w i l l emerge before the moral consciousness; i f , i n other words, 
man's attitude towards his inborn propensities i s v o l i t i o n a l 
before i t oan possibly be influenced by any.sense of r i g h t or 
wrong, then i t must surely follow that the w i l l from the f i r s t 
has been neutral towards the lower impulses. I t oould not be 
anything else. The impulses are non-moral, and the w i l l i s 
as yet non-moral: the being i s purely animal at this stage." 
(op.oit. p. x v i i i ) . He continued, "That the child should 
continue to g r a t i f y impulses after having oome already to 
understand i t ought not, i s a serious moral fact: but i t i s 
not necessary to postulate any sympathy and alliance with 
natural impulses more mysterious than the oontlnuanoe of the 
capacity to feel pleasure i n their satisfaction. There i s , " 
Tennant oonoludes, "no root of the whole matter deeper than 
» 
that whioh my investigation of the sources of actual sin 
sought to lay bare." 
R. S. Moxon, i n discussing Gayford's oritioism, agreed 
that Tennant's answer was satisfying to the reason, but added 
that i t somehow fai l e d to secure conviction beoause of the 
discontinuity which Tennant s t i l l found between the fomes 
peccat! and the w i l l . 
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We must agree that Gayford1s question did go to the root 
of the matter, but we must observe a very Important point. His 
question i s , unintentionally ambiguous, and whether or not 
Tennant peroeived the ambiguity, his answer met both of the 
two possible interpretations. Where lay the ambiguity? I n 
the words "from the f i r s t " . "Is the w i l l from the f i r s t i n 
sympathy with the impulses i t ought to curb... or does i t 
incline towards the higher law just beginning to dawn on the 
consciousness?" Did Gayford mean (a) from the f i r s t moment 
when conduct began to be v o l i t i o n a l , or (b) from the f i r s t 
moment that the w i l l was faced with a choice between 
gratifying the old Impulses and obeying the higher law by 
denying them? I f he meant the f i r s t , then Tennant answered 
that there was no sympathy and alliance as such for there was 
no alternative to ohoose apart from the impulses. I f Gayford 
meant the second, then Tennant answered there was a sympathy 
and an alliance, but suoh only as sprang from the remembered 
pleasure of past gratifications of those Impulses. 
I t i s here maintained that t h i s answer i s correot, and 
that to seek an answer along the /lines of presupposing an 
already existing s i n f u l tendency or perversion of the w i l l 
or bias to e v i l i n the beginning i s to go sadly astray. I n 
supporting this contention we propose to reveal the pre-
suppositions that underlie Gayford*s question, and to show how 
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unsatisfactory these are for serious thought. 
Gayford obviously believed that the w i l l was i n sympathy 
and alliance with the Impulses that ought to have been curbed, 
at the f i r s t moment when i t encountered the demands of the 
higher law, and that this should not have been the oase. This 
means that he believed the w i l l should have been more swayed 
i n action by something new than by something old, that there 
should have been no tendency on the part of the w i l l to 
gr a t i f y old impulses on oooasions when i t was clear that they 
should not be gr a t i f i e d . We have to ask, can any good reason 
be given for supposing that a nature habituated to unopposed 
se l f - g r a t i f i c a t i o n (a) should oease to tend to g r a t i f y i t s e l f 
immediately a law appeared demanding the subordination of self, 
(b) should never have to struggle i n order to achieve obedience 
to that law, (o) should not probably f a i l sometimes to achieve 
obedience? Is the answer to t h i s , - that the tendency to 
disobey the moral law would be absent i n suoh a nature, beoause 
the new law's attraction would vastly outweigh that of self-
gratification? I f th i s is the kind of answer that would be 
given, we have to ask what reason can be given for supposing 
that the moral law would be immediately more attractive than 
the prospect of the old habitual self-gratification? Is the 
answer to t h i s , - that God would see to i t that i t would be so? 
I f that answer i s given, then we have stripped Gayford's 
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original question down to i t s basio underlying presuppositions. 
As so often, we see i t i s a oase of an idea or feeling about 
what God would and would not do i n certain oiroumstanoes. God, 
i t i s f e l t , might make sin possible, but He could never, surely, 
.make i t as easy as i t i s ! Virtue He would certainly make 
possible, but never as d i f f i c u l t as i t i s ! That virtue i s 
d i f f i c u l t and sin easy, and that Divine Love could not 
conceivably wish this to be so at the beginning, would seem 
to be the underlying presupposition i n the minds of those who 
attribute these faots to an i n i t i a l perversion of human nature, 
an i n i t i a l bias of the w i l l to e v i l . 
This perversion or bias to e v i l i s thus seen to be 
introduced i n order to defend a particular idea of God's 
character, an idea, which, reduced to i t s simplest form, i s 
that the mark of love i s always to make virtue easy from the 
very beginning for the object of i t s regard. The idea that the 
Divine purpose of love i s to be measured by reference only to 
what i s most convenient and pleasant and easy for man, cannot, 
however, commend I t s e l f to serious thought amongst those who 
believe that the evolutionary scheme represents God's i n i t i a l 
design of creation i n the universe. The reason why i t cannot 
do so i s , as we hope to show, because psychological self-
oentredness is the necessary prelude i n man to the calling out 
of unselfishness. 
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We must now look a l i t t l e more closely at this idea of an 
i n i t i a l perversion of the w i l l , which i s introduced i n order to 
account for the tendency of the w i l l from the beginning to 
g r a t i f y old impulses i n defiance of the promptings of the moral 
law. The following reflections would seem to show that the use 
of the word perversion i n this connection i s quite indefensible. 
Man i s not a oreature of one single nature, l i k e an angel who 
has a purely s p i r i t u a l nature. He i s neither pure animal nor 
pure s p i r i t . He is a mixture of both, i n the sense that he i s 
growing out of an animal past into a s p i r i t u a l future. I t i s 
natural for man to be thus double-natured, and i t i s natural 
also that he should at f i r s t be more animal than s p i r i t u a l , 
since the s p i r i t u a l cannot be perceived at once i n a l l i t s 
beauty. I t i s natural, too, that the animal should war 
against the s p i r i t u a l , and that there should be at f i r s t 
victories and defeats on both sides. A momentary victory 
of the animal over the s p i r i t u a l cannot be called unnatural 
i n the sense that i t is due to some perversion. 
Perversion i s essentially something that i s unnatural, 
against nature, and the use of the word to describe the w i l l 
which at f i r s t g r a t i f i e s self i n opposition to the demands of 
the higher law springs from confusing i n i t i a l moral and 
s p i r i t u a l disobedience with what is unnatural. Immorality i s 
not always perversion, though perversion i s always Immorality. 
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A man i s not a sexual pervert who f a i l s to control his desire 
for sexual intercourse with his wife when he.knows he ought. 
He i s a moral weakling, but not a pervert l i k e a homo-sexual 
whose oonduot i s against both animal and s p i r i t u a l nature alike 
i n man. Neither i s a man a pervert who f a i l s to control his 
desire for food and drink. He i s a glutton, but while gluttony 
is s i n f u l i t i s not a perversion. I t would be a perversion i f 
he desired always to satisfy his gluttony by being fed through 
a tube i n his toe. I t would be a case of perversion i f an 
angel, a pure s p i r i t , desired intercourse with the daughters 
of man, for no part of i t s nature was constituted l i k e that by 
God. Squally i t would be a case of perversion i f an animal 
desired intercourse with vegetables, for no part of i t s nature 
was constituted l i k e that by God. Perversion must always be 
reckoned against a background of established natural procedure: 
i t i s a deviation, a turning away, from a constituted order of 
nature. For man to yield to animal desires may be wrong, but 
i t i s not unnatural i n the sense of perversion, for the animal 
ordained by God, i s i n him, i n accordance with the w i l l of God. 
The p r i o r i t y and Intensity of animality, opposed to the 
posteriority and weakness of s p i r i t u a l i t y oould be the adequate 
"explanation"of weakness of w i l l i n a man, and we would 
here maintain that i t i s a serious misuse of the word, to o a l l 
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a creature perverted because at the f i r s t dim dawn of the 
moral sense i t continues to act i n line with the law of i t s 
ancient God-given nature. . 
Now l e t us consider the phrase "a bias to e v i l " . The 
universal tendency to please self rather than God i s 
attributed to such a bias. The tendenoy to please self i s 
inherited from our animal ancestors, and, by i t s e l f , t his 
tendenoy, this' psychological self-centredness, is not an e v i l 
thing. I t does not even become an e v i l thing when i t i s 
yielded to i n the face of the knowledge that such yielding to 
i t i s e v i l . We must differentiate, here, between the tendency 
to please self, and the aot of surrendering to i t on certain 
occasions. We must recognise, i n other words, that i t is 
sometimes e v i l to yield to a tendenoy which, i n i t s e l f , is not 
e v i l . The tendenoy to please self on a l l occasions oannot 
be identified, with a bias to e v i l . A bias to e v i l would be a 
tendenoy to yield to the tendenoy to please self for the sake 
of displeasing God! I f the pleasing of self oonslsted i n the 
displeasing of God, then i t would be a bias to e v i l , but as a 
matter of faot we know that i n muoh self-pleasing there i s an 
element of discomfort caused precisely by the knowledge that 
such self-pleasing is displeasing to God. Man's pleasure at 
f i r s t i s always i n the thing sought, and not i n the knowledge 
that the thing sought i s e v i l i n the circumstances. 
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Moreover, besides the universal tendenoy to please self, 
there i s the universal dread of oonsoienoe, the universal 
str i v i n g to excuse or rationalise or minimise transgression at 
f i r s t . These things soarely witness to an i n i t i a l bias to 
e v i l . Such a bias would rather have been evidenced by a 
degree of pleasure I n having done something that was sought and 
done because i t was known to be e v i l . Consolenoe would have 
been somewhat mocked rather than feared, the memory somewhat 
exulted i n rather than shunned. There i s no authoritative 
evidence that suoh things were universally true, rather than 
their opposite, i n the beginning. These are precisely the 
characteristics of e v i l i n i t s l a t e r , more developed, i.e. 
diabolical stage. Once again we must contend i t is a case of 
serious misnomer to describe as a bias to e v i l , a tendenoy to 
do things (which happen to be e v i l i n certain circumstances), 
not beoause they are e v i l but solely because they happen to 
be pleasing to self, and were pleasing to self long before they 
could be done i n the oiroumstanoes that now make the i r doing 
e v i l . 
2. Next there i s the oriticism that the theory offers an 
explanation of something which i s , ex hypothesi, inexplicable. 
Man's s i n f u l w i l l , i t i s said, remains as the one completely 
i r r a t i o n a l fact i s a world which God created and ;saw.. to be 
very good. That Tennant foresaw such oritioism i s evidenced by 
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his note B "On the explanation of sin" on pp.250 f f , of 
"The Concept of Sin". The following passages indicate the only 
sense i n which he seeks to "explain" the rise of sin. "Sin 
cannot be wholly explained i n terms of cognition. Feeling and 
conation are equally involved i n i t s constitution, and feeling 
and conation.... are a "surd" factor of experience that cannot 
be rationalised", (p.252 op.oit.). 
"There i s no further explanation of these oonative faotors i n 
experience than that they are there. Man i s primarily a 
oonatlve and feeling being, and by taking t h i s fact into 
consideration we oan explain without at the same time excusing 
his frequent lapses into sin", (p.254 op.oit.) " I f i t be 
asked why...we come to be capable of preferring...satisfactions 
of lower worth, the only answer is that as a matter of fact 
estimations of worth are not the only considerations whloh 
weigh with us, and i n virtue of which the w i l l i s prompted to 
aot. This i s an original property of our nature as we Inherit 
i t : i t Is an ultimate datum behind which we cannot go." 
(p.256 op.oit.) "The only explanation we oan give of s i n f u l 
a c t i v i t y of the w i l l which never works i n vacuo and which i s 
not solely influenced by reasons of the oognltional kind Is 
an account of the oonative modes of consciousness which 
furnish interests and motives such as may prompt the w i l l to 
unreasonable or Immoral action. These of themselves apart 
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from v o l i t i o n no more wholly constitute or explain sin than 
does v o l i t i o n apart from themv" (p.258. op.cit.) 
"Sin i s not thust"traced to" what is not sin as i f i t were 
identloal with, exhausted by, or explained solely i n terms of, 
involuntary motive or material." (This i s an answer to Dr. 
Orchard, i n his "Modern Theories of Sin" (p.100)). 
"Inherited propensities, i n themselves non-moral, are the 
indispensable material from whioh the w i l l constructs sin. 
Their presence i n every human, being, making the Inducement to 
sin common to a l l men i s the sufficient explanation of the fact 
that few i f any...go through t h i s world without contracting 
some stain of sin." (p.259. op.oit.). 
I t i s the repetition of such a qualified use of the word 
"explain" that proves beyond a shadow of doubt that the theory 
does not offer anything l i k e a oomplete explanation of any 
sin f u l aot of the w i l l . Tennant i s most careful to make clear 
that any explanation of sin can only go so far and not the whole 
way. What he offers i n his theory i s an explanation of how i t 
i s exceedingly probable (but not inevitable), that man will>at 
least , at f i r s t , make a certain use of freedom rather than anothe: 
i n relation to the oonfliot between self and duty. This i s a l l 
that any theory of the o r i g i n of sin oan do, that does not 
reduce human conduct to completely determined behaviour. I n 
view of Tennant's whole paragraph on the meaning of the 
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explanation of sin, and of his reiterated statements showing 
the qualified sense i n which he uses the word, and also of the 
faot that he d i s t i n c t l y retains the ideas of man's freedom 
and g u i l t and responsibility, i t oannot, with reason, be 
maintained that his theory explains sin away by seeking to 
explain i t completely. 
3. This brings us to the cri t i c i s m that the evolutionary 
theory of the origin of sin re a l l y makes sin inevitable', and 
therefore minimises i t s seriousness. I n answer to i t we may 
quote Tennant'a own words. " I would have i t observed" he says 
(p.112. The origin and Propagation of Sin) "that i n thus 
accounting naturally for the or i g i n and universality of sin, 
we neither excuse i t nor explain i t away. I f sin can (thus) 
be traoed back...it loses nothing of i t s exceeding sinfulness 
for us to whom i t is none the less the deliberate grieving 
of the Holy S p i r i t . " % 
I n a note on p.26 of "The Conoept of Sin" he says "In my 
work 'The Origin and Propagation of Sin* (2nd ed. p.113) I . 
unfortunately allowed myself to speak of sin as "empirically 
inevitable" when what I should have said was "universally present 
i n some degree i n the lives of men". Had this phrase been 
anything but a s l i p , a careful reader would observe that i t was 
practically a surrender i n two words of the result which many 
pages were expended i n attaining. That i s was no more than 
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a s l i p would also be made evident by the remainder of the 
sentence i n whioh the phrase occurs " i t by no means implies 
that sin i s theoretically or on a p r i o r i grounds an absolute 
necessity." Again i n "The Gonoept of Sin" he says (p.246) 
"When we have made every allowance" (for disease, inherited 
weakness, environment)" ...there remains i n much lawless conduot 
an element which i s not to be explained away, - namely, the 
fact of deliberate choosing of the worse when a better course 
i s both known and possible." 
These are scarcely the words of one whose intention i t 
was to oonstruot a theory that should represent sin as 
inevitable, and so minimise i t s seriousness: and the 
oritlolsm cannot be sustained that such was i t s effect. 
The only way i n which his theory oould make sin inevitable 
would be for i t to represent the inborn propensities of human 
nature as too powerful ever to be moralised by the w i l l , and to 
represent the power of the moral ideal as insufficient to aid 
the w i l l i n i t s task of moralising these propensities. The 
theory e x p l i c i t l y rejects both of these positions, for i t 
asserts that the animal Impulses are Indifferent material 
waiting to be moralised (p.96 op.oit.) and that morality 
consists i n the formation of the non-moral material of nature 
into charaoter i n subjecting the seething and tumultous l i f e 
of natural tendenoy, of appetite and passion, affection and 
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desire, to the moulding influence of r e f l e c t i v e purpose. Sin 
consists i n the w i l l ' s f a i l u r e completely t o moralise the raw 
material of morality. He speaks of the higher nature which 
demands the subordination of the lower i n man (p. 36 op.pit.) 
and of oases (p.xix) i n which the moral sanotion i s obeyed. A l l 
t h i s i s not the language of a theory which represents the 
animal propensities as too powerful to be moralised, or the 
moral ideal as powerless t o ef f e c t that morallsation by the 
w i l l . The theory's whole raison d'etre i s to account f o r the 
d i f f i c u l t y , not the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the moral ascent, and f o r 
man's crying need of grace. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to notice that 
some who d i f f e r e n t i a t e themselves from Tennant's theory or 
accuse him of making s i n inevitable by i t , yet f i n d themselves 
driven to the conclusion that s i n i n the human race i s 
" v i r t u a l l y i n e v i t a b l e " or "too probable" not to happen (see 
J*. S. Whale a r t i c l e i n Expository Times A p r i l 1940: and 
W. Temple, Nature, Man, and God, p. 366). The exceedingly 
narrow margin by which such w r i t e r s separate s i n from the 
realm of the ine v i t a b l e i s maintained i n order to defend 
God's oharaoter and the v a l i d i t y of morality, but of suoh 
margin i t may be said i t i s too narrow not to tend to breed 
a despair whioh i t i s p r a o t i o a l l y Impossible to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
from the despair bred by the e x p l i c i t idea of sin's 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y . 
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4. Upholders of the Catholic doctrine of o r i g i n a l righteous-
ness sometimes bring against the evolutionary theory of the 
o r i g i n and propagation of s i n the charge t h a t i t i s a godless 
naturalism. (F. J. H a l l : "Evolution and the F a l l , p.155). 
Tennant d i s t i n c t l y dissociates himself from any evolutionism 
which can f i n d no place f o r supernatural a c t i v i t y w i t h i n i t . 
He says (p.xvil,,, Origin and Propagation of Sin) "Inasmuch as 
my account of man i s professedly expressed i n terms of 
s c i e n t i f i c f a c t or s c i e n t i f i c theory, and since science as 
science oan use the language neither of philosophy nor of 
theology because i n d i f f e r e n t to the p r i n c i p l e s of both, the 
charge of naturalism i s not to be wondered a t . " On p.144 he 
says " I t matters l i t t l e when we are s c i e n t i f i c a l l y describing 
the process whether we speak of i t as God*s revealing of 
Himself to man, or as man's becoming sensible of God's 
influence and t r u t h . I n the l a t t e r mode of speech we assume 
the movement of God i n man, i n man's f e e l i n g a f t e r God, and 
i f our language resembles that of naturalism, our mind i s that 
of theism." And i n a note he adds, "The process of God's 
revel a t i o n of Himself and His onward guidance of man's moral 
and s p i r i t u a l ideas have been desoribed i n these lectures 
solely i n t h e i r human or natural aspect as i f they were the 
outcome of unaided human thought. I have used the language 
of description rather than of explanation." 
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No charge of a naturalism excluding the operation of 
divine grace can be sustained against his theory. Evolution 
i s u l t i m a t e l y represented as the work of God. God i s never 
out of i t , and He gives to each oreature at every stage i n 
i t s upward growth His graoe i n appropriate mode and 
measure. 
5. I t i s von Hugel (Essays and Addresses, i . 8-9) who makes 
the o r i t i c i s m that "certain sins of the f l e s h may be 
occasioned by the body, e.g. impurity, s l o t h , gluttony, but 
others, e.g. the deadly s i n of pride cannot be made to depend 
on our animal descent: such a single-derivation theory w i l l 
not work. I t may s i m p l i f y many pressing problems but . i t 
f a i l s to distinguish between two d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t 
souroes of man's d i f f i c u l t i e s as a s p i r i t u a l being." He points 
out the double chara c t e r i s t i c of a l l i n t e l l i g e n t creatures -
they are dependent on God f o r t h e i r very existence and t h e i r 
e s s e n t i a l l y f i n i t e powers, and yet God has- endowed them w i t h 
a c e r t a i n l i m i t e d power of. independence to say yes or no. 
I n reference t o t h i s point of von Hugel's, «T. S. Whale concludes 
"man's capacity not only f o r obedience but also f o r proud 
defiance constitutes the mystery of the f a l l . The fundamental 
i n s t i n c t of the animal world i s the w i l l to survive. Man's 
si n cannot be so explained or described. I t i s the w i l l to power 
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which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s man from the animal, and constitutes 
the t r a g i c dissidenees of human h i s t o r y . " 
The f i r s t t hing we must say i n answer t o t h i s i s , we must 
keep i n mind Tennant's warning, which i s so e a s i l y forgotten, 
namely, tha t the advocate of the evolutionary theory, i n 
discussing the I n i t i a l stages of s i n must neoessarily use 
language which would seem t e r r i b l y inadequate t o describe s i n 
as i t i s present t o the mind of the Christian penitent, von 
Hugel looks at pride from the advanced Christian point of view 
(witness his reference t o the pride of the f a l l e n angels - the 
most advanoed of a l l creatures!), then looks back at the animal 
l i f e from which i t i s suggested that our d i f f i c u l t i e s r i s e , 
and refuses t o believe there could be any connection. The 
answer t o von Hugel, however, i s surely p l a i n . However f a r 
removed the developed pride of humanity may seem to be, from 
the undeveloped l i f e of the brute, he would be a bold man who 
would say that i t was impossible t o discern i n some animals, 
not least i n those generally acknowledged to be nearest to 
man i n the l i n e of asoent, the f a i n t beginnings of that pride 
and self-assertiveness which, i n exoess, i s the curse of our 
race. A l l that we are oonoerned to do i s to establish that 
there are suoh f a i n t beginnings. I t i s not neoessary to seek, 
as von Hugel does, f o r a separate source, i n man's nature, 
of developed pride and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , separate, that i s , 
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from our animal nature. For that " c e r t a i n l i m i t e d power of 
independence t o say *yes* or 'no*,'* which, i t i s claimed, i s 
man's peculiar danger and constitutes the separate source of 
his s p e c i f i c a l l y s p i r i t u a l s i n , t h a t power i s f a i n t l y 
discernible i n the realm of animal social l i f e , as i t i s p l a i n l y 
so i n human l i f e . Whether the authority be the herd-leader, as 
i n the case of animals, or'God, as i n the case of men, the same 
a b i l i t y and tendency to rebel (against the other than s e l f ) 
i s apparent. 
To say, moreover, as Whale does, that man's capacity not 
only f o r obedience but also f o r proud defianoe constitutes the 
mystery of the f a l l , i s t o say something which surely borders 
on the meaningless. That man should have t h i s oapaoity i s 
surely no mystery, i f God wished man t o love Him. Man could 
not love God without such capacity. I f there i s any mystery 
i n the f a l l , i t surely l i e s , as Whale himself elsewhere suggests, 
i n the f a c t that man availed himself of the oapaoity t o defy 
God. Why he should ever do that might be called a mystery, 
but that he should be able t o do so i s surely not mysterious. 
Here, however, a remark from C. 0. J. Webb's "God and 
Personality" seems worth quoting: "The p o s s i b i l i t y of Sin 
i s , a f t e r a l l , involved i n freedom to choose the good: and i t 
would seem meaningless to f i n d a new problem i n the r e a l i t y of 
what i s already understood t o be i n a true sense possible." 
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Again, to seek to dissociate oertain sins from our 
animal nature by saying that the fundamental i n s t i n c t of the 
animal world i s the w i l l to survive, whereas i t i s the w i l l 
t o power which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s men - t h i s betrays a f a i l u r e to 
perceive the oommon root of both. The w i l l to power i s a 
developed expression of that root of self-oentredness which 
i s present i n the animal world, and which expresses i t s e l f 
there as the w i l l to survive. The w i l l to power i s compounded 
of s e l f - g l o r i f i c a t i o n , self-magnifioation, s e l f - d e i f i c a t i o n . 
I t i s pride i n i t s worst form. B u t . i t i s pride, and pride i s 
essentially the s e t t i n g up of s e l f over against others i n 
claims to undue a t t e n t i o n , service, and praise. That t h i s i s 
altogether absent from the beasts few would assert. I t i s to 
t h i s self-assertiveness, f a i n t , perhaps, but none the less 
discernible that we can look as the root and source and 
beginning of the l a t e r developed w i l l t o power. I t may be 
true t o say that the fundamental i n s t i n c t of the animal world 
i s to survive, but we must beware of verbal disguises. To 
survive means I must survive, and that implies at the cost, i f 
necessary, of other selves. That i s but another form of the 
root self-oentredness of a l l created l i f e , of whloh the w i l l to 
survive may thus be said t o be but an early form, and the w i l l 
to power a l a t e r one. No separate and d i s t i n c t source i s 
needed f o r the l a t t e r . I t s root i s surely obvious. Impurity, 
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"while being the v i l e r s i n , may be i n s t l n o t i v e l y f e l t t o be 
less deadly than pride", but greater deadllness i s no proof 
of difference of o r i g i n . Moreover, oan we r e a l l y maintain 
that "while impurity i s occasioned by the body, pride i s • 
not"? I s pride never occasioned by physical strength, 
physical s k i l l , physical beauty? Pride may be f i r s t 
occasioned.by the body, then by the i n t e l l e c t , then by the 
s p i r i t . We have to be careful here, and heed again Tennant*s 
warning about s i n i n i t s beginnings and s i n i n I t s l a t e r more 
developed forms. I t i s a f a r cry from the p r i m i t i v e s e l f -
assert iveness of the stronger or more agile or more graceful 
animal, with i t s preenlngs, i t s tyrranies i t s jealous guarding 
of l i t t l e p r i v i l e g e s , to the maniacal human leader, drunk with 
the sense of power and grinding thousands i n t o subjection, 
slavery and death. I t i s so f a r a ory, indeed, th a t i t i s not 
d i f f i c u l t to understand the immediate and ou t r i g h t denial by 
some of any connection whatsoever between the two. But when 
these two characteristics are examined closely, t h i s much 
becomes clear: - given the p r i n c i p l e of evolution which never 
excludes the Divine a o t i v i t y , i t oan no more be reasonably 
argued that there i s ho root of s e l f i n animal l i f e from whioh 
human pride and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y could grow than i t oan now be 
reasonably maintained that woman was o r i g i n a l l y formed from 
the r i b of a man! 
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To point, as von Hugel does, t o the f a l l of the angels as 
an I l l u s t r a t i o n of the f a c t t h a t pride i s not occasioned by the 
body, i s a perfeot example of that negleot of Tennant*s warning 
already referred t o . I n i t s highest and most developed form, 
pride i s open and deliberate r e b e l l i o n against God, the attempt 
to usurp His power and oooupy His throne. One does not expect 
the highest form of anything t o appear immediately at i t s 
beginning i n an evolutionary prooess. Pride, when i t f i r s t 
appeared i n man, was nowhere near a conscious open deliberate 
r e b e l l i o n against His Maker. Man's pride was not i n i t i a l l y 
d i a b o l i c To use the pride of the rebellious angels, whioh was 
dlabollo, as an analogy of the beginnings of pride i n man, 
so as to disc r e d i t the theory of i t s lowly o r i g i n , t h i s i s 
surely i l l e g i t i m a t e . I t i s t o argue thus: since pride 
appeared i n man, who had an animal ancestry, and also i n 
angels, who had no suoh ancestry, therefore since i t oould not 
be occasioned by anything animal i n the angels, i t oould not 
be oooasioned by anything animal i n man: whioh i s absurd. 
The angels are conceived as being created immediately w i t h 
a l l the a t t r i b u t e s of s p i r i t u a l l i f e f u l l y developed. Man was 
made d i f f e r e n t l y . He was evolved. The angelic character was, 
as i t were, the outcome of a shortout i n creative method. 
Man's was the r e s u l t of a long prooess. I t does not follow 
t h a t because the a b i l i t y t o be proud and defiant towards God 
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i n the ertremest form was neoessarily ready made i n the oase 
of the angels, and was, i n them, unconnected w i t h any bodily 
l i f e , therefore i t was bound t o be the one thing whioh was 
ready made and unconnected w i t h animal l i f e i n man, who i n a l l 
other respects i s rooted i n the past. The difference between 
pride i n man at f i r s t (non-diabolic), and pride i n the angels 
at f i r s t ( d i a b o l i c ) , i s a difference between two stages i n 
pride's growth; both can appear i n man, but the diabolio 
represents the l a t e s t stage. When one admits the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of stages of growth, one oannot exolude the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
common root i n the past of a l l stages. 
I t i s the cumulative weight of these considerations 
rather than, perhaps, the foroe of any one of them i n 
p a r t i c u l a r which would seem to render von Hugel's argument 
« 
unoonvinoing. 
6. To the c r i t i c i s m t h a t to define s i n i n terms of a 
f a i l u r e t o moralise the raw material of morality i s to make 
i t purely negative, i t i s perhaps s u f f i c i e n t to r e p l y that s i n 
i s represented as pos i t i v e i n so f a r as i t i s shown t h a t the 
f a i l u r e i s due to a oonsoious and deliberate misuse of 
experience. This i s also the answer t o those who o f f e r t h i s 
o r i t l o i s m i n the form "that Tennant desoribes s i n as an 
evolutionary overhang", or "as a mere s u r v i v a l of animal 
impulses i n t o the r a t i o n a l stage of development". The point 
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i s that the w i l l permits the overhang, and that i t i s a 
w i l l e d operation of animal Impulses. The mere sur v i v a l of 
animal impulses constitutes the ..f amies boni as w e l l as the 
fomes peooatl, and i f there i s one thi n g which Tennant i s 
careful to do i t i s to dis t i n g u i s h between the w i l l that 
sins, and these impulses that constitute the raw material of 
sin . 
7. I t i s R. S. Moxon who says (p.211 The Doctrine of Sin) that 
Tennant*s theory o f f e r s no adequate explanation of the sense 
of g u i l t . " I n tending t o reduce the o i r o l e of human conduct 
to which s i n i n the s t r i c t sense can be applied, h i s theory 
f a i l s t o confirm the judgment of the universal consciousness 
of g u i l t . I t breaks down i n i t s i n a b i l i t y t o fathom the 
depth of self-abasement which the sinner feels at the thought 
of his s i n , and which compels him t o ory aloud i n the agony 
of c o n t r i t i o n : "Woe i s me, f o r I am undone". As the 
consciousness of g u i l t i s a factor of experience that oannot 
be denied, serious suspicion i s at once oast on the v a l i d i t y 
of any theory whloh f a l l s to j u s t i f y i t s v e r d i c t . " 
I n answer t o t h i s we may doubt i f t h a t f e e l i n g which 
prompts t o the ory "woe i s me", i s always t o be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
a consciousness of g u i l t . To believe, w i t h Moxon, t h a t i t i s 
to be so I d e n t i f i e d , i s t o leave no room f o r anything but a 
moral r e l a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l , as actual sinner, to God. 
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Professor Otto i n h i s book "The Idea of the Holy", urges that 
we oannot reduce either our idea of God or our reaction to 
that idea t o a purely moral or r a t i o n a l content. The conception 
of the wrath of God e.g. i n the n i n e t i e t h psalm i l l u s t r a t e s 
the overplus i n the idea of the holy. There i s a hidden 
depth i n God - the numinous - which oannot be ra t i o n a l i s e d or 
moralised by us. This provokes i n man such oonfessions as 
those of Isaiah or Peter ("Woe i s me! f o r I am undone...Depart 
from me: f o r I am a s i n f u l man. 0 Lord."): "these outbursts 
of f e e l i n g are not simply, and probably, at f i r s t , not at a l l , 
moral depredations, but belong to a quite special category 
of valuation and appraisement...the f e e l i n g of absolute 
profaneness" (English Transl. by Harvey 1933 p.53) I n God 
there i s "the posi t i v e numinous.value or worth, and to i t 
corresponds, on the side of the creature, a numinous disvalue 
or "unworth"." ( i b i d . p.53) The g u i l t of a bad action i s to be 
cl e a r l y distinguished from i t s moral p o l l u t i o n . This r e l i g i o u s 
element can be neither moralised nor conceptualised. 
We thus see that a consciousness of g u i l t i s not t o be 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h i s universal sense of numinous disvalue or 
unworth. Wherever humanity becomes consoious of God at a l l , , 
t h i s sense awakens, and i t i s i n no way reduced, even when 
the area of aotual s i n i n the i n d i v i d u a l l i f e i s reduoed by 
some theory of sin's o r i g i n . 
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8. Moxon also puts forward the c r i t i c i s m t h a t man can only be 
held f u l l y responsible f o r s i n , i f i n addition to having the 
fao u l t y of o r i g i n a t i n g action, i t can be proved that he has 
also a clear knowledge of the nature and importance of the 
moral i d e a l . But the degree of moral enlightenment, he 
oontends, whloh i s possessed by man at any moment i s not under 
his oontrol, and so, i n order t o avoid a t t r i b u t i n g the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for s i n t o God, i t must be proved that a man's 
moral i l l u m i n a t i o n i s independent of God, as we l l as hi s w i l l . 
Moxon i s here obviously t h i n k i n g of sins done i n ignorance. 
I t i s preoisely Tennant's argument that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s i n 
i s i n ezaot proportion t o moral i l l u m i n a t i o n , that f u l l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would imply f u l l enlightenment. God may be 
responsible f o r the degree of laok of enlightenment. He 
oe r t a i n l y i s at the beginning, though not always l a t e r ; but 
that does not Involve God i n a charge of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
s i n , on Tennant's theory, f o r on that theory " s i n " i s 
r e s t r i c t e d for the i n d i v i d u a l , to the area of "deliberateness" 
and "knowledge". Material s i n , on that theory, i s a misnomer. 
4. W. Temple's Views. 
I n concluding t h i s section on the evolutionary theory o f 
the o r i g i n and propagation of s i n we must look at what William 
Temple says i n the ohapter on Flnitude and E v i l i n his G i f f o r d 
Lectures (Nature, Man and God, pp.359 f f . ) He argues t h a t the 
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problem of e v i l I s t o t a l l y misconceived i f we pioture i t as the 
winning of oontrol over lawless and therefore e v i l passions by 
a righteous but i n s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful reason or s p i r i t . I t 
I s the s p i r i t whioh i s e v i l : i t i s reason which i s perverted: 
i t i s aspiration i t s e l f whloh i s corrupt. Our primary need, 
he says, i s not to control our passions by our purposes but to 
di r e c t our purpose i t s e l f t o the r i g h t end. 
How did t h i s need and t h i s problem arise? Temple asks 
why are we such that what appears t o us good i s other than the 
r e a l good? and answers, there i s here an unquestionable bias 
or tendenoy to e v i l i n human nature; i t i s called o r i g i n a l s i n . 
The f a l l can r e a l l y be called a f a l l upwards for i t consisted 
i n the winning of the knowledge of good and e v i l . I t i s the 
form taken by t h i s knowledge that perverts our nature. We 
know good and e v i l but we know them amiss. The corruption i s 
at the centre of r a t i o n a l and purposive l i f e . 
P rior t o t h i s , however, Tample asserted that man i s 
narrowly l i m i t e d i n the range of his apprehension, that t h i s 
l i m i t a t i o n i s i n no way his own f a u l t but i s his d i v i n e l y 
ordained c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t i s t h i s l i m i t e d range of 
apprehension that leads t o wrong estimates about what i s the 
r e a l good, and these wrong estimates, i n t u r n , lead to wrong 
preferences, and these t o wrong aotions. There seems to be 
l i t t l e , i f any, room f o r r e a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The s p i r i t oan 
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scarcely be called e v i l , the reason perverted, and aspiration 
corrupt, f o r aspiration i s but another word f o r preference, 
reason i s subject to natural l i m i t a t i o n s , and the s p i r i t 
i s r e a l l y the w i l l , which i s the person i n action, which action 
i s determined by reason and desire. Man i s f a r too heavily 
determined by the l i m i t a t i o n s of f l n i t u d e , whioh seem to be 
the r e a l cause of a l l the trouble. 
Temple oer t a i n l y goes as far as i s humanly possible i n 
appearing to diminish human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i n making s i n 
appear p r a c t i c a l l y unavoidable, without implicating God I n a 
charge of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r si n . God so made the world, he 
says, that man was l i k e l y t o s i n , and the dawn of moral s e l f -
consciousness was l i k e l y t o be more a f a l l than an asoent. 
Also, some selves must be expected to order t h e i r scale of 
values wrongly, beoause of t h e i r f a l s i f i e d perspective (due to 
the l i m i t a t i o n s of f i n i t u d e ) and th a t w i l l be enough to i n f e o t 
the raoe. I t i s s t i l l more l i k e l y that a l l w i l l thus e r r , 
then mutually infeot w i t h error one another. " I t was not 
necessary" Temple oontinues," th a t we should e r r , so we oannot 
say s i n i t s e l f i s God's aot. But He must have foreseen the 
issues so that s i n f a l l s w i t h i n His purpose and i s even part 
of i t . What He faced was a p r o b a b i l i t y so great as t o be 
distinguishable only i n thought from c e r t a i n t y . " Temple admits 
that God, w i t h His eternal knowledge apprehends a l l r e a l i t y i n 
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i t s ordered completeness, so, r e a l l y , f o r Him there i s no such 
thing as a p r o b a b i l i t y , but human beings must maintain the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between c e r t a i n knowledge and p r o b a b i l i t y i n order 
to save God from a charge of d i r e c t l y causing man to s i n . 
i • . . . . . . 
We cannot f a i l t o notioe the likeness between Temple and 
Tennant. There i s l i t t l e i f anything to ohoose between 
Temple's "necessary tendency of the mind towards s e l f -
oentredness", his " s i n f a l l s w i t h i n God's purpose, and i s even 
part of i t " and Tennant's " s i n , while not an absolute necessity, 
may yet be neoessarlly i n c i d e n t a l to the execution of God's 
plan." 
The chief r e s u l t of both works i s to represent s i n as 
p r a o t i o a l l y inevitable at f i r s t by v i r t u e of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 
a l l f i n i t e l i f e , t o assert that God nevertheless cannot be held 
responsible f o r aotual s i n , and t o leave us with what; i s 
v i r t u a l l y an unresolved tension of c o n f l i c t i n g opposites. For 
t h i s boldness we have reason to be thankful. 
The main reason f o r t h i s , perhaps, somewhat lengthy 
discussion of the evolutionary theory has been to defend i t 
against the charges usually brought against i t , charges which, 
i t i s believed, spring from a wrong reading of Tennant's work, 
due, perhaps, t o a prejudiced approach, t o the theory as such. 
I t i s also believed the main orit i o l s m s oannot stand i n the 
l i g h t of a f a i r re-examination of t h a t work. I t may be true 
172. 
that he has not throughly purged his f l o o r , and t h a t c e r t a i n 
i n f e l i c i t i e s of expression s t i l l remain even a f t e r major 
al t e r a t i o n s l i k e t h a t already noted, but while that i s also 
true of his theory which i s true of any theory about,this 
subject, namely, that i t leaves something f i n a l l y unexplained, 
i t remains, i t may be believed, the best attempt t o place the 
story of man's o r i g i n and growth i n the scale of l i f e i n r i g h t 
p o s i t i o n w i t h the fa c t of human s i n . 
At t h i s point we oan look back and take stook of our 
survey of these theories of s i n . We have noticed some main 
points of b e l i e f i n o l a s s l c a l Augustinianism and Thomism, and 
have indicated why we oannot agree with these.- We have done 
likewise i n the case of some modern Augustinians and Thomists. 
We have passed i n o r l t i o a l review the theories of a 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of pre-natal f a l l s , and of a premundane s e l f — 
v i t i a t i o n of the world-soul. With these we have disagreed. 
We have dealt d i f f e r e n t l y with the evolutionary theory 
of the o r i g i n and propagation of s i n , o r i t i o i s i n g , not the 
theory i t s e l f , but ce r t a i n orltiolsms of i t . I f , i n doing t h i s 
we have suggested a measure of agreement, we would safeguard 
ourselves against misunderstanding so f a r as to dissociate 
ourselves from any appearance of believing t h a t such an account 
oould explain s i n f u l l y . 
So f a r , i n other words, our work has been, mainly, 
destructive or i t io lsm. There remains the consolidation or 
exposition of our own be l i e f . Before we move on to that 
d i rec t ly , however, there i s one thing we must do by way of 
prelude. We must exhibit i n a sweeping glance, as i t were, the 
important part played by the idea of development and by the 
knowledge of evolution, i n writ ings on the subject of s in 
during the las t century or so. 
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IX. EVOLUTION AMD THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT IN . 
RESENT THOUGHT ABOUT SIN. 
* 
Since the publication of the Origin of Species i n the 
middle of the last century, the facts of growth and 
development have been given an important place i n the thought 
of many wri ters , other than those already mentioned, regarding 
the problem of the o r ig in and propagation of s in . These 
writers have shown, i n e f f e c t , that human nature cannot be 
understood aright theologically without considering i t i n 
re la t ion to i t s o r i g in and growth, and that , whether a new 
explanation of s in i s attempted, or pre-Darwinian theories are 
merely defended and restated i n the l i g h t of new knowledge 
about man's beginnings, no one can now a f f o r d to negleot the 
fac t of evolution i n re la t ing the d i f f i c u l t y of human virtue to 
bel ief i n a God of Love. 
The great names, Spinoza, Kant, Sohleieraaoher, Hegel, 
Sohelilng, Kierkegaard, Ri tschl , e tc . , which are Included i n 
most treatises on modern theories of s i n , precede the era when 
the sc i en t i f i c theory of evolution challenged existing bel iefs 
concerning man's o r ig in and sinfulness. We are, thus, under no 
obligation to include them i n what i s , s t r i c t l y , an examination 
of post-Darwinian thinkers, yet we cannot help observing that 
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though those giants of philosophy and theology were not called 
upon to face the challenge of evolution, their work i s , 
nevertheless, not wholly without a r e f l ec t ion of the realisat ion 
of the importance of the fact of development i n human l i f e , f o r 
a r ight understanding of the problem of s i n . * 
Schleiermaoher represented s in as having i t s r ise in the 
struggle of the f lesh against the s p i r i t , and the cause of the 
opposition, he said, was the fact that the history of the race 
was one of progress and development. Sin arose through the 
p r i o r i t y of man's sensual and in te l lec tual development to his 
power of w i l l , and the explanation of or iginal sin i s , therefore 
closely bound up with the ea r l i e r appearance of ttie self-
assertiveness of sense. (The Christian Fai th, para.69.) 
Brunner says of Schleiermacher that he gave up the fundamental 
Christian view of the or igin of man and substituted f o r i t an 
i 
idea l i s t ic evolutionary theory with ai strongly natural is t ic 
bent: for the idea of the or ig in in creation he substituted 
that of the goal of evolution of a universal s p i r i t u a l process. 
Hegel regarded the doctrine of the f a l l as a myth expressive of 
the f i r s t step in human development, and said that at f i r s t man 
gave way ins t inc t ive ly to natural impulses, but as l i f e 
i 
developed he came to realise by aotual t r i a l that to do so 
always was wrong. (Philosophy of Religion, Spiers and Sanderson' 
translation p .p .275 . f f J . Sohelling oonceived of the soul as 
s We are not here suggesting that these wri ters anticipated the 
s c i en t i f i c theory of evolution. The idea of development as 
such is an old one amongst philosophers. 
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existing before b i r t h . By m act of choice i t subjected 
i t s e l f to the exigencies and l imitat ions of temporal l i f e 
involving the necessity to s i n , which was represented as an 
inseparable feature of human development. The importance of 
the idea of evolution f o r Schelling is shown by the fact tha t 
even God, f o r him, i s subject to the process, being evolved 
from a bl ind unconscious w i l l , t o be. (Philosophical 
Investigations on the nature of Human Freedom, and subjeots 
connected therewith). Kierkegaard approached the subject of 
sin in his "Fear and Trembling" (1943), and, i n The Idea of 
Dread (1844) put forward the view that every man is the Adam 
of his own soul (chapter 1, section 2 . ) , For a time he was 
afra id to make sin the very substance of human nature, but in 
1849, in Sickness unto Death, he l e f t his f i r s t position and 
moved on t o a be l ie f in the dogma of the universality-^nd 
t o t a l i t y of s in , and in a supra-mundame corruption of the w i l l . 
Kierkegaard was not concerned with evolution as such, but his 
description of the state of mind of fee f i r s t sinner, with the 
stress on vagueness, trembling, the apprehension of mere 
poss ib i l i t y , and the gradual approach to the borderland of 
moral freedom must surely be admitted to be a far better 
desocriptlon of what must have been the mind of the f i r s t man, 
X See Tennant: Origin and Propagation of Sin. Lecture I I . 
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than of every man, as temptation was encountered fo r the f i r s t 
time. We cannot press his views into the service of a theory 
alien to his own be l i e f , but i t i s d i f f i o u l t to res i s t the 
Impression that in the Concept of Dread, (chapter one, 
especially sections three and f o u r ) , Kierkegaard described 
perfectly the psychological condition (as f a r as i t can 
legit imately be Imagined and reconstructed) of that remote _ 
f i r s t ancestor of man as he emerged from the purely animal 
stock, and became dimly and f e a r f u l l y conscious of somewhat 
that lay before him. We may not un fa i r ly say that though 
Kierkegaard professed to be describing the advent of freedom as 
he saw i t happen to a l l , he was, i n f ac t , anticipating a 
description of how i t happened and could only happen to that 
creature whom we visualise as f i r s t stepping fo r th from the 
animal kingdom into the world of humanity. In an indirect , and 
certainly in an unconscious, way, therefore, be may be said to 
have borne witness to the importance of the fac t of growth in 
the story of humanity f o r a r igh t understanding of the or igin of 
s in . ' 1 
Ritschl held that e v i l sprang out of the merely natural 
impulses of the w i l l , which, being subject to development has 
not, at f i r s t , perfect knowledge of the good, and e v i l must 
necessarily arise u n t i l tfaat perfect knowledge is attained. 
Sin, viewed as ignorance, was thus regarded as. a necessary stage 
in the development of man as a moral being. ( Jus t i f ica t ion and 
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Reconciliation, English translat ion, p.349). 
Brunner had noted that Hase showed that same kind of 
change of view as took place in the case of Schleiermacher. 
Hase held that the orthodox Christian view about man's or ig in 
dealt not so much with a lost past as wi th an intended future 
which was to be realised through struggle and growth. Rothe 
thought that the concept of the creation i t s e l f contained the 
idea that at f i r s t the personal oreature could not emerge 
otherwise than from matter, and was then immediately tainted 
and defi led by i t , while Troeltsch declared that the doctrine 
that man was made i n the Image of God does not mean the loss of 
an or ig inal condition, but a goal to be reached through 
h i s to r i ca l development, (see Brunner, Man in Revolt, p.87). 
In addition to these there has been a continuous l ine of 
writers who, in one way or another, have stressed, as a.key 
feature f o r the better understanding of the whole problem of 
s in , the idea of development in human l i f e . Some have 
advocated a quite de f in i t e ly evolutionary treatment of the 
problem. Others, who do not a l l y themselves specif ica l ly with 
that theory, or who reject i t de f in i t e ly , yet f i n d in t h e i r ' 
own theories a dea r place for the idea of development. In a l l 
oases i t has somehow to be " f i t t e d i n " . 
Pfleiderer was the f i r s t theologian to attempt seriously 
to give an evolutionary account of the or ig in of s in in the 
individual , and his attempt furnished the main l ines on which 
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F.R.Tennant constructed his theory in his Hulsean lectures. 
He held that sin was to be found in the y ie ld ing to natural 
impulses, which themselves were not s i n f u l , i n circumstances 
where t h e i r g ra t i f i ca t ion had been prohibited. At f i r s t the 
desire f o r s e l f - g r a t i f i c a t i o n was inst inct ive and a law of l i f e , 
but gradually the laws of sooiety appeared and regulated the 
occasions when mam might,give in to his impulses. He believed 
that a f te r the t radi t ional doctrine had been surrendered,. i t 
was possible to retain as i t s core, "the idea that the d igni ty 
of man does not l i e behind us but before us as the goal of 
evolution". 
Tennant remarked that Canon J . M. Wilson, Ruetschi.and 
Hermann had addressed themselves to the problem of sin in a 
way similar to his own, and in addition to these we can mention 
S.A* McDowell's "Evolution and the need of Atonement" (1912), 
R.S.Moxon's "The Doctrine of Sin" (1922), H.W. Lane's "Evolution 
and the Christian Faith" (1923), W.R. Selbie's "The Psychology 
of Religion" (1924), and W. Powell's "The Fa l l of Man" (1934). 
These a l l treat the problem of man and sin from an evolutionary 
point of iview. 
Orchard i n his "Modern Theories of Sin" spoke of s in as 
being Incidental to the process of development, of the 
dissatisfaction which i s bound to fol low on sin, of s in ' s 
essentially impermanent nature, and of i t s ultimate self- , 
destruction. He held that i t was essefltial to the true 
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attainment of man's destiny that be should realise himself 
through struggle , aid that there should be open to him certain 
experiments which, being doomed to f a i l u r e and dissat isfact ion, 
should leave f i n a l l y and permanently open only the true path, 
v i z . , union with God. 
There is no need to repeat in deta i l the we l l known 
cri t icisms of some-of these views. A l l that we would do here 
i s reject any idea of s in as being a necessary stage in 
development, and as having any aotual value in the ultimate 
production of goodness. Such ideas obviously minimise sin 's 
seriousness, compromise the concept of g u i l t , and empty the 
ideas of divine forgiveness and atonement of much of t h e i r real 
meaning. I t is enough f o r the purpose of th is essay to have 
indicated the place a l l o t t ed by many wri ters to tiie idea of 
development or to the theory of evolution in the i r consideration 
of man's sp i r i t ua l fa i lu res . We have now to attempt to 
c l a r i f y our own position regarding the r e l a t ion between the 
sc i en t i f i c theory of man's asoent from lowly beginnings and the 
Christian doctrines of or iginal righteousness, the f a l l , and 
or iginal s in . 
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X. CONCLUSION. 
1 . The basic presupposition i n a l l t radi t ional thought about 
sin. 
To read the history of attempts made by theologians to 
account fo r the f ac t of sin i n human l i f e is to read very 
largely the story of one persistent be l i e f , the be l i e f , namely, 
that God is not' and could not be responsible for an or ig ina l 
condition of man's w i l l which would make sin easy, and vir tue 
hard. This is the fundamental presupposition, i t seems, i n 
a l l defences of the doctrines of o r ig ina l righteousness and 
original s i n . God i s love, and, therefore, i t i s supposed, 
He could not have created wwn o r ig ina l ly more prone to g r a t i f y 
self than to please Him. God is love, and therefore i t i s 
supposed, something must have happened to disturb an or ig ina l 
God-ordained condition. 
J 
This underlying presupposition about the nature of Divine 
Love, and i t s obligation to create man or ig ina l ly more disposed 
to please God than to please sel f , may not always be referred 
to ezp l i c l ty , but our thesis is bu i l t upon the bel ief that i t is 
always there. I f oar bel ief is not j u s t i f i e d then our argument 
f a l l s to the ground. 
I t i s t h i s underlying bel ief which has given r ise to 
theories about s in 's o r ig in i n man whereby something i s brought 
from outside, whether i n the form of a supra human angelic w i l l 
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already self corrupted, and Insinuating temptation into the 
human s i tuat ion, or i n the form of some dislocating act committed 
by the human w i l l i t s e l f , or by the world-soul, i n some pre-
existance, and so f o r t h . A s i tuat ion i s imagined beyond th is 
l i f e , wherein conditions were originated which conspired to 
make sin easier and more probable on earth. The order of l i f e , 
or the consti tut ion of l i f e as we know i t cannot, i t Is thought, 
be conceived as representing God's or iginal plan. The writer 
of the Genesis story of the f a l l of Adam, St. Paul, 
St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Muller, N.P.Williams, 
Nelbuhr, Brunner, Barth, Helm, Berdyaev, 'Quick, and many others, 
despite the i r theological and philosophical differences, 
a t t r ibute the rise of e v i l i n this l i f e pa r t ly to something 
which happened prior to i t , and contrary to God's w i l l . 
With a l l the reconstruction of theological doctrine made 
necessary by sc i en t i f i c discovery th is old bel ief s t i l l persists. 
Man may no longer be conceived as a special creation separate 
from the beasts, but i f i t is his animal ancestry that i s said 
to be the major occasion of his s in , then i t is answered either 
that his animal ancestry cannot be the original plan of God, and 
so must i t s e l f be the result of some already exist ing e v i l , or, 
i f i t i s His plan., i t must have been tempered with by some e v i l 
agency f o r otherwise, surely, i t would not be so troublesome. 
I t i s always the idea of what love would and would not do that 
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decides the idea of nan's or ig ina l condition. 
I n other wards, what we seem to be faced with in theology 
i s a widespread inab i l i t y or refusal to iden t i fy the psycholog-
i ca l self-cent redness of man's animal ancestors with the main 
structure of the God-ordained nature of man i n his h is tor ica l 
beginning. To put i t otherwise and ,'perhaps, more p la in ly , 
or ig ina l self-can tredness i s deemed to be incompatible with the 
idea of a loving Creator. That man should appear, should be 
conscious of supernatural demands, and that his desire and 
a b i l i t y to obey those demands should be o r ig ina l ly weaker than 
his desire and a b i l i t y to disobey them, t h i s is u t t e r ly 
rejected by the majority of theologians. I t is assumed that 
God, because He is love, would never arrange such a hard 
s l tua t i on for nan • 
The theories which have been evolved i n order to avoid 
these d i f f i c u l t i e s , however, i n the moment of seeming to do so 
only raise others equally great. We may a t t r ibu te the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of the evolving order to some extra-temporal or 
pre-mundane catastrophe, but that disaster is i t s e l f as 
clamorous of explanation as the very problems which i t purports 
to solve. 
The t r ad i t iona l method of approach, and of answering the 
problem has been rejected by evolutionists, but amongst these 
there are two di f ferent att i tudes. One is that we can regard 
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evolution as the original unmodified plan of God, and that s in 
may, therefore, he regarded as a mere stage necessary to the 
f i n a l emergence of perfection. The other i s that while we can 
regard evolution as God's o r ig ina l plan, we cannot, on that 
account, regard s in as ei ther necessary or inevitable, but only 
as exceedingly probable. For Christians the second kind of 
evolutionism alone i s possible, provided that i t can be reconciled 
with the be l ie f that God is Love. 
We now declare our be l ie f that i t i s along the path of a 
new and oareful thinking together of the empirical f ac t of 
evolution, and the theological postulate of the love of God that 
we shal l ar r ive at the most satisfactory answer to the question 
of s in 's beginning and i t s universal i ty . 
The f i r s t safeguard however, against misunderstanding is 
to be established by making clear what we mean by an answer. 
Why the f i r s t man i n th i s world, or a noumenal s e l f , or an anima 
mundi, or an angel, or any other created centre of self 
conscious purposive a o t i v i t y , i n time, or out of time, should, 
act. contrary to perceived duty, i t i s , i n the nature of the case, 
impossible f u l l y to explain. I f such an act could be f u l l y 
explained, then no moral problem would exis t , for the w i l l 
would be completely determined. Any professed answer to this 
ancient and.continuing tragedy must be prefaced by the 
acknowledgment tha t i t can only go so far and no fu r the r . 
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Determinism must be avoided because i t i s not consistent with 
creative Love. Our answer can only take the shape of showing 
how i t i s very probable, the circumstances being what they are 
supposed to have been, that human w i l l s would act at f i r s t 
s e l f i sh ly rather than unself ishly, and that those circumstances 
and that probabi l i ty are not only not incompatible w i t h the 
presupposition of a loving Creator, but are the only possible 
expression of Divine Love. 
We are to attempt to j u s t i f y what we believe to have been 
God's act i n bringing to b i r t h a self-centred organism as the 
prelude to the creation of responsive love. This prelude we 
would seek t o defend as morally necessary. In doing this we 
believe that a somewhat d i f ferent approach to the problem of sin 
is being explored. In the past the evolutionary scheme has 
been generally represented as "not making sin a necessity, or 
inevitable", as "no* minimi sing either sin 's seriousness, or 
man's need o f salvation", and so on. In other words, though 
these are important considerations, there has be ea generally a 
somewhat t imid and negative apologetic so f a r as any 
evolutionist theodicy is concerned. Original righteousness has 
been rejected pr imari ly because i t contradicted the evolutionary 
scheme, not pr imari ly because i t involved a rea l contradiction 
of Love. 
On the other hand, the general I n a b i l i t y to see i n a 
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gradual moral and sp i r i tua l evolution, the only morally 
consistent path of creation open to a God of Love has led to 
f l i g h t s of metaphysical fancy which, f a r from defending Him 
, against charges of in jus t ice have, i n f ac t , we believe, only 
exposed Him to a fundamental moral f a i l u r e . 
We are to maintain tha t i t is precisely because God i s 
Love that He could do no other than create man o r ig ina l ly se l f -
centred, o r ig ina l ly f a r more disposed to please self than to 
please any other. The doctrine of o r ig ina l righteousness i s 
untenable, not pr imari ly because of any d i f f i c u l t y of 
reconciling i t w i th an eTOlutionary view of man 's o r ig in , but 
because i t contradicts the idea of a t r u l y Loving Creator. We 
believe that orthodox theology is under an obligation to 
reconsider i t s idea of Love i n creation. We must conceive of 
Divine Love as being bound to create responsive .love only out 
of that which I t must f i r s t have created with the greatest 
possible chance of refusing to respond to anything but s e l f . 
We must conceive of Love as being morally bound to weight as 
heavily as possible the scales against I t s e l f . The idea of 
o r ig ina l righteousness does not f u l f i l these conditions, I n so 
f a r as righteousness was original ' , i t must have been established 
without reference to the creature's own w i l l and desire, and 
that is immoral. 
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2. Science and Theology i n re la t ion to Original Righteousness. 
We cannot conceive of God as "being faced with a choice 
between a number of al ternative methods of creating 
responsive love. To the perfect wisdom and love of God only 
one way could be open, namely the best, most loving. I f today 
we reject the idea of Special Creation, and accept evolution as 
God's way of creating a moral and sp i r i t ua l creature who should 
learn to love and worship Him, then this w i l l have-- two 
results. I t w i l l undermine any idea of a moral and s p i r i t u a l 
creature who was not created by being evolved from a lower order 
of l i f e , and who was i n his beginning endowed with highly 
developed moral and sp i r i tua l excellencies: and i t w i l l also 
undermine the idea of a being whose bodily and mental nature 
was continuous w i th and l imi ted by lowly antecedents, whose 
sp i r i tua l or rel igious nature yet appeared i n i t s beginnings 
very largely unlimited by such continuity. 
At th is point we are very conscious of the spectre of the 
natura l is t ic f a l l acy . We may therefore clearly state our 
bel ief i n the absolute newness, the sheer novelty, of. the 
religious consciousness in man. That is a miracle i n the sense 
that i t s appearance is believed to be caused by the direct 
action of Gody and oannot be understood f u l l y i n terms of 
antecedent physioal causation. The re ject ion of the 
natural is t ic f a l l acy however, does not mean that what is 
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believed to be thus supernaturally created is f r e e from the 
natural law of small beginnings, slow growth and. t i t an i c 
struggle against exist ing forces for survival . The appearance 
of an absolutely new facul ty i s one thing, the degree of power 
with which i t i s conceived to be o r ig ina l ly invested is 
another. The former is not i n I t s e l f inconsistent with 
i 
evolution as God's way of ' or eat i 6 cont inual the l a t t e r can 
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contradict i t , and the idea of or iginal righteousness is nothing 
less than such a contradiction... 
I t may be t rue , that science cannot prove that the f i r s t 
men were l i t t l e above the brutes i n their large self-cent redness, 
but there is such a thing as an overwhelming probabi l i ty , and 
theology cannot overlook such probabi l i t ies . We have admitted 
that we are concerned to re jec t the idea of o r ig ina l 
righteousness not on sc i en t i f i c but on theological grounds. 
Before we do so, however, we must make this observation. There 
i s no sc ien t i f i c evidence which points our minds i n the direction 
of or ig ina l righteousness as the probable i n i t i a l condition of 
the earl iest man. What s c i en t i f i c evidenoe there i s , however, 
points us i n the di rect ion of a large element of superstitious 
ter ror , and of a desire to placate the supernatural for purely 
self ish reasons, i n the earl iest religious l i f e of man. 
This cannot be reasonably disregarded by any who are 
concerned to defend a doctrine of man's original s p i r i t u a l 
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cond i t ion . We must always admit a huge gap between our 
knowledge of p r i m i t i v e re l ig ious a c t i v i t y and what i s c a l l e d 
the r e l i g i o u s l i f e of the f i r s t man, but tha t does not e n t i t l e 
us to refuse to read back into the l i f e of the f i r s t man a 
r e l i g i o u s condi t ion which i s the l o g i c a l extension backwards 
of tha t low moral and s p i r i t u a l l i f e which we f i n d 
progressively as we move f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r back i n the h i s to ry 
of man general ly . We are not e n t i t l e d to refuse t o do t h i s , 
unless our idea of Divine love makes such a procedure impossible: 
and such i s the case wi th t r a d i t i o n a l theology's idea of Divine 
Love. 
Again, i t may be t rue tha t the o r i g i n a l s p i r i t u a l cond i t ion 
of man may be beyond the precise determination of s c i e n t i f i c 
method. That, however, does not give us the r i g h t to f o r c e 
into the categories of physical Science pre s c i e n t i f i c ideas 
about o r i g i n a l man, which we do when we seek to represent o r i g i n a l 
righteousness as an evolutionary leap or a mutat ion. Few 
sc ien t i s t s of repute would be found who would say t h a t an 
immediate change from animal self-centredness to a great rather 
than a small degree of human God-centredness f i t t e d i n with what 
was known of evolutionary progress. I f we r e t a i n the idea of 
o r i g i n a l righteousness because i t seems best to f i t i n with our 
idea of the love of God, then we must do so without seeking 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h the s c i e n t i f i c p r o b a b i l i t i e s about ear ly 
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man, and at the same t i n e declare t h a t what we do I s purely f o r 
a theologica l reason which we can see no good reason to change. 
Having discarded the idea o f special creat ion i n favour of 
evo lu t ion , modern Augustlnians and Thomists a l i k e have yet 
retained the idea of the s p i r i t u a l nature with which t h e i r 
predecessors o r i g i n a l l y invested the spec i a l l y created Adam, and 
have jo ined i t : to the body and mini of a creature evolved from 
ape-like ancestors. We cannot have i t both ways, however. 
Either we r e t a i n the idea of a special c rea t ion completely, or 
we r e j e c t i t completely. Ei ther we r e t a i n the idea of 
evolu t ion completely or we r e j e c t i t completely. We cannot 
r e t a i n a b i t o f one and a b i t o f the other, and, j o i n i n g both 
b i t s together, c a l l the r e s u l t i n g mixture an evolved creature. 
Brunner, a f t e r assert ing the importance of s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge about man's beginnings to exp la in the f a o t of s i n 
(Man i n Revolt , p.401), goes on to assert that human existence 
was o r i g i n a l l y disposed f o r the recept ion of the g i f t of " being 
i n the love of God," which, he says, i s the l i f e o r i g i n a l l y 
given to man. The o r i g i n a l God-created s ta te of l i f e , he says, 
i s the l i f e o r i g i n a l l y given to man. The o r i g i n a l God-created 
state i s to be understood as an existence i n l o v e , as a 
j u s t i t l a o r i g i n a l ! s , since the g i f t comes f i r s t , - "He f i r s t 
loved us ." This i s t h a t fo r which God creates man. Thus the 
o r i g i n a l nature i s "being i n the love of God," the. f u l f i l m e n t 
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of responsible being, the r e spons ib i l i t y which consists i n 
responsible love . 
On p . 407 Branner argues there i s no good reason f o r not 
admit t ing the f a c t of development. He deprecates the device 
by which theology would seek to fence o f f a ce r t a in remote 
sphere of l i f e so that i t may remain immune from the probings 
of science. Development both physical and mental he describes 
as being from embryonic human condi t ions . To admit such 
development does not mean t h a t we exp la in mental l i f e from i t s 
o r i g i n . Development does not exclude the f a c t t h a t i t i s 
something completely new. He asks PWhy should not tha t vblch , 
i n p r i n c i p l e , i s new appear only gradual ly by degrees?" 
I t i s surely begging the question to admit the f a c t of 
mental and physical development f rom embryonic human condi t ions , 
and then to state tha t , s p i r i t u a l l y , because God loved us, 
because we were, at the beginning i n a state of "being i n the 
love o f God", tha t t ha t could therefore only mean we were i n a 
state o f responsive l ove , tha t i s , responding wi th ac tua l love 
to the love of God which was operative towards us from the 
beginning. 
I t does not at a l l f o l l ow t h a t because God f i r s t loved us, 
t he re fo re , a t f i r s t , we would be able to love Him back. I t 
i s possible even f o r us, not only to love someone who i s 
capable of love, who yet doe s not love us i n r e tu rn , but also to 
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love someone who i s phychologioal ly incapable, of responsive 
l o v e . Such people would s t i l l he " i n our love" i f we loved 
them. I t does not f o l l o w tha t because a c h i l d has "being i n 
the love of i t s f a t he r " , t ha t i s , i t s fa ther loves i t when i t 
f i r s t appears, therefore the c h i l d i s able to love the f a the r 
immediately,, For quite a time i t s world of r e l a t i onsh ip i s 
developing, i n s t i n c t i v e , b lu r red , dominated by the clamour of 
cons t i t u t i ona l self-centredness, and ob l iv ious to any c a l l o f 
love to respond w i t h love . I t i s qu i te sub-moral. 
The very f a c t tha t God loved us f i r s t , t h a t i s , before we 
loved Him, could mean that His love and ours did not meet at 
the moment of our appearing. 
I f man's response to God, as we l l as man's physical and . 
mental l i f e , can be described as developing out of embryonic 
condi t ions, and i f t ha t response can be said only to become a 
response o f love a f t e r God's f i r s t love of us, then there i s 
good reason f o r describing man's growth up to love i n terms o f 
gradual stages, beginning at f i r s t w i t h something which might 
be desorlbed as a vague awareness of mystery and otherness, and 
only moving slowly upwards through stages o f clearer v i s i o n and 
higher response, to the great moment when at l a s t love of God 
i s born i n the hear t . 
We may say God loved man through the in fan t stages of man's 
apprehension of the supernatural, stages i n whioh t h a t 
apprehension was tor long devoid of t he s p i r i t u a l v i s i o n 
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necessary f o r the c a l l i n g out of l ove . Man was, i n other 
words, " i n the love of God" long before God was ever " i n the 
love o f man", even while man ex i s t ed . 
Brunner i t would seem, confuses the creat ion o f man, w i t h 
t 
the crea t ion i n man of t ha t v i s i o n o f God as love , tfiich alone 
can c a l l f o r t h the response of love i n a growing creature. 
Man was man, and aware of and responsive to the supernatural, 
long before he was aware that that supernatural was a God of 
l o v e . 
I t i s begging the question to say tha t human existence 
was.disposed f o r the recept ion of t h i s g i f t of "being i n the 
love of God", which Brunner ca l l s "the l i f e o r i g i n a l l y given 
to man", and then to assert tha t tha t d i spos i t i on would mean 
tha t men would immediately respond to being loved by God by 
l o v i n g Him back. Human existence may be sa id to be disposed by 
God f a r the reception of the g i f t of "being i n His love" , but 
such d i s p o s i t i o n i s not incompatible w i t h an i n i t i a l i n a b i l i t y 
to respond. I t i s not neoessarily i d e n t i c a l with a b i l i t y at 
f i r s t . Human existence i s disposed to receive the g i f t by 
being disposed by God f o r growth up to that point of, s p i r i t u a l 
awareness when He can reveal His t rue nature. Only a f t e r such 
reve la t ion i s a r ece iv ing of the g i f t possible i n the sense of 
a response of l o v e . A c h i l d i s disposed f o r the recept ion of 
the g i f t o f "being i n the love of i t s fa ther" long before i t 
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responds with love to t i n t love . 
Bruhner, as we nave seen, deprecates the p i t i a b l e comedy 
which i s enacted whenever theology would claim tha t a higher 
more per fec t human existence o f the f i r s t generaticm,ejxisted i n 
a sphere not accessible to reason, as i t r e t i r e s before the 
re len t less onward march of s c i e n t i f i c discovery. He says i t 
should be anandoned. He also deprecates, however, the surrender 
o f the idea that man was created o r i g i n a l l y good, i n the 
in t e res t s of r econc i l ing theology with science. He r e f e r s as 
we have seen to the i d e a l i s t i c evolutionism of the 19th century 
which replaced the orthodox Chr i s t i an doctrine because the 
h i s t o r i c a l form of t h a t doctrine had become impossible. Such a , 
mod i f i ca t ion of theology to meet the pressure of knowledge he 
r e j e c t s , and retains the orthodox doctrine of man created 
o r i g i n a l l y r ighteous. 
Brunner thus holds together the idea of man's development 
from embryonic humam condi t ions , tnOaich, he says, ought to cause 
no alarm, and the idea of man being created o r i g i n a l l y 
r ighteous. He seems to seek t o safeguard himself against a 
t o t a l surrender to the impl ica t ions of the doctr ine of 
development by leaning too heavi ly on the idea that new forms of 
l i f e are not completely explained by reference t o t h e i r 
p r imi t ive , o r i g i n s . To admit development does not exclude the 
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f a c t that forms of l i f e are absolutely sew th ings , not 
e n t i r e l y depended; on t h e i r predecessors. I t i s by the se 
p r i n c i p l e s of novelty and independence t h a t Bxunner would 
appear to defend his p o s i t i o n concerning o r i g i n a l righteousness. 
The gap between o r i g i n a l righteousness and preceding 
animal self-centredness cannot, however, be adequately bridged 
merely by thus r e f e r r i n g . t o the Imposs ib i l i t y of explaining new 
appearances sole ly i n terms of antecedents. The f a c t tha t 
one accepts the p r inc ip l e o f development and also r e j e c t s the 
n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y does not keep open the gate fo r the 
doctrine o f o r i g i n a l righteousness. For the new t h i n g which 
appears i n the oase of God's c rea t ion of man, which cannot be 
explained gene t i ca l ly , i s not o r i g i n a l righteousness, but the 
consciousness of the supernatural . The sense , of the numinous 
was the great new t h i n g , which, because i t was subject to the 
law o f development d i d not begin at an advanced stage, but at 
a l o w l y stage. 
What we r e a l l y have to face here i s the question: of the 
content of man's f i r s t apprehension of the supernatural. I t 
i s i r r e l e v a n t t o speak of man being created with a w i l l already 
disposed to obey God i f the question i s not f i r s t faced and 
answered, what k ind of God was i t t ha t man f i r s t conceived he 
had to obey? What was the content of h is f i r s t v i s i o n o f 
the supernatural? Visions d i f f e r , and wi th them, the motives 
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f o r obedlenoe. Obedience can spr ing f rom l o v e , but i t can also 
spr ing f rom f e a r , greed, i nd i f f e rence . 
I f we grant the f a c t o f development from embryonic human 
condi t ions, so f a r as mental and physical l i f e are concerned, i s 
there any sound reason f o r denying such development i n the case 
of r e l i g ious l i f e ? I f not, i s there any sound reason f o r 
supposing that the f i r s t stages of man's r e l ig ious awareness 
should involve a v i s i o n o f a supernatural person whose nature 
was lore? 
Brunner and tiiose who th ink l i k e him seem to make t h i s 
supposit ion. They take advantage o f the idea of new appearances 
i n the evolutionary scheme, and of t h e i r independence of 
preceding condit ions, to launch man's r e l ig ious l i f e in to being 
at an already advanoed stage. The r e a l l y v i t a l point i s ra i sed , 
however, when we ask "Can we r e a l l y say that man f i r s t conceived 
of God as a lov ing Heavenly Father?" Only such a v i s i o n could 
draw out a response of l o v e . I f , created w i t h such a v i s i o n , 
nan began to responding t o i t w i th love , then, indeed, he might 
be said to have been created o r i g i n a l l y r ighteous . Against 
such an idea of man's beginning, however, we have to place the 
s to ry , too w e l l known to need r e p e t i t i o n i n d e t a i l , of man 
a r r i v i n g a t t h a t apprehension of God, and g i v i n g to Him that 
kind of obedient lov ing response only a f t e r long ages of slow 
groping towards i t . 
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We would here contend, t he re fo re , tha t i n view of Brunner's 
surrender of the idea of any area of l i f e being sacrosanct so 
f a r as s c i e n t i f i c researoh is concerned, and i n view of h i s 
acceptance of the idea o f development, he i s g u i l t y of a gross 
inconsistency i n c l i ng ing to the idea of o r ig ina l righteousness. 
He i s g u i l t y o f reading back i n t o man's o r i g i n a l cond i t ion a 
v i s i o n and an obedience to i t , which only characterised man's 
l i f e at a l a t e r stage,. "Why should not t ha t which i n p r inc ip l e i s 
new appear only gradually by degrees?" Why not , indeed? I t 
i s p rec ise ly because the v i s i o n of God only appeared gradual ly , 
by degrees, that man was unable at f i r s t to render the l o v i n g 
obedience t o God which can only be ca l l ed out by a v i s i on of God 
as love . 
Why God should not have granted man such a v i s i on at the 
beginning i s another quest ion. That He would do so because He 
is love i s assumed by many. Does not Brunner assume tha t God 
created man o r i g i n a l l y righteous because, to him, any other 
assumption would appear to be inconsistent w i t h the idea of 
Divine Love? And i s tha t inconsistency conceived to be so 
p l a i n , t ha t i t is assumed there i s no need to discuss i t or 
even s ta te i t ? . At t h i s point we can take up our contention 
that i t was prec i se ly because God i s love ttiat He did no t , could 
not , create man o r i g i n a l l y r ighteous. 
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3. How can we reconci le o r i g i n a l self-centredness w i t h 
the idea o f a God of Love? 
How can we say tha t i t was a moral o b l i g a t i o n incumbent 
upon God to create a being who should desire and be able t o 
love and worship Him, by creating him at the outset with a 
nature very l a r g e l y of animal se l f -cen t re dns ss? That i s our 
central question. 
I t was consistent wi th love for God to create i n a 
creature an awareness of a supernatural world, wi thout consulting 
the creature 's wishes i n the matter . No transgression of the 
bounds of mora l i t y , no v i o l a t i o n of personal i ty , however 
p r i m i t i v e that personal i ty , would be involved i n such a 
r eve l a t i on . I t would s t i l l be l e f t to the creature 's own choice 
to respond l a t e r by love or self ishness . 
But i t would not be consistent wi th love f o r God to order 
the creature 's response without reference to i t s own wishes. 
This would happen i f God dealt wi th the o r i g i n a l se l f -cen t red 
d i spos i t i on of the creature t o whom He revealed Himself, by any 
other means than that of Love. I t would not be love i f God 
changed the creature 's d i s p o s i t i o n from self-centredness to any 
degree whatsoever of God-centredness, without consul t ing i t . 
The doctrine o f o r i g i n a l righteousness implies tha t God did 
prec i se ly so change His creature 's d i spos i t i on . The oreature 
did not choose to be r ighteous . God did not seek i t s w i l l i n g 
response. He made i t r ighteous, whether i t desired or no t . 
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He d i d not wait on His creature's wishes. By an. act of sheer . 
power, self-centredness was changed i n t o a degree of God-
oentredness. Along w i t h God-consciousness came, a g iven degree 
of God-centredness. 
This p r e c i p i t a t i o n of righteousness would be a violence 
to moral nature, fo r choice, consul ta t ion, agreement, are the 
ineradicable elements of mora l i ty and love. Or ig ina l 
righteousness would be a r t i f i c i a l l y induced righteousness, and 
there i s no such righteousness i n Godfs s i g h t . No such immoral 
tour de f a rce can be conceived as being perpetrated by a God of 
Lore. 
I t i s an axiom of mora l i ty tha t lore must be consciously, 
f r e e l y , g ladly g iven , tha t true righteousness must spring from 
lov ing obedienoe to the law. Love, to be r e a l , must be the 
f r ee choice of l o v e , and a choice i s a choice between 
a l t e rna t ives . There had to be an a l t e rna t ive to l o v i n g God, f o r 
the creature whom God w i l l e d should love Him. God had to create 
that a l t e rna t ive to Himself, since i t had to be there i n the 
beginning, and since i t bad to be an a l t e r n a t i v e object of l ove , 
i t would have to be created from the beginning by God with the 
power t o a t t r a c t man away from God. 
God could not create another ' d e i t y ' , separate f rom 
Himself and man, f o r t h a t would mean, i f the second ' d e i t y ' were 
oreated as good as God, i t would not be ant : n a l t e r n a t i v e . I f 
i t were created less good so that i t would w i & to draw men to 
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I t s e l f away f rom God, then i t would he e v i l ; since nothing 
good could desire t h a t men should t u r n f r o m God to i t , and so 
God would be the creator of something e v i l , whioh i s impossible. 
There had to be an a l t e rna t ive to God, other than a second 
d e i t y separate f rom man. That the creature should be able to 
love I t s e l f , seems to be the only law by which God could secure 
the existence of a l a w f u l a l t e rna t ive to Himself, and that t h i s 
might be possible God had to create His creature man w i t h some 
degree of self-oentredness. Thus f a r even the staunch est 
upholders of o r i g i n a l righteousness would go. They would a l l 
agree tha t there must have been some degree of self-adherence i n 
the f i r s t man i n order to make possible t h a t rea l choice by 
which the moral worth of love 's response i s determined. Here, 
however, i s the great quest ion. What degree o f self-adherence 
was necessary i n the beginning i n order to make possible t h a t 
choice upon which the moral q u a l i t y of love would depend? 
I t i s obvious t ha t the smaller the degree o f self-adherenoe 
i n the beginning, the greater the degree of God-adherenoe; 
the less the r i se o f choosing self:, the greater the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of choosing God. We have already seen that a complete lack of 
self-adherence i n the beginning would mean the complete moral 
worthlessness of the response t o God. By how much, i t seems, 
you increase the i n i t i a l degree of self-adherence, by so much 
you increase the moral worth of the response to God, whereas, by 
how much you increase the i n i t i a l degree of God-adherence, 
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by so much you decrease the moral worth of t h a t response* 
This somewhat mathematical way of f i g u r i n g moral f a c t s may 
seem a r t i f i c i a l and misleading, but we know what i s s i g n i f i e d , 
and can we speak i n anymore appropriate or relevant manner 
which does not lead to the same end? 
I t may be answered to t h i s pa r t i cu la r way of arguing, i f 
the moral worth of the creature 's f i r s t response to God i s 
determined by the large i n i t i a l degree of self-adherence, and 
the small i n i t i a l degree of God-adherence, does i t not mean tha t 
the greatest worth of the response w i l l be secured by a t o t a l 
i n i t i a l s el f -adher en ce and by a t o t a l lack of God-adherence? 
I s not t h i s the end t o which we are driven by sheer log ic? 
I t may be r e p l i e d t h a t i f i t i s , then i t i s at leas t i n l i n e 
wi th what the s c i e n t i f i c theory of e-volution suggests, namely, 
tha t the fur ther back we go along the l i ne of ancestry, the 
poorer i n q u a l i t y becomes the general moral response, receding 
fu r the r and f u r t h e r f r o m the highest qua l i ty of t rue love, t i l l 
i t reaches the stage of t h i n l y disguised self-centredness. 
To t h i s i t may i n t u r n be rep l i ed tha t i f a completely 
se l f -cent red organism i s the l o g i c a l l y moral ly necessary prelude 
t o the c rea t ion of responsive love, how can any response of love 
to God proceed from what i s , a t f i r s t , devoid of any God-
adherence whatsoever? A completely se l f -cen t red creature 
would be incapable,of any love at a l l : i t could not even begin 
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to . l ove . Have we extinguished moral i ty by logic J? 
How can supernatural love reveal i t s e l f to a creature 
o r i g i n a l l y disposed to please only i t s e l f ? I s there any ground on 
vhich God can work, any po in t of contact, any bridge, as i t were, 
over which He can pass to make His love known? We believe that 
even God could not reveal Himself as Love to a creature who had 
had no experience of l ove . Love f rom above , f rom the super-
n a t u r a l , could not be understood or responded to by man i f there 
was not , f i r s t , love f rom below, f rom the na tu ra l , f rom man. We 
believe t ha t God prepared fo r the r eve l a t i on of Himself as Divine 
Love, by g i v i n g to man f i r s t the experience of human l o v e . Love 
had to be known and experienced by man f i r s t , as between male and 
female, parent and c h i l d , e t c . , before God could hope to 
succeed i n any appeal to man to obey Him f o r l o \ e ' s sake. Man., 
we may say, i s led by God through the experience of ear th ly l ove , 
tha t he may be enabled to see and understand the beginning of the 
t r u t h about God's nature. 
This p r i o r i t y i n time o f the human exper fence of ear th ly 
love does not i n any way diminish the importance of God's 
r eve l a t i on , f o r e a r t h l y love i s i t s e l f the d i v i n e l y prepared 
vehicle wherein God has prepared the p o s s i b i l i t y of the l i g h t n i n g 
f l a s h of His r eve la t ion of His character. 
How prec ise ly animal lus t ac tua l ly passed into human care 
and a f f e c t i o n and love cannot be explained. We can only c a l l 
i t a mirac le , an instance of God's eternal c rea t ive a c t i v i t y . 
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I 
He made man i n such, a way that i t could happen, and when i t 
happened i t was f a r more God's accomplishment than man's, i n the 
sense tha t man but real ised what had been arranged as a 
p o s s i b i l i t y by God i n the beginning. 
There are no grounds, however, for be l iev ing t h a t when love 
f i r s t appeared, i t appeared immediately at i t s highest or even 
at a high l e v e l amongst men, tha t human nature was at t ha t moment 
miraculously recons t i tu ted so that man became henceforth f a r 
more disposed to love than to be s e l f i s h . Love, we believe, i n 
accordance w i t h the laws of an. evolving universe, was born i n 
lowly fash ion , having to struggle against the entrenched s e l f -
centredness of mi l l i ons of years, and the burden of proof i s upon 
those who believe otherwise. 
Man was not f i r s t awakened to a sense of the supernatural , 
i i • 
however, by. h is experience of ear th ly love . That experience 
provided him wi th the moral content wi th which to f i l l out his 
idea of the supernatural, but t h a t idea i t s e l f f lashed i n Upon 
him through the medium of the impact of the wor ld of sub-human 
nature. I t was i n the context of t h a t impingement of Nature 
upon the creature 's soul tha t there was brought to b i r t h the 
sense o f the supernatural . Again, i t was God's accomplishment 
rather than man's i n the sense tha t man responded to Nature i n 
a way which had been made possible by God f o r him i n the 
beginning. 
There were thus two channels through waich God's 
204 
reve la t ion was made t o man. There was the world of sub-human 
nature, and the world of human re l a t ionsh ips . The f i r s t was 
mainly the medium through which God awakened man 's sense o f the 
supernatural: the second was mainly the medium -through which He 
gradually enabled him to f i l l h i s idea, of the supernatural with 
a moral content. 
Since we believe that man's f i r s t conception of the super-
natural was determined by the nature of h is r e l a t ionsh ip with 
sub-human and human nature, we have to ask what was the qual i ty 
of t ha t r e l a t ionsh ip when man f i r s t became aware of the 
supernatural? Sinoe t h a t moment i s obsoured by the t h i c k mist 
of prehis tory we have to resor t to a probable hypothesis. I t 
i s that man's response to the whole of l i f e , to his fel lows.and 
to sub-human nature a l i k e , would be, a t f i r s t , scarcely 
dis t inguishable f rom that of the beasts f rom which he had 
energed. I t would be, i n other words, at f i r s t , almost whol ly 
and i n s t i n c t i v e l y a se l f - cen t red response, v i z . to get pleasure 
and to avoid h u r t . 
This being the probable qual i ty of man's f i r s t response to 
the n a t u r a l , we assume t h a t his f i r s t response to the super-
natural would be on the same i n s t i n c t i v e and se l f -cent red l e v e l . 
i 
We can see no reason f o r be l iev ing tha t the advent of anything so 
vague and disquie t ing a s the sense of the numinous would 
immediately e l i c i t a response of love from a creature who had 
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had no experience o f l o v e , or awaken i n h im a r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t 
i t was h i s duty t o make t h a t response. 
Obedience a t f i r s t , t h e n , would be s e l f - c e n t r e d , concerned 
c h i e f l y w i t h g e t t i n g p leasure and a v o i d i n g h u r t . Na tu re ' s 
a b i l i t y t o g i v e both pleasure and h u r t would be i d e n t i f i e d a t 
f i r s t w i t h the a b i l i t y and i n t e n t i o n o f the s u p e r n a t u r a l . The 
idea of the superna tu ra l would change i n accordance w i t h the 
slow m o r a l i s a H o n of human r e l a t i o n s h i p s . God a t f i r s t would 
be made " i n the image o f man". Such anthropomorphism, i s not 
deroga tory to r e l i g i o n . I t was man's response to the r e v e l a t i o n 
t h a t God i s at l e a s t l i k e the best i n man. Obedience to the 
superna tura l would be co r r e spond ing ly mora l i sed . The demand f o r 
i t would c l a s h w i t h the bas ic s e l f - cen t r edness and the r e n d e r i n g 
of i t would be of. g rea te r moral relue than the f i r s t s e l f - c e n t r e d 
obedience. S e l f - d i s c i p l i n e , s e l f - s a c r i f i c e would become 
i n c r e a s i n g l y poss ib le and so would e v i l . 
This prooess of understanding God th rough f i r s t unders tanding 
h imse l f was on ly an i n i t i a l stage f o r man. As soon as man 
p e r c e i v e d , under God, t h a t God was Love , then he began t o 
understand what love r e a l l y was, f o r love was seen no longe r 
merely i n the l i g h t o f human r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but i n the l i g h t o f 
God's dea l ings w i t h n a t i o n s and i n d i v i d u a l s , i n c r e a t i o n , i n 
providence, i n f o r g i v e n e s s . I f , f o r man, love had been f o r a 
sho r t t ime , under God, a schoolmaster t o l e a d men t o God, i t 
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now en te red the schoo l o f God's l o v e as t h a t was revealed i n the 
broad con tex t of w o r l d h i s t o r y . I n the l i g h t o f t h a t r e v e l a t i o n 
the i m p e r f e c t i o n s of human love were exposed, and man hencefor th 
could o n l y understand h imse l f a r i g h t by unders tanding God a r i g h t . 
Since God i s f u l l y revea led o n l y i n C h r i s t , on ly i n C h r i s t can 
man understand h i m s e l f p r o p e r l y . . 
I n a sense, t h e r e f o r e , man may be sa id to have been c rea ted I 
i n God's image o n l y when he f i r s t pe rce ived God was l o v e , and I 
obeyed Him f o r l o v e ' s sake , and no t when he was f i r s t c rea ted , or 
when he f i r s t sensed the supernatura l and obeyed i t s e l f - c e n t r e d l y . 
The idea of spec i a l c r e a t i o n could h o l d w i t h the idea t h a t man was 
crea ted immedia te ly i n God's Image, f o r i t saw crea ted 
immedia te ly a t the stage when he was ab l e t o respond w i t h l o v i n g 
obedience. The image of God:, l i k e t r u e freedom, and t r u e 
r ighteousness may be sa id t o have been bom l a t e , and to have 
increased o n l y as God l e d man s l o w l y a n i p a i n f u l l y out o f h i s 
i n i t i a l s e l f -oen t redness i n t o the l i f e of l o v e , the lo~ve of man, 
and t h e love of God, i n response t o the revealed knowledge of the 
l o v e o f God f o r man. 
We know t h a t l o v e can change s e l f - c e n t r e d n e s s i n t o i t s 
o p p o s i t e , but o n l y by way o f s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n , appea l , h e l p , 
encouragement., warning, punishment, s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . Love, 
however, always stops shor t a t the c i t a d e l of the be loved ' s w i l l . 
jFurther t h a n t h a t i t cannot g o . Accord ing to t he r e v e l a t i o n o f 
i 
207 
God i n tltie I n c a r n a t i o n , t h a t i s how He dea ls w i t h s e l f -
cent redness. I t i s how He b id s His c h i l d r e n deal w i t h i t now. 
There cannot be two ways open to l o v e to Changs s e l f - c e n t redness. 
We know t h i s one by eaperience and r e v e l a t i o n . Any other must 
be by s p e c u l a t i o n o n l y . I f the essence of t rue r ighteousness i s 
obedience, by f r e e c h o i c e , t hen , s ince the f i r s t man, i f he was 
made o r i g i n a l l y . r i g h t eous by God w i t h o u t be ing consul ted , would, 
not h i m s e l f have f r e e l y chosen to r e j e c t h i s previous s e l f -
centredness, h i s r igh teousness would not be t r u e r ighteousness . 
I t might be asked, I f God had i t i n His power then to make 
a c rea ture r i g h t e o u s , to change i t s d i s p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t 
c o n s u l t i n g i t , i . e . , not byway of the c r e a t u r e ' s IB sponse, but by 
way of His own d i v i n e f i a t , why does He not s t i l l so act? The 
mere accident of chronology," the mere d i f f e r e n c e between the f i r s t 
and succeeding members of a s e r i e s would s ca rce ly c o n s t i t u t e a 
reason f o r change i n the D i v i n e t a c t i c s . 
Moreover, i f i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t the reason f o r God's 
c r e a t i o n o f o r i g i n a l r ighteousness was to make i t easier f o r man 
to r e s i s t t e m p t a t i o n , t h e r e i s , i n the na tu re o f the case, no 
evidence a v a i l a b l e by which we may judge whether i n f a c t i t was 
so made easier f o r h i m . We o n l y know t h a t , i f God did make man 
o r i g i n a l l y r igh teous , i t had t h e same r e s u l t as i f man had not 
been so made. Man f a i l e d to r e s i s t t e m p t a t i o n . 
A g a i n , i f i t i s b e l i e v e d tha t o r i g i n a l r ighteousness was 
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c r e a t i v e love T s device f a r making i t easier f o r the c rea ture to 
r e s i s t t e m p t a t i o n , i t has to be acknowledged tha t i t might indeed 
have had t h a t r e s u l t , hut i t would also have made i t eas ier f o r 
God t o e l i c i t a response of love f r o m His c r e a t u r e . I t would 
not he as d i f f i c u l t f o r God to persuade a creature to he 
r i g h t e o u s , who had a w i l l a l ready disposed to obey Him, as i t 
would he t o persuade one whose w i l l was s t i l l w h o l l y disposed t o 
please s e l f r a t h e r t h a n ano ther . I n c r e a t i n g man o r i g i n a l l y 
r igh teous God would not thus g ive t o man every poss ib le chance 
o f r e f u s i n g to obey Him, and t h i s n i s a moral o b l i g a t i o n even f o r 
God. Any obedience which man might render , t h e r e f o r e , by v i r t u e 
o f o r i g i n a l r ighteousness would be l e s s c o s t l y to h imse l f I n 
s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , and consequently l e s s precious t o God than an 
obedience won f r o m one l e s s disposed t o obey God and more disposed, 
to please se l f . . The doc t r i ne thus r e f l e c t s on the q u a l i t y of 
God's l o v e , on the r i s k He was prepared to t a k e i n seeking t o w i n 
t h a t love and obedience f r o m H i s c r e a t u r e which He d e s i r e d . 
O r i g i n a l r ighteousness means t h a t God weighted th<e moral sca les 
i n H i s own f a v o u r i n an inmoral f a s h i o n . 
There i s t h i s f u r t h e r general c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The whole 
l i n e o f development p r i o r to man's appearance m i l i t a t e s aga ins t 
the " l i k e l i h o o d o f o r i g i n a l r igh teousness" . I f God spent 
hundreds o f m i l l i o n s of years , a s we reckon t i m e , p repar ing the 
veh ic le f o r man's consciousness of Himse l f , would He, when a 
creature was a t l a s t touched by Him i n t o awareness of a 
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s u p e r n a t u r a l , war I d , rush His f ences , as i t were , and change, a t 
a s t r o k e , t h e d i s p o s i t i o n vhich had thus been so p a t i e n t l y 
evolved i n o rde r t h a t i t might be worked upon by His love? I f 
t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n was the s p e c i a l m a t e r i a l which He had been a t 
such pains t o prepare i n order to wre s t l e out of i t , b y ' l o v e , a 
response of l o v e , what reason could t h e r e be f o r an a c t which 
determined t h e d i s p o s i t i o n i n any degree without any such w r e s t l i n g 
o f love? 
We are o n l y t o&v w e l l aware of the danger of ana logies drawn 
f r o m phys i ca l processes to i l l u s t r a t e s p i r i t u a l t r u t h , but the 
process of c r e a t i o n p r i o r to man's appearance e n t i t l e s us to speak 
of God's p a t i e n c e . Are we abusing the analogy i f we suggest t h a t 
the c r e a t i o n of any r igh teousness by a mere f i a t , would represent 
an Impatience on God's p a r t ? 
I f i t i s m o r a l l y poss ib le f o r God to enter on ly i n t o a 
moral r e l a t i o n s h i p of love w i t h His c rea tu res whom He des i r e s 
should l o i e Him i n response, then He i s m o r a l l y c o n f i n e d t o one 
o n l y way o f d e a l i n g w i t h se l f -oen t redne ss . Here we must repeat 
what we have s a id once a l r e a d y . God must f i r s t of a l l seek t o 
make Himse l f known, f o r response depends on, and can o n l y f o l l o w , 
r e v e l a t i o n and v i s i o n . The w i l l and the desire must not be 
touched b e f o r e the consciousness i s i l l u m i n a t e d . Love o f God dan 
o n l y t r u l y oome a f t e r the v i s i o n or knowledge of God. 
-Righteousness can only f o l l o w upon i l l u m i n a t i o n . This i s not 
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to suggest t h a t we need on ly t o know God's character and purpose, 
i n o rder t o obey. We need His grace to he lp us do what we 
b e l i e v e i t i s His w i l l we should do, but enabl ing grace i s g iven 
a f t e r t he graoe of i l l u m i n a t i o n . 
The purpose o f i l l u m i n a t i o n or r e v e l a t i o n or v i s i o n i s t o 
change the d e s i r e , t h a t of e n a b l i n g grace t o s t rengthen the w i l l 
to r e a l i s e the d e s i r e so induc ed. 
Man's response must be a response to a v i s i o n . This i s 
v i t a l , i f love i s to be conceived as we know i t by r e v e l a t i o n 
and exper ience , so f a r a s i t s mora l i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e concerned; 
and i f man's v i s i o n of God was s u b j e c t to the same law of : g rowth 
as c h a r a c t e r i s e d the whole phys i ca l and mental prooess before him 
and i n h i m , then the v i s i o n which e l i c i t e d the des i r e f o r 
r ighteousness and love , as w e l l as t he power f r o m on higd which 
enabled him i n a degree to r e a l i s e h i s d e s i r e , these represent 
l a t e r stages i n man's p i l g r image and not h i s i n i t i a l s p i r i t u a l 
s t a t e . 
There i s one very simple c o n s i d e r a t i o n which makes the 
doc t r i ne of o r i g i n a l , r i g h t eousness suspect . I t i s so simple t h a t 
i t i s i t s e l f ap t t o be suspeot. We may asse r t as l o u d l y and as 
l e a r n e d l y as we l i k e t h a t God made nan o r i g i n a l l y r i g h t e o u s , i . e . 
o r i g i n a l l y more disposed to obey God than t o please s e l f , but the 
f a l l proves t h a t the w i l l t h a t f e l l was o r i g i n a l l y more disposed 
to please s e l f than to please God. I f i t was n o t , then i t could 
not have f a l l e n . 
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The Genesis s t o r y o f Adam i s consonant w i t h the account o f 
man's o r i g i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n as t h a t is suggested by the account o f 
h i s ascent f r o m the beas t s . The Genesis w r i t e r could o n l y 
conceive of Adam as a s p e c i a l c r e a t i o n , yet i n s p i t e o f t h i s , he 
was compelled t o r ep resen t Adam as doing what he could o n l y have 
done i f he had been o r i g i n a l l y more disposed to please s e l f than 
t o obey God. The B i b l e represen ts Adam as a s e l f - c e n t r e d 
c r e a t u r e : and such we b e l i e v e man was i n h i s beginning by God's 
des ign . 
4 . The bear ing o f t h e idea of o r i g i n a l s e l f - c e n t redness on 
(a) the f a l l , (b? o r i g i n a l s i n , ( c ) f reedom. (d)" the 
I n c a r n a t i o n , the" R e s u r r e c t i o n , the Atonement. 
(a) The F a l l * , 
What, t hen , o f the d o c t r i n e of the f a l l ? Obviously as t h i s 
d o c t r i n e has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y expounded, i t i s i ncons i s t en t w i t h 
any r e j e c t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of o r i g i n a l r ighteousness ant 
o r i g i n a l s i n . We cannot f i t i n the o ld doc t r i ne of the f a l l w i t h 
a d o c t r i n e of o r i g i n a l s e l f - c e n t redness. The f a c t t h a t every man 
was once Innocent of• moral wrong, t h a t once he s inned f o r the 
f i r s t t i m e , and soon discovered t h a t one s i n made the nex t e a s i e r , 
t h i s i s no t the d o c t r i n e of t h e f a l l o f the human r a c e ; f o r i t 
was not mere innocence t h a t was supposed to have vanished w i t h the 
f a l l . Innocence could have oo-^existed w i t h sheer animal s e l f -
centredness, a s we know i n the case of a c h i l d now. The f a l l 
was b e l i e v e d t o have a l t e r e d man ' s d i s p o s i t i o n to what i t i s now, 
and we have seen why we cannot b e l i e v e t h i s . 
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I f on moral grounds, we b e l i e v e t h a t God Himsel f orda ined 
t h a t each man shou ld b e g i n w i t h s e l f - c e n t redness as thee bulk of 
h i s o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n , t hen we may b e l i e v e , w i t h Temple and 
other e v o l u t i o n i s t s , t h a t the f i r s t encounter w i t h the demands 
of the moral and s p i r i t u a l l a w would almost , but not q u i t e , 
i n e v i t a b l y lead to t r a n s g r e s s i o n . S i n would be a p r o b a b i l i t y . 
I t would , i n f a c t , be " too probable not t o hap pen" • I t can 
never , however, be reckoned a s necessary or i n e v i t a b l e . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n i n -thought here may be a f i n e one, but i t i s 
necessary, as Temple h e l d , i n order t o safeguard God aga ins t a 
charge of be ing r e spons ib le f o r a c t u a l s i n . His r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
t h e '-'.v.-. h i g h degree of p r o b a b i l i t y of s i n i s p r e c i s e l y the mora l 
o b l i g a t i o n incumbent upon Div ine Love which we have n o t i c e d . 
Over against t h i s d i v i n e l y ordained p r o b a b i l i t y , however, we 
have to p lace t h e f a c t t h a t as soon as God l i t "the lamp o f the 
human consciousness of H i m s e l f , " He WETS, i n a c t i o n to d imin i sh the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of s i n . H i s a c t i o n i s what we c a l l grace . That God 
helps men t o f i g h t a g a i n s t t e m p t a t i o n r i g h t f r o m the beginning i s 
the b e l i e f which cancels any b e l i e f t h a t s i n i s i n any way 
necessary t o mail 's f i n a l p e r f e c t i o n . God would never be found 
f i g h t i n g against what was necessary. 
O r i g i n a l r ighteousness, t h e f a l l , o r i g i n a l s i n , these th ree 
ideas are a l l l i n k e d t o g e t h e r , and are based u l t i m a t e l y on a 
p a r t i c u l a r concept ion o f Divine Love. I t was because tha t love 
was conceived i n a s imple manner, as ( b e i n g concerned p r i m a r i l y t o 
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make t h i n g s easy f o r nan, t h a t man was conceived as having he en 
crea ted w i t h a nature and d i s p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t which 
was perce ived t o be t h e common l o t o f man. I t was because h i s 
o r i g i n a l nature was so conceived t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g u n i v e r s a l 
c o n d i t i o n was deemed to be the consequence of some p r i m a l d i s a s t e r . 
Once we analyse the o b l i g a t i o n f a c i n g Divine Love i n the 
work o f c r e a t i n g souls who should respond w i t h l o v e , we see tha t 
t h a t l ove has t o be conceived d i f f e r e n t l y frmm t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l 
i d e a . Once t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l idea of Love i s seen to be f a l s e , 
the o l d t r i n i t y of inter-dependent d o c t r i n e s i s seen to be no 
l onge r tenable i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m . 
I n s h o r t , once we peroeive t h a t God had to make men o r i g i n a l l y 
s e l f - c e n t r e d , and t h a t tiiat idea, I n c i d e n t a l l y , f i t s i n w i t h vfcat 
scienoe i n d i c a t e d as the probable c o n d i t i o n o f the f i r s t human 
b e i n g , then o r i g i n a l r ighteousness has to go and w i t h i t the idea 
o f a f a l l of such a m ture t h a t i t i n v o l v e d the whole of t he human 
race i n the consequence o f s e l f - c e n t redness or o r i g i n a l s i n . What 
we a r e f aced wi th i s not the t r a d i t i o n a l p i c t u r e of the f a l l , bu t 
the p i c t u r e o f each i n d i v i d u a l having to f i g h t , w i t h God's h e l p , 
aga ins t a d i s p o s i t i o n w i t h which God o r i g i n a l l y endowed h im, t h a t . 
d i s p o s i t i o n be ing the m o r a l l y necessary pre lude t o the emergence 
i n man o f t h e r e a l s e l f - s a c r i f i c e i n v o l v e d i n the moral ohoioe o f 
s e r v i n g God r a t h e r than s e l f . 
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(b) O r i g i n a l S i n . 
How does t h i s a t t i t u d e to o r i g i n a l r ighteousness a f f e o t our 
thought about o r i g i n a l s i n? 
T h i s l a t t e r d o c t r i n e was cons t ruc t ed to account f o r t h a t 
weight of s e l f - c e n t redness which makes obedience to God d i f f i c u l t 
and disobedience easy - the b i a s t o e v i l a s i t has been c a l l e d . 
We have seen how i t seemed Impossible to many to b e l i e v e t h a t a 
God o f love would make man o r i g i n a l l y l i k e t h a t . His o r i g i n a l 
d i s p o s i t i o n , i t was though t , must have been d i f f e r e n t . He must 
have been c r e a t e d o r i g i n a l l y r i g h t e o u s . 
That wh ich o r i g i n a l s i n Was conceived to stand f o r , i s thus 
seen to be i d e n t i c a l w i t h the very d i s p o s i t i o n vti ich we have 
declared to be o r i g i n a l l y God-created: I t was t h a t which God was 
m o r a l l y bound to g i v e man a t the beg inn ing : namely the tendency 
to please s e l f ra ther t h a n the other than s e l f . 
I n so f a r a s the c o n d i t i o n descr ibed as o r i g i n a l s i n has 
been t r a d i t i o n a l l y b e l i e v e d to represent a c o n d i t i o n not o r i g i n a l l y 
belonging t o man, bu t c l e a v i n g to him o n l y a s the r e s u l t of f i r s t 
s i n , we are under a c l e a r o b l i g a t i o n to cease f r o m us ing the 
phrase i n t h i s connec t i on . . I n saying t h i s , we do not cease t o be 
aware of the t e r r i b l e m o r a l l y weakening e f f e c t of s i n upon our 
n a t u r e , of the vas t sepa ra t ion f r o m God and man worked by s i n . 
The cumulat ive e f f e c t s o f s i n are t e r r i b l e r e a l i t i e s ; but these 
e f f e c t s work i n a na tu re which a t f i r s t was more prone to serve 
s e l f than God, when i t was met by God's demands for s e l f -
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s a c r i f i c e . 
Man's i n i t i a l proneness ro please s e l f , i n other words , would 
on ly be s i n i f i t was the r e s u l t o f s i n . Since i t was not t he 
r e s u l t of s i n (though i t can be i n t e n s i f i e d by s i n ) i t cannot be 
c a l l e d , o r i g i n a l s i n . The c o n d i t i o n remains w i t h u s , bu t i t ought 
to be renamed, not p r i m a r i l y because of what e v o l u t i o n i s t s may 
have to t e l l us o f the nature which man has i n h e r i t e d f r o m the 
b ru t e s , but p r i m a r i l y because i t i s seen t o have been determined 
by the very na ture of Div ine Love i n tiie beg inn ing . . Our bias 
t o s e l f i s not o r i g i n a l s i n , f o r i t i s an o r i g i n a l b i a s , and what 
i s o r i g i n a l i n man i s o f God. 
(o) Freedom. 
The ques t i on o f freedom must be d iscussed i n r e l a t i o n to the 
ques t ion "Why was i t m o r a l l y incumbent on God to create man 
o r i g i n a l l y s e l f - c e n t r e d , i . e . more disposed t o please © e l f than to 
please God?" 
We have to s t a t e our b e l i e f a t the outset t h a t the d o c t r i n e 
o f o r i g i n a l r igh teousness s e r i o u s l y compl ica tes the problem o f 
freedom. I f man was c rea ted out o f the beasts by God and endowed 
w i t h o r i g i n a l r i g h t ecus ness, i t means t h a t p r i o r to such c r e a t i o n 
e i t h e r the c r ea tu r e f rom which God evolved h im, was f r e e t o choose 
to become r i gh t eous or not, but t h a t God overrode i t s freedom by 
an a r b i t r a r y ac t , i n whidi case He abused t h a t f reedom, or the 
creature was not f r e e t o choose to become r i g h t e o u s , but God made 
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I t r i g h t e o u s independent ly o f any such f reedom, i n vfaich case God 
abused the v i r t u e o f r ighteousness by separating i t f r o m i t s moral 
ground, namely, f reedom. 
God c rea ted nan i n order t h a t he migh t respond w i t h love to 
H i s l o v e . As C h r i s t i a n s , we can o n l y speak of freedom i n 
r e l a t i o n to man's choosing to r ea l i s e t h i s purpose. The phrase 
"Whose s e r v i c e i s p e r f e c t freedom" expresses p e r f e c t l y the 
C h r i s t i a n concept ion of f reedom. I t i s freedom f rom whatever has 
the power to prevent us f r o m l o v i n g God p e r f e c t l y . What i s i t 
t h a t has such power? I t i s t h a t complex of s p i r i t u a l a l l e g i a n c e s 
which i s represen ted under the phrase "the w o r l d , the f l e s h and 
the d e v i l " . Whatever i s capable o f drawing man's l ove and l o y a l t y 
away f r o m God i s the cause of un- f reedom. 
I f i t was God's p lan t o c a l l men i n t o l o v e , i t means t h a t He 
w i l l e d to c a l l men i n t o l o v e of H i m s e l f , out o f what was* not love 
f o r Him. That I s , God's w i l l was t o draw men to Himse l f , f r o m 
someone e l s e . That i t was poss ib le f o r man to respond must be 
assumed. 
Freedom f o r man i s t o serve God. Unfreedom, t h e r e f o r e , i s t o 
serve someone e l s e . Man begins by l o v i n g s o l e l y h i m s e l f . Since . 
t h i s i s t h e l ove f r o m which he i s to be made f r e e i n o rde r t h a t he 
may f i n d the h ighes t f reedom i n l o v i n g God, he may be said to 
beg in by be ing bound, and to move onward and upward by God's grace 
i n t o the f reedom des t i ned by God f o r h i m . Man begins i n 
unfreedom - the unfreedom of s e l f l o v e - not i n f reedom. 
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Freedom, I t has "been said (by R0.S«Moxon and o t h e r s ) , i s gained 
and unfreedom i s l o s t , as man enters w i l l i n g l y i n t o the l i f e o f 
l o v i n g and s e r v i n g God. 
There are some who would r ep resen t the f i r s t s i n as man's 
f i r s t ao t o f emancipat ion - the f i r s t blow s t r u c k f o r freedom and 
independence aga ins t the t y r a n n y of e x t e r n a l law and a u t h o r i t y . 
I n one sense, s i n i s an express ion of f reedom- but o n l y o f the 
freedom which , Berdyaev says, e x i s t s p r i o r t o cho ice . This i s the 
basic non-moral freedom w i t h o u t which s i n and v i r t u e a l i k e would 
be i m p o s s i b l e . One may o a l l i t mechanical f reedom, i n con t r a s t 
w i t h the dynamic freedom o f the l i f e of s e l f - s u r r e n d e r to God. 
I t i s f reedom t o become.. I t i s not the f reedom of be ing somewhat. 
S t .Augus t ine c a l l e d t h i s mechanical f reedom, " i n i t i a l 
freedom" or " l i b e r t a s m i n o r " . And i t i s t h i s f reedom presumably 
to which Berdyaev r e f e r s when he speaks o f the freedom which i s 
grounded i n the v o i d , i n ttie abyss f rom which the. dark stream of 
l i f e i ssues f o r t h , fFreedonT, he says , " i s not c r ea t ed because i t i s 
no t p a r t o f na ture , i t i s p r i o r t o the world and has i t s o r i g i n i n 
the p r i m a l v o i d " . 
To use t h i s f reedom i n order to serve s e l f , i n s t e a d o f God, i s 
t o use mechanical freedom so as t o lose the poss ib le freedom o f 
God's s e r v i c e . 
I t i s t o use mechanical freedom i n order to serve . s e l f and so 
to become bound i n the unfreedom of s e l f - c o h t r e d n e s s . To a c t 
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l i k e t h i s t h e r e f o r e does not a s s e r t the higher k i n d of freedom 
( l ibe fc ta s m a j o r ) as belonging a l r eady to man. I t o n l y reveals 
the possession o f mechanical f reedom (the basic f reedom which i s 
p a r t of the e s s e n t i a l mechanics of the morel l i f e ) and the use of 
t h a t freedom to become bound i n the unfreedom o f the se rv ice o f 
s e l f . 
There i s , t h u s , something ambiguous and u l t i m a t e l y wrong i n 
o a l l i n g the f i r s t s i n , a blow s t ruck f o r f reedom, f o r w h i l e i t 
r evea l s t he f a c t of mechanical freedom i t o n l y gains freedom f rom 
God's s e r v i c e a t the cost o f being bound more secure ly i n t h e 
se rv ice o f s e l f and , i n exper ience, such freedom i s d iscovered to 
be no t w o r t h h a v i n g , to ber?. i n f a c t , the vory w o r s t k i n d o f bondage. 
We may say t h a t man i s f r e e ( i . e . m e c h a n i c a l l y ) , to be f r e e 
e i t h e r f r o m serv ing God or f r o m se rv ing s e l f . And t h i s means t h a t 
man begins a l ready i n one s e r v i c e , and i s f r e e t o remain i n tha t 
se rv ice or t o t r a n s f e r t o another s e r v i c e . He cannot be 
conceived as being i n i t i a l l y i n no s ta te of s e r v i c e or a l l e g i a n c e 
whatsoever. No crea ture about to become a moral c rea ture can 
be conceived as being f r e e to beg in to be i n se rv ice e i t h e r to God 
or to s e l f . I t i s freedom e i t h e r t o become other than he i s 
a l r eady , or t o remain what he i s a l r e a d y . I t i s never f reedom t o 
become e i t h e r of two t h i n g s , n e i t h e r of which he i s a t the 
moment i n the b e g i n n i n g . 
To w i n freedom f r o m s e l f i s God's purpose . I t can o n l y 
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be won i f one' i s a l r e a d y i n bondage to s e l f . Thus they are r i g h t 
who say t h a t man does not b e g i n i n freedom, but t h a t he wins h i s 
f reedom. Righteousness i s f reedom gained f r o m the s e r v i c e of 
s e l f , i n t h e s e r v i c e o f God. Henoe t r u e freedom i s best desc r ibed 
i n the words of the Ang l i can Catechism."A death u n t i s i n , and a new 
b i r t h unto r igh teousness . " 
O r i g i n a l r ighteousness i s thus seen to imro lve the idea t h a t 
a cons ide rab le degree of freedom f r o m the s e r v i c e o f s e l f 
( l i b e r t a s ma jo r ) has been gained wi thout the exe rc i se of i n i t i a l 
or mechanical freedom ( l i b e r t a s m i n o r ) . But i t was t h i s l a t t e r 
k i n d o f freedom w i t h tfiich God endowed man so as t o enable him 
m o r a l l y t o g a i n the h i g i e r f reedom. O r i g i n a l r ighteousness thus 
i n v o l v e s God i n a moral c o n t r a d i c t i o n . freedom i n b e i n g gained 
w i t h o u t any exe rc i se of f reedom-to-choose, c o n s t i t u t e s a 
v i o l a t i o n o f the (moral) purpose f o r which f reedom t o choose was 
made an i n t e g r a l p a r t of man's b e i n g . 
I b a t purpose could be se rved i n g i v i n g t o man, readymade* a 
measure o f t h a t dynamic f r e e d o m - i n - b e i n g , vh ich ought to have been 
gained by. the exerc i se of i n i t i a l freedom? I t means t h a t God took 
no heed o f t h a t which wa know, i n tiie depths o f our b e i n g , must be 
heeded by God i f m o r a l i t y i s to be r e a l and no sham. I t cannot be 
b e l i e v e d t h a t the fons e t o r i go of a l l m o r a l i t y would a c t t h u s . 
Such a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the meaning of f reedom, b r i e f though 
i t b e , o n l y serves to r e i t e r a t e the c o n v i c t i o n a l ready s t a t e d , 
namely, i t was a moral o b l l g a t i l n incumbent upon God to crea te man . 
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i n i t i a l l y w i t h the d i s p o s i t i o n f r o m v&ich He w i l l e d t o redeem him 
v i z . s e l f - cen t r edness . 
(d) The I n c a r n a t i o n , the Resu r r ec t i on , and the Atonement. 
We suggested a t the beginning of t h i s essay t h a t i t was the 
s igh t o f the f a r r each ing i m p l i c a t i o n s o f new knowledge about 
man's beginnings t h a t kept back many f rom the t a s k of seeking to 
r e c o n c i l e t h a t knowledge w i t h the ca rd ina l d o c t r i n e s o f our f a i t h . 
The purpose o f t h e essay has been t o r e l a t e such knowledge 
to the o l d doc t r i ne s of man's o r i g i n a l s t a t e , h i s f a l l , and the 
consequences. We have seen, however, t h a t those d o c t r i n e s would 
appear to need r e v i s i o n not o n l y , i n the l i g h t o f what we now know 
concerning man's o r i g i n , but a l s o , and, we b e l i e v e , c h i e f l y , i n 
the l i g h t o f a courageous r e -examina t ion of the moral o b l i g a t i o n 
incumbent upon D i v i n e Love i n the c r e a t i o n o f man. I t i s the 
na tu re o f Div ine Love t h a t r e a l l y determines the b e l i e f t h a t man 
was c rea ted o r i g i n a l l y s e l f - c e n t r e d , t h a t i s , o r i g i n a l l y disposed 
to please s e l f r a t h e r t han any o ther , and not -just a c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f h i s ascent f r o m the beas t s . 
We are not o b l i g e d to go on and t r e a t i n d e t a i l , t h e bear ing 
o f t h i s b e l i e f upon the c e n t r a l d o c t r i n e s of the I n c a r n a t i o n , the 
Resu r r ec t i on , and the Atonement. One or two obse rva t ions , 
however, may not be out o f f l a c e . 
The I n c a r n a t i o n and Atonement do not depend f o r t h e i r t r u t h 
upon t h e p a r t i c u l a r idea o f the p r e - f a l l s t a t e o f man. I t was 
the c o n d i t i o n of s i n , not any p r e - s i n c o n d i t i o n , which determined 
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God*s a c t i o n , and which i s therefore p i v o t a l f o r these doctr ines. 
T r a d i t i o n a l i s t s may i n s i s t tha t the Atonement deals wi th s in toy 
res to r ing a lost grace upon human nature. We may assert that i t 
deals w i t h s in by bestowing a new grace on man : but whether God 
restores a los t grace, or bestows a new one, i n C h r i s t , He. gives . 
i t , and tha t i s what i s e s sen t i a l l y true and fundamental i n the 
doctrine of the Atonement. 
So f a r as the doctr ine of the Resurreotion i s concerned i t 
may seem a t f i r s t sight t h a t the view out l ined herewoald a f f e c t 
tha t doctr ine adversely. That i s not the case. I f the a b i l i t y 
to overcome death was an o r i g i n a l endowment of man which was los t 
by s i n , then i t was restored i n Christ by v i r tue of His sinlessness. 
I f the a b i l i t y was not an o r i g i n a l endowment but one to be gained 
by v i c t o r y over s i n , then i t was bestowed i n Christ by v i r t u e of 
His v i c t o r y over i t . KhelSier God restored the a b i l i t y , or 
bestowed i t , i n Chr i s t , He did give i t i n His Son, and t h a t i s 
what i s e s sen t i a l ly t rue and fundamental i n the doctr ine o f the 
Resurrection. 
I t may be thought that whi le our view may not make s in e i ther 
inev i tab le or necessary, i t yet minimises the seriousness of s i n . 
Surely, i t might be argued, i t i s less serious to y i e l d to what, 
on our view, was God-ordained (a large degree of self -cent redne ss) 
than i t i s to y i e l d to what has always been held to be man-
created (a large degree of se l f -cen t redness). The answer i s , we 
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cannot argue tha t i t i s less serious t o y i e l d to what God created 
and ordained should be res i s ted (however small or great the degree) 
than i t i s to y i e l d to what God d id not create hut which i t i s 
equally His w i l l should be res i s ted . Whether God or man was 
responsible f o r the large degree of self-centredness i n man makes 
no d i f fe rence to the seriousness of y i e l d i n g to i t , f o r whatever 
i t s o r i g i n , God commands us to r e s i s t i t . The seriousness of s in 
consists i n i t s being a y i e ld ing to tha t which God commands us to 
r e s i s t . I t does not depend upon who was responsible f o r tha t to . 
the y i e l d i n g of which i s s i n . 
A l l e n , E. L . 
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